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Abstract 
 Both the historical person and the literary works of Thomas More are notoriously 
challenging to interpret, not the least because More himself so frequently hides his intentions 
and communicates in knowingly ironic and enigmatic ways. To suggest the peculiar 
complexities one encounters when reading More, I begin with an investigation of an anecdote 
which relates More’s quasi-legendary mode of communicating and work through the various 
ways one might seek to understand the anecdote itself and the meaning of More’s statement 
within it. Building on what is learned in this investigation, I turn to More’s most enigmatic 
communication of all, Utopia. When one opens Utopia one finds, before anything else, the 
provocative, perplexing persona of Raphael Hythlodaeus. I make the case that Hythlodaeus, 
not his island, is the central conundrum of Utopia and that understanding why More 
characterizes him so ambiguously is the best way to understand what More seeks to 
accomplish in Utopia. If More’s aim, as most assume, was to design an ideal commonwealth 
in the tradition of Plato, why did he complicate his work by telling most of it through the 
mouth of a man like Raphael Hythlodaeus and as if it were a true account? Why not follow 
Plato’s model, bringing into being an openly fictional commonwealth through a trustworthy 
narrator? If Hythlodaeus’ account of the island of Utopia is the main thing, then why does 
More keep calling the reader’s attention to Hythlodaeus himself?   
My argument is that sorting out why More created such a demanding narrator ends in 
an understanding of what More sought to achieve through Utopia, not so much what he 
meant by it. Most interpreters of More have refused to countenance the full significance of 
More’s characterization of his narrator and so have failed to recognize that More’s aesthetic 
decision to complicate his work in this way signals the definite context to which Utopia 
belongs: the renewal or revival of the study of ancient Greek language and culture in the 
northern countries, a movement which Erasmus and More were orchestrating at the time of 
Utopia’s publication in large part through their efforts to popularize the work of Lucian of 
Samosata. In 1506, More and Erasmus had published a set of translations of some of Lucian’s 
dialogues. In 1509, Erasmus published his Encomium Moriae, a work explicitly indebted to 
Lucian. In the 1510s, Erasmus nearly broke himself over his new edition of the Greek New 
Testament and his endless exertions to find audiences to appreciate this labor, a task which 
essentially involved finding readers of ancient Greek. Then, in 1516, More published his 
Utopia, which he meant not merely as another spur to the study of Greek, but as an attempt to 
mediate a poetic drawn from the works of Lucian and, through Lucian, since Lucian himself 
was a mediator of classical Greek culture to the Roman Empire, from the Greek tradition. In 
this tradition, in works like the Odyssey and Plato’s Protagoras and especially in the works of 
Lucian, one meets with numerous unreliable or even trickster narrators. The central claim of 
this study is that More meant his readers to see Raphael Hythlodaeus as in that tradition. The 
bulk of this study will focus on demonstrating what techniques and outlooks More took from 
Lucian and his tradition and how he adapted them to his own purposes in the Utopia and 
suggested ways for other humanists to do the same. I finally arrive at an understanding not so 
much of what More intended the Utopia to mean, for the final meaning of this work is 
intentionally inscrutable, but of what More must have wanted the Utopia to accomplish – to 
train his readers in a skeptical mode of intellectual inquiry that could counter many of the 
false and superstitious habits of thought that More thought were corrupting the church of his 
day.  
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Introduction: Thomas More’s Sense of Indirection  
 Johannes Ludovicus Praschius (1637-1690) records the following anecdote about 
Thomas More in his Facetiae, “in Anglia quidam malae notae e carcere profugerat. Thomas 
itaque Morus, vocato custodiae praefecto, serio imperavit ut diligenter obseraret carcerem ne 
rediret illuc, qui evaserat” (“In England, an especially wicked criminal had escaped from 
prison, and so Thomas More summoned the [prison] warden and in all seriousness ordered 
[him] to lock down the prison so that the man who had escaped not get back in there” (Riley 
3).1 Consider this story closely for a moment, for, although Riley claims that no other extant 
sources corroborate it, this sketch does effectively illustrate how Thomas More 
communicated with others (Riley 3). One would assume as context, based on the mention of 
a prison (“carcere”) and its warden (“praefecto”), that this incident occurred during More’s 
time as undersheriff of London, sometime between 1510-1518, for this is the time when More 
would have been most involved in the day-to-day of the criminal system of London (Guy 45). 
How is one to take hold of this story so as to make some sense of it? If one first identifies 
with the poor warden, one might hope that More is actually serious here. Best not to have 
such a monster back in our midst, one might reason. This interpretation, after all, would best 
please the warden since it would mitigate his responsibility for losing a prisoner. But even the 
thickest warden must soon realize his duty and the simple fact that the prison in London is 
precisely where such a monster belongs. Perhaps, then, this is just a joke, and that More is 
said to have issued this command “serio” because he made all his jokes in this manner: 
in the midst of his jokes he kept so grave a face, and even when all those around were 
laughing heartily, looked so solemn, that neither his wife nor any other member of the 
 
1 All translations from Latin and Greek are my own.  
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family could tell from his countenance whether he was speaking seriously or in jest, 
but had to judge from the subject-matter or the circumstances. (Stapleton 139)   
Judging from the “subject-matter or the circumstances,” though, More could not have meant 
his order to the warden merely as a joke for a joke’s sake, yet, if it was more than a joke, 
what did it mean? And why did More choose to complicate this matter with such a puzzling 
response? What did More seek to accomplish by communicating in this way? Thinking 
through More’s comment, though, and running up against questions like these will only make 
it more apparent that what is needed to understand More’s “order” to the warden is more 
context. Perhaps, then, since such an abundance of information about the times and the 
person of Thomas More is available, one might be able to recover a context in which More’s 
quip makes sense. One has already taken this step, after all, in assuming that this event took 
place during More’s time as undersheriff, and that supposition seems likely enough, after all. 
Surely additional historical and textual research would shine some light on this saying of 
More’s.    
When one begins researching, one learns early on that Thomas More both appreciated 
and practiced communication that was indirect and even misdirecting (Cox 304-306). In 
1516, for instance, More read the infamous Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum (Letters of 
Obscure Men). This work of German humanism mercilessly satirizes the preferred target of 
Northern humanism, the scholastics, for their foolishness, their uncouthness, and, above all, 
their deplorable Latinity, memorably called their “Küchenlatein” or “kitchen Latin” (Pfeiffer 
462). The meaning of the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum, though, is not patent to all, for the 
humanists who penned this work actually wrote not in propriis personis but took on the 
personas of scholastics and wrote letters back and forth to one another in the worst Latin their 
humanist brains could muster. Hence, these fake letters, sometimes written in the name of 
actual, living persons, deceived many of their readers. Thomas More, of course, was not 
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deceived. He understood that the laughs were directed not only at the Latinity of the 
scholastics but at nearly all of their practices. Thus, he wrote to Erasmus the following:  
Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum operae pretium est videre quantopere placent 
omnibus, et doctis ioco et indoctis serio, qui, dum ridemus, putant rideri stilum 
tantum; quem illi non defendunt, sed gravitate sententiarum dicunt compensatum et 
latere sub rudi vagina pulcherrimum gladium. Utinam fuisset inditus libello alius 
titulus! profecto intra centum annos homines studio stupidi non sensissent nasum 
quamquam rinocerotico longiorem. 
It is a pleasure to see how delighted everyone is with the Epistolae Obscurorum 
Virorum, the learned by their humor, the unlearned by their ‘significance.’ When we 
laugh, the uneducated think we are merely laughing at their style, which they do not 
defend, ‘but,’ they say, ‘[the style] is compensated for by the importance of the 
thoughts, and a stunning blade is hidden within a crude scabbard.’ Oh, if only another 
title had been given to this little book! Surely within a hundred years these fools 
would not have noticed the scorn heaped on them! (51)  
More delighted in this non-direct style of communication, then, but observe that in the last 
part of this quotation More expresses his opinion that the authors of the Epistolae 
Obscurorum Virorum had not gone far enough in concealing their joke on the scholastics 
because they had given the work a title that nearly gives the joke away. The adjective 
“Obscurorum” in the title is a pun that allows for several different meanings. Its primary 
sense may be that these men are “unknown” or “undistinguished,” but it also suggests that 
they are “obscure” in their writings or even “unintelligible.” Whatever meaning one assigns 
to this word, or even if one allows it a range of meanings, it certainly is pejorative. Hence 
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More’s wish that the authors should have given it a less revealing, less direct, title so that 
scholastic fools might go on being deceived for decades to come. 
 More also has his persona “Morus” in the Utopia advocate directly for a form of 
communication that he terms “ductus obliquus,” to be used when one is acting in an official 
capacity to convince princes and their ilk: “at neque insuetus et insolens sermo inculcandus, 
quem scias apud diversa persuasos pondus non habiturum, sed obliquo ductu conandum est, 
atque adnitendum tibi uti… omnia tractes commode” (“Nor should you use an unusual mode 
of speech that contradicts custom, for you know that it will have no weight with those 
persuaded of the opposite. Rather, you should try an indirect strategy, striving to manage all 
things agreeably.”) (96). Admittedly, the context for this statement is markedly different from 
the putative context we have established for the anecdote from Praschius. In this passage 
from the Utopia, the character is explaining how to advise kings and cardinals – “princes,” in 
the idiom of his time – whereas in the anecdote from Praschius More is certainly speaking to 
an inferior. This much can be determined by the fact that More summons the warden rather 
than the other way around. Nonetheless, Virginia Cox, in her learned discussion of “ductus 
obliquus” expands the range of this concept such that it readily applies to the present 
discussion. She reminds her readers, and this reminder is always needed, of “how self-
conscious rhetorically trained early modern readers were about the different relationships that 
can obtain between utterance and belief or conviction” (306). Steeped as they were in 
rhetoric, More and men trained like him conceived of all public interactions as contexts of 
persuasion. They were at every moment keenly aware that one of their best tools for fixing a 
point more effectively and memorably in the minds of their hearers was, as Cox suggests, to 
play with the differences “between utterance and conviction,” and so they often 
communicated with others, especially their social inferiors, in ways that ran counter to more 
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commonly coined speech. And what was true of other men was doubtless doubly true of 
Thomas More. 
Democritus’ Son  
 The persistent researcher will also learn that More closely connected his fondness for 
indirect communication with his self-adopted role as a new Democritus, and thus gave to the 
entirety of his public life a satiric and ultimately moral shape. Democritus, contemporary of 
Socrates, lived and studied philosophy in the Ionian settlement of Abdera, on the northern 
shore of the Aegean; he was renowned in antiquity for having systematized and developed 
the atomistic philosophy of his teacher Leucippus (Berryman; Cartledge 3). Thomas More 
neither likened himself nor allowed himself to be likened to this Democritus, however, 
because he helped to generate a formidable materialistic philosophy, but because Democritus 
was also known in antiquity as the “laughing philosopher,” especially as one who derided the 
irrational actions and habits of the people around him (Berryman). Thus Horace, while 
ridiculing the habits of Roman theatergoers for their vulgarity and longing for spectacle, says 
that, if Democritus were still around and in attendance at a Roman play, he would turn 
himself around and watch the folly of the crowd rather than the play itself since the crowd 
would present “nimio spectacula plura” (“far more sights worth seeing”) (ii.i.198). In On 
Sacrifices, Lucian recounts the Egyptian habits of beating their breasts after sacrificing a 
victim or shaving themselves bald out of respect for a dead god and exclaims that the 
ignorance betrayed by these sorts of actions wants a Democritus to laugh at it (170). And in 
Philosophies for Sale, Lucian has Democritus rebuke the high god Zeus himself for the 
laughable arrangements of human affairs. When Zeus asks the Abderan sage why he cannot 
seem to stop giggling, Democritus responds with his characteristic bluntness and insolence: 
“ἐρωτᾷς; ὅτι μοι γελοῖα πάντα δοκέει τὰ πρήγματα ὑμέων καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑμέες;” (“Do you really 
need to ask? Because all your affairs are laughable to me, as are you yourselves.”) (474). 
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Democritus, then, became the model of the wise man who not only notes the follies of 
humankind but who is willing to deride them openly.  
 Within More’s humanist circle, this understanding and celebration of Democritus as 
the laughing philosopher was often applied to Thomas More. In his introduction to the 
Encomium Moriae, Erasmus addresses a letter of dedication to Thomas More and there first 
(1509) dubs More a contemporary Democritus: “soleas huius generis iocis, hoc est, nec 
indoctis, ni fallor, nec usquequaque insulsis, impendio delectari, et omnino in communi 
mortalium vita Democritum quendam agere” (“You [More] are accustomed greatly to delight 
in jokes of this kind, that is, neither unlearned nor, unless I’m mistaken, wholly without wit 
and in the common life of mortals entirely to act the part of a Democritus”) (67). Around the 
time More was writing Utopia, his friend and fellow humanist Richard Pace published a 
curious book entitled De Fructu Qui Ex Doctrina Percipitur, which is translated by Frank 
Manley and Richard S. Sylvester as The Benefit of a Liberal Education. In this work, Pace 
offers a quirky sketch of More which is generally accepted to be accurate historically 
speaking, although the work in which it is contained is a decidedly “in” book that revels in 
the current gossip concerning the best known humanists (xvi). After stating that Thomas 
More most subscribes to “[philosophiae] Democriticae,” Democritean philosophy,” whatever 
that might mean, Pace goes on to elaborate on Democritus and his re-embodiment in Thomas 
More:       
de illo Democrito loquor, qui omnes res humanas risit, quem non modo diligentissime 
est imitatus, verum etiam una syllaba superavit. nam ut ille humana omnia ridenda, ita 
hic deridenda. unde Richardus Paceus, Morum amicissimum suum, Democriti filium, 
vel successorem, per iocum appellare solet.  
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I am speaking about that Democritus who laughed at all human affairs. [More] has not 
only imitated him most industriously but has even surpassed him by one syllable. For, 
just as he [Democritus] considered all things human to be risible, so he [More] 
considered them to be derisible. For this reason, Richard Pace often as a joke calls 
More, who is his dear friend, the son or successor of Democritus. (104) 
The play on words that Pace makes here, while clear enough in the Latin, “ridenda” and 
“deridenda,” is difficult to carry over into English. Manley and Sylvester render it as follows: 
“For just as Democritus thought that everything that pertains to man was ludicrous, More 
thought it was ridiculous” (105). How one should render this statement, though, is scarcely 
the point. The point is that, in the eyes of one of his contemporaries and friends, Thomas 
More was even fonder of laughing at human folly than was Democritus himself.  
 Pace then relates an anecdote to exemplify More’s Democritean persona and brings 
one closer to understanding why he might have chosen to toy with the prison warden as he 
did. In Pace’s story, More, still a boy (“adhuc puer”), listens to two Scottish theologians 
arguing that King Arthur once made a coat for himself out of the beards of giants he had 
killed (104). When More asks them how this was physically possible, the elder of the two 
responds that the skin of the dead is remarkably stretchy (104). The other Scot readily agrees. 
The boy More issues a cuttingly enigmatic response: “hoc… incognitum fuit, atque illud est 
notissimum, alterum ex vobis hircum mulgere, alterum cribrum subiicere” (“I didn’t know 
that, but this is well known – that one of you is milking a he-goat and the other is catching its 
milk with a sieve” (104-106).2 Since the Scottish dunces are unfamiliar with Lucian, who 
 
2 For the purposes of this study, it is essential to note that this quip is taken directly from Lucian’s Demonax, 28. 
As Manley and Sylvester note, in that passage the philosopher Demonax, who shares much in common with 
Democritus, sees two ignorant philosophers ignorantly debating and asking silly questions of one another and 
says to those standing about and listening, “Doesn’t it seem to you, friends, that one of these fellows is milking 
a he-goat and the other is holding a sieve for him!” (173). It is possible, of course, that Pace simply adapts this 
story of Lucian for his own purposes, creating this convenient fiction in order to illustrate the character of 
Thomas More and perhaps pleasing More in that he is drawing on one of More’s most beloved writers. More 
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relates this anecdote in his Demonax, and not accustomed to opposition from mere boys, they 
do not understand what More has just said to them (106). The way Pace rounds off this story 
should resonate with anyone seeking to make sense of More’s more enigmatic statements: 
“quod dictum quum perciperet illos non intellexisse, ridens sibi et eos deridens, abivit” 
(“After he said this and noted that they did not understand, he went away laughing to himself 
and mocking them.”) (106). There is every indication in the surviving sources that Thomas 
More enjoyed laughing at the folly of others and that his typical response to folly was folly, 
to suggest that the fool should be expected to understand only what is foolish. 
The Porter and the Lord Chancellor   
  Perhaps, then, this anecdote about the prison warden should be added to the 
biographical details of More’s life. After all, this event can be fitted neatly into More’s time 
as undersheriff (1510-1518) and certainly is in keeping with his character and his commonly 
assumed mode of communicating with others. But one would be wrong in this conclusion. It 
turns out that, if one had only begun by searching for a historical kernel for this anecdote 
rather than with the biographical reconstruction of More’s adopted modes of thought and 
communication, one would have made better progress from the start. For, in spite of Riley’s 
comment that historical sources for the anecdotes in Praschius’ Facetiae “are so far 
undiscovered,” More describes an event in his The Apology of Sir Thomas More, Knight that 
seems to be the basis for the anecdote that eventually found its way into Praschius’ book of 
jokes.  
Historically speaking, More’s own porter was the warden in the story, and the prison 
More’s own house. In 1531, George Constantine, “carrier” or trafficker in books of heresy, 
 
likely, though, this story is at least roughly accurate. Perhaps More himself told this story to Pace. If that is the 
case, it would mean that More’s familiarity with Lucian and thus Lucian’s shaping of his persona and project as 
an author began when he was still a boy.  
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was apprehended and then imprisoned in More’s home at Chelsea (Rex 106-107; Ackroyd 
304-305). Constantine was put into the stocks in More’s home, questioned by More himself 
and perhaps tortured or threatened with torture under the supervision of More, who was at 
this date the Lord Chancellor of England. Ackroyd relates the results More’s handling of 
Constantine succinctly: “Constantine talked” (304). Constantine disclosed to more not only 
“divers of his companions,” but he also revealed “the brethren’s” methods for secretly 
marking and shipping heretical books into England (Ackroyd 304-305). And then 
Constantine escaped, or, for Ackroyd, “was allowed to escape after providing such good 
service to the old faith” (305). However Constantine found his way out of the stocks, More 
later wrote a defense of his treatment of Constantine, in response to the “many marvelous 
lies” of the brethren against More, denying that he had tortured anyone or that Constantine’s 
escape had even made him angry:  
And some have said that when Constantine was gotten away, I was fallen for anger in 
a wonderful rage. But surely… when he was neither so feeble for lack of meat but that 
he was strong enough to break the stocks, nor waxen so lame of his legs with lying 
but that he was light enough to leap the walls, nor by any mishandling of his head so 
dulled or dazed in his brain but that he had wit enough when he was once out, wisely 
to walk his way – neither was I then so heavy for the loss but that I had youth enough 
left me to wear it out, nor so angry with any man of mine that I spoke them any evil 
word for the matter, more than to my porter that he should see the stocks mended and 
locked fast, that the prisoner steal not in again. And as for Constantine himself… 
never will I for my part be so unreasonable as to be angry with any man that riseth if 
he can, when he findeth himself that he sitteth not at his ease. (9, 119, 16; emphasis 
my own).  
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I have given this passage in full to exhibit how determinative is the historical context in 
which More issued his enigmatic statement to the porter. In this passage, More is 
unmistakably attempting with all his rhetorical skill to show himself as the sort of person who 
would never torture or otherwise mistreat prisoners. Note first how More stresses that 
Constantine must have been in a sound enough physical state to “break the stocks,” his legs 
strong enough to “leap the walls,” and his head clear enough “wisely to walk his way.” But 
even these “facts” do not suggest how generous was More’s treatment of the heretic must 
have been. The Lord Chancellor was able to bear the prisoner’s escape lightly, he insists, and 
yet at the same time he absolves himself from responsibility for the heretic’s escape by 
placing it on his porter, to whom he did not even speak an angry word “more than” to suggest 
that he rebuild the stocks and lock them so that the prisoner “steal not in again.” More even 
goes so far as to say that he is understanding of Constantine’s act. After all, he suggests, he 
could never be so unreasonable as to expect that someone held against his will would not flee 
at the first opportunity.  
 That this passage is the historical basis for Praschius’ anecdote can scarcely be 
doubted, so parallel do the stories show themselves when one substitutes the porter in for the 
warden, yet the historical context provided in More’s Apology entirely alters the meaning of 
this anecdote. One can clearly see now that More’s purpose in making this enigmatic 
statement was at least twofold. Given that the overarching purpose of this entire passage is to 
absolve More of any wrongdoing, it is first and foremost a subtle way of suggesting that the 
prisoner did not slip out on More himself. The blame for Constantine’s escape is decisively 
placed on the porter. Second, this anecdote is intended to show the reader that, far from being 
angry, More was sufficiently pacific and even cheerful enough to make a joke out of the 
prisoner’s escape. The subtle suggestion here is that Constantine, who had informed on his 
friends and given up so much useful information to the Lord Chancellor, was distasteful 
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enough that More would not want him around for longer than he had to have him (Marius 
213). Hence, the anecdote as it is told in More’s own writings is not so much an example of 
More playing Democritus, although such a coloring may be hinted at when More connects 
this joke to an “evil word.” Rather, it is a glimpse into the mutual revulsion both More and 
his porter must have shared for their heretic prisoner. When one combines these insights with 
the fact that this anecdote has to be moved, temporally speaking, from More’s time as 
undersheriff to his time as Lord Chancellor, one can readily see that this anecdote has 
morphed into something entirely other than what it originally seemed. 
On to Utopia  
I have thought through this anecdote and its possible contexts at such great length 
because all the deliberations and conclusions set forth above have peculiar bearing on how 
one should reach an understanding of Thomas More’s Utopia, the main object of this study. 
Unless one’s interpretation is to lack constraints, one should do with Utopia what I have done 
above with the anecdote about More and the prison warden as told in the Facetiae. One 
should begin by noting its salient characteristics and then locate reasonable historical contexts 
to account for those characteristics. One should then read back and forth between work and 
context until one has a sense of what More is trying to accomplish in his Utopia. This study 
seeks to be the most thorough examination of a historical context that is still largely neglected 
by interpreters of More: the writings of Lucian of Samosata and their role in More’s and 
Erasmus’ attempt to revive the learning of ancient Greek language and culture in northern 
Europe. This is a context that strikingly reorients one’s thinking and allows one to see the 
meaning of More’s literary techniques, particularly his way of creating his main character, 
Raphael Hythlodaeus, and then to grasp not so much what Utopia means as what it is 
supposed to do. For, just as the meaning of More’s statement to the warden is still ambiguous 
and open to further interpretation while the function of the anecdote as a whole is relatively 
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well-defined, so the final meaning of Utopia will always be open, although it will be possible 
to determine what More hoped to accomplish through the many ironies and obscurities and 
enigmas that make up Utopia. Before explicating the context in which More wrote, then, I 
should put a finger on what is most enigmatic in Utopia, what facet of More’s writing most 
calls for explanation, what stops and unsettles the reader regularly throughout the story. Once 
one has a sufficient grasp on this central conundrum, one will inevitably ask about its 
function and the historical context in which such a function makes sense.        
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Chapter 1: Raphael Hythlodaeus, the Man and His Monkey   
As he was about to set sail on his “quarto” (“fourth”) voyage with Vespucci,3 Raphael 
Hythlodaeus, the main speaker and character in Thomas More’s Utopia, tells his audience, 
“librorum sarcinam mediocrem loco mercium quarto navigaturus in navem conieci” (“rather 
than goods I might sell, I tossed on board an average-sized bag of books”). Hythlodaeus 
ended up giving all of these books away to the Utopians upon leaving their island, even 
though in the same sentence he tells us “mecum plane decreveram numquam… redire” (“I 
was completely decided never to return”) to Europe (180). One of the books he gave to the 
Utopians, however, “Theophrastum item de plantis” (“Theophrastus’s book On Plants”) was 
“pluribus... in locis mutilum” (“badly mutilated”) (180). Hythlodaeus’s explanation of this 
mutilation is surprising, and revealing: “in librum enim dum navigabamus negligentius 
habitum cercopithecus inciderat, qui lasciviens ac ludibundus paginas aliquot hinc atque inde 
evulsas laceravit” (“While we were sailing, a long-tailed monkey, who was frisky and wanted 
to play, attacked the [Theophrastus’] book, which I had rather carelessly put away, and 
mangled several of the pages it had ripped out here and there.”) (180). That More created this 
character to narrate his Utopia should always come as a surprise to the contemporary reader. 
So much of Hythlodaeus’s idiosyncrasy and eccentricity is related in this oddball anecdote 
involving a long-tailed monkey. First, there is his unreliability and his negligence: his 
statement that he was setting sail with Vespucci on his “fourth” voyage directly contradicts 
 
3 I have used the Latin text of Utopia prepared in 1995 by George M. Logan, Robert M. Adams, and Clarence 
H. Miller for Cambridge University Press rather than the text prepared in 1965 by Edward Surtz and J.H. 
Hexter, although the latter, as a part of the Yale Complete Works of St. Thomas More, is generally taken to be 
the more authoritative volume. I have done so largely because, while the text prepared by Logan et aliis is just 
as accurate as the Yale text, it is also much more readable and comprehensible; the editors themselves state that 
they have prepared their Latin text “aiming at ease of comprehension” (Logan xxxv). The older Yale text 
adheres more closely to the the original printed manuscripts of 1516-1518, and thus it contains antiquated 
spellings of words, no paragraphing of the Latin text, and, most importantly, confusing punctuation. The early 
manuscripts of More’s Utopia are marred by an indefensible overuse of punctuation. The editors of the 
Cambridge text tell of one printer’s “unnecessary and frequently obstructive colons” and “needless” spates of 
commas, for instance (xxxvi). The Yale edition, of course, goes a long way towards correcting this problem, but 
not to the point of reforming it altogether. In many passages, the Yale edition retains commas and even the 
cryptic colon of the early printers that obfuscate the text and cannot but confuse contemporary readers. 
 Verhine 19 
 
his earlier statement that he had accompanied Vespucci only on the last three of his four 
voyages (45). Moreover, Hythlodaeus’s stowing of his book “neglegentius” recalls for the 
vigilant reader the first time Morus caught sight of him in Antwerp and looked him carefully 
over (42).4 There, Morus notes that Hythlodaeus wore his cloak “neglectim ab humero 
dependente” (“carelessly hanging from his shoulder”) (42). Then comes Hythlodaeus’s oft 
marked scorn for all things commercial, “mercium,” which he accents when he makes sure 
his audience knows that he carried books with him specifically in place of wares he might sell 
on his travels, and his very accenting of this point reveals his incessant concern with 
controlling how his audience perceives him. There is also, with the mention of Theophrastus 
and then, later in the passage, when the Greek texts in his sack are catalogued, Hythlodaeus’s 
close association with the learning and the culture of the ancient Greeks.  
 Most striking, though, is the “cercopithecus.” Why should More include such an 
incongruous animal and his antics in a passage of the Utopia where the narrator is recounting 
how enthusiastically the blessed islanders took to Greek literature and the small canon of 
books Hythlodaeus gave them? More than one biographer has noted that Thomas More loved 
animals and had his own menagerie – “two dogs, rabbits, a fox, a ferret, a weasel, and an 
exotic collection of songbirds” – which included a pet monkey (Guy 63; Ackroyd 261; 
Marius 401). The family’s monkey may even be seen “scrambling up the skirt of More’s 
second wife, Alice” in the family picture Holbein painted (Hawhee 153). And, lest one 
wrongly assume, as I did, that More’s children must have talked him into the purchase of 
such an exotic animal, Erasmus himself explains that, whatever the rest of More’s family 
thought about their menagerie, it was Thomas More’s own fancy that motivated his collection 
(19). Erasmus even tells a story in one of his Colloquies about the Mores’ monkey and what 
 
4 Following a scholarly convention commonly used when writing about Utopia, I will refer to the historical 
person Thomas More, the author of Utopia, as More, and to the character of More within the Utopia as 
“Morus.”  
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Ackroyd terms its “primatial compassion” (262). He recounts how the family’s monkey, 
while convalescing from an injury, closely observed a weasel trying to force his way into the 
rabbit hutch and then, when it seemed the weasel would be successful, intervened to rescue 
the unwitting rabbits from death (707). Perhaps, therefore, since More seems to have 
appreciated monkeys and even, perhaps, to have passed on stories about their good qualities, 
the cercopithecus and its relation to Hythlodaeus is merely an amusing anecdote, maybe even 
one that subtly connects Hythlodaeus to the author More, if one assumes that the monkey 
belonged to Hythlodaeus.  
 Such a lighthearted reading of this passage, it should first be noted, does not mitigate 
its strangeness, nor does it evade the question of why More chose to complicate his story in 
this way. As Stephen Greenblatt has argued both in “Utopian Pleasure” and more extensively 
in The Swerve, More founded the island of Utopia at such a distance from contemporary 
Europe because he wanted its islanders to embody for the humanist reader a sense of ancient 
Greekness that was “at once compellingly vital and at the same time utterly weird” (37). 
Indeed, throughout the narrative of Utopia, both Hythlodaeus and the Utopian islanders are 
strongly associated with the ancient Greeks. When Hythlodaeus relates his brief anecdote 
about the cercopithecus, he does while telling of how readily the Utopians absorbed ancient 
Greek learning. Hythlodaeus supposes that the Utopians enjoy such facility in Greek because 
they are, ultimately, a Greek-speaking people:   
eas litteras ut equidem conicio ob id quoque facilius arripuerunt, quod non nihil illis 
essent cognatae. suspicor enim eam gentem a Graecis originem duxisse: propterea 
quod sermo illorum cetera fere Persicus, non nulla Graeci sermonis vestigia servet in 
urbium ac magistratuum vocabulis.  
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As I see it, they absorbed the [Greek] language so readily because it was somehow 
related to their own [language], for I suspect that they are a Greek people in origin, 
especially because their speech, which is Persian in most respects, preserves some 
traces of the Greek language in their terms for cities and magistrates. (180) 
Greenblatt also demonstrates that the Utopians are not merely native Greeks but are a 
specifically Epicurean people (37-39). Hence, the context in which one meets the 
cercopithecus and learns of his destructive ways is obviously trying to get at something 
specific about the Utopians themselves. Even if this anecdote about the cercopithecus bears 
little in the way of significance, then, it remains a conspicuously unnecessary interruption to 
the account that Hythlodaeus is setting out in this portion of Book II. It seems likely that 
More is up to something in this anecdote. 
The Meaning of a Monkey  
 Just what that is one may begin to see by taking seriously Guy’s note that “animals 
were regularly used for didactic or symbolic purposes in the Renaissance. They were 
allocated attributes which had a moral significance” (65). Guy himself suggests that the More 
household’s pet monkey was “symbolic of the need to avoid worldly temptations” (65). Here 
Guy is drawing on a story related in Roper about how More would exhort and instruct his 
family to resist temptation:  
Whosoever will mark the devil and his temptations shall find him therein 
much like to an ape. For like as an ape, not well looked unto, will be busy and 
bold to do shrewd turns, and contrariwise, being spied, will suddenly leap 
back and adventure no farther, so the devil, finding a man idle, slothful, and 
without resistance ready to receive his temptations, waxeth so hardy that he 
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will not fail still to continue with him, until to his purpose he have thoroughly 
brought him. (16) 
The resemblance between this passage and Hythlodaeus’s anecdote about the cercopithecus is 
striking. Note first how More’s description of the devil as “an ape, not well looked into” calls 
to mind Hythlodaeus’s statement that he had stored away his books carelessly (“librum… 
neglegentius habitum”) and the fact, implicit in the story of the long-tailed monkey, that 
Hythlodaeus was not looking after him when he tore into a defenseless Theophrastus (180). 
The style of language More uses in this account to describe the “ape” also recalls 
Hythlodaeus’s story. More’s description of the ape as “busy and bold to do shrewd turns” 
recalls Hythlodaeus’s description of his monkey “lasciviens ac ludibundus,” and the ways 
More describes the aggressive and fearful movements of this devil-ape suggests 
Hythlodaeus’s monkey jumping “here and there” (“hinc atque inde”) (180).   
  More than once in his writings More connects a “monkey” or an “ape” to the devil. 
When he is describing Tyndale’s hypocrisy, More maintains that although Tyndale begins his 
works with words of the utmost Christian propriety, he “bloweth and blustereth out at last his 
abominable blasphemy against the blessed sacraments of Christ, and like the devil's ape 
maketh mocks and mows at the holy ceremonies that the Spirit of God hath so many hundred 
years taught his holy Catholic Church” (8.76.25). Note, of course, that here the ape is not 
representative of the devil himself but is a sort of henchman or foolish subordinate. More 
develops this connection significantly later in the same work when he criticizes Tyndale for 
prying overmuch into the sacramental mysteries of the church:  
with his curious search [Tyndale] hath so narrowly so long pried upon them [the 
sacraments], with beetle brows and his brittle spectacles of pride and malice, that the 
devil hath stricken him stark blind and set him in a corner with a chain and a clog, and 
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made him his ape to sit there and serve him and to make him sport, with mocking and 
mowing and potting the sacraments, which yet the devil dreadeth himself and dare not 
come near them. (8.127.34)  
This passage is an entertaining example of just how well More can write English prose in 
paratactic style, but it also develops another nuance to the link in More’s mind between the 
devil and the ape, for here Tyndale, as the devil’s ape, is also bound by the devil and made to 
serve him as a sort of fool. The devil himself is not adventurous enough to approach the 
sacraments on his own, and thus he keeps a fool in Tyndale, through whose mocking he feels 
somewhat emboldened and perhaps even ennobled.  
 In other of his polemical works, More explicates the source of this apish, foolish 
assistance to the devil, human pride. In Apology of Sir Thomas More, Knight, More criticizes 
those who pridefully seek out human praise, calling them “some of the most foolish apes that 
the devil hath to tumble before him and to make him laugh, when he seeth them take so much 
labor and pain for the reward of the blast of a few men's mouths” (9.69.3). More again draws 
on this idea in A Dialogue Concerning Heresies when he is holding forth on the origin of 
heresy. Following Augustine, More contends that the “mother of all heresies” is “pride” 
since, he argues, heretics are so “frantic” for the “liking of the people” and “worship that 
people talketh of them” that they cannot resist opening their mouths and spreading their ideas 
(6.423.13). Hence, after they are burned by authorities they become “the devil's martyrs, 
taking much pain for his pleasure, and his very apes, whom he maketh to tumble through the 
hope of the holiness that putteth them to pain without fruit” (6.423.13). Thus, for More the 
concept of an ape or monkey when used to some literary end was a composite or aggregate 
that involved sin or Satan at its core with connections to idleness and sloth, foolishness, 
wrongheaded, heretical thinking, and pride. When the author More associates Hythlodaeus 
with an unattended long-tailed monkey that has run loose and torn apart the very embodiment 
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of reason, Theophrastus’s book, this association must at the least suggest that this longwinded 
narrator who believes he has the answers to most of humanity’s ills is himself the sometime 
plaything of what is absurd and destructive in human experience.      
        But the most suggestive hint as to what More the author is suggesting through the tale 
of the cercopithecus may be revealed in the term “cercopithecus” itself. More uses the word 
“cercopithecus” only once in his writings, here in this passage from Utopia. Elsewhere, when 
More needs a word for “monkey” or “ape,” and he does so more than a dozen times, he 
always uses the word “simius” or “simia,” depending on the animal’s gender. Moreover, it is 
this word, “simius,” which Erasmus uses in his dialogue Amicitia to denominate the More’s 
household pet, and this usage probably means that More himself would have called his own 
monkey a “simius.” This is not surprising. William McDermott has explained that after the 
time of the church fathers “simia [or simius] becomes the regular word in late authors for this 
animal” (155 n.42). The word “cercopithecus,” which means quite literally a “tailed 
monkey,” was a rare Greek term transliterated into Latin and used as a noun of the second 
declension, as More uses it in Utopia. It is likewise a rare term in Latin literature. The very 
rarity of this word indicates both that More selected it purposively and that the context in 
which he encountered it may have some bearing on the discussion at hand. More also likely 
used this term, of course, to introduce into his narrative a long-tailed monkey for the sake of 
its exoticism. Perhaps he imagined that this is just the sort of pet a sailor would have. He 
might have read in Pliny the Elder that these animals came from central Africa (8.30.72) or, 
less likely, in Strabo that they came from India (15.1.29). In either case, he would have 
associated a long-tailed monkey with exotic lands. This word, however, is so rarely used by 
Roman writers that it might even have stumped some of More’s learned humanist readers, 
and this fact suggests that the context in which More found this strange word might have 
bearing on its meaning in Utopia. 
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Where is it most likely that More met this strange word? Martial uses it three times, 
and Ackroyd notes that Martial was certainly on Erasmus’s list of poetic authorities (142). In 
J.P. Sullivan’s judgment, though, Martial seems not to have engaged More, especially in 
comparison with Greek epigrammatists (153). Moreover, even if More met the term 
“cercopithecus” in Martial’s writings, he would have seen that Martial does not elaborate or 
develop the meanings of this term but draws on preexisting connotations of it. As McDermott 
explains, Lucilius and Varro seem to have established that the general referent of this term, 
when it was referred to a human, was that of a “tricky and evil man” (153). Suetonius even 
refers to a person whose name was “Cercopithecum Panerotem,” or “Paneros the Ape Guy,” 
a money lender whom Nero enriched with both urban and rustic villas (30.2). McDermott 
thinks he was assigned this epithet “because of his evil character or his apelike appearance,” 
or maybe both (153). Perhaps, then, in associating Hythlodaeus with this animal and this 
term, More meant to suggest his narrator’s slipperiness and ambiguity by drawing on 
associations with monkeys in both the Christian and the classical tradition.  
The Superior of Ulysses  
 This supposition seems all the more likely when one considers another striking usage 
of the term “cercopithecus” in the Roman poet Juvenal. Juvenal’s “Satire 15” is a meditation 
on the unfamiliar and the foreign, both in human behavior and in storytelling. Juvenal begins 
his satire in the far off, exotic land of Egypt by ridiculing the Egyptians for their alien 
religious ideas and practices, like the fact that “nefas illic fetum iugulare capellae;/ carnibus 
humanis vesci licet” (“it is forbidden to slay the offspring of a she-goat, [but] permissible to 
eat human flesh” (12-13). Among the several customs Juvenal derides is the Egyptian 
practice of worshipping animals as gods. The poet notes that, although no one worships 
Diana, “the mistress of animals,” whole towns are devoted to the worship of cats, dogs, and 
river-fish (7-8; McKim 60). Before he laughs at these absurdities, though, Juvenal first laughs 
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at the “portenta” worshipped in Egypt (2). This important, multivalent term, “portenta,” may 
refer to “portents” and “omens,” “monsters” or “monstrous births,” or even to “extravagant 
fictions,” all of which are under consideration in the fifteenth satire.5 Strictly in the context of 
the opening lines of this satire, though, “portenta” is the term Juvenal uses for the “monsters” 
which Egyptians adore as gods, namely, crocodiles, ibises whose stomachs are full of snakes, 
and an “effigies sacri… aurea cercopitheci” (“a golden statue of a sacred long-tailed ape”) 
(4).  
 This shared use of the word “cercopithecus,” in itself does not amount to much, but, 
when one rereads Juvenal’s fifteenth satire with Utopia in mind, one finds a remarkable 
consonance of themes between the two works that may be more than accidental. As hinted at 
above, both works rely heavily upon the interest, even a disgusted interest, aroused by the 
foreign and the exotic. Juvenal creates this sense of foreignness not merely by detailing the 
strange practices of the Egyptians, but by presenting himself as a second Odysseus who is 
reporting on these religious practices and, at the center of the satire, a recent act of 
cannibalism, as if he himself had witnessed these events, which he may indeed have done 
(Kelting 422 n.6). What is of interest, though, is how the poet depicts the figure of Odysseus, 
for he does not depict him as the great hero-traveler of the Odyssey, but as a garrulous liar 
easily seen through, who deserved to be devoured by one of the monsters he invented for his 
fabulous narrative: 
tale super cenam facinus narraret Vlixes 
Alcinoo, bilem aut risum fortasse quibusdam 
mouerat ut mendax aretalogus. ‘in mare nemo 
 
5 More uses the term “portenta” in precisely the same sense that Juvenal uses it here when he has Morus remark 
that he and Peter Giles avoided asking Hythlodaeus whether he encountered any “monsters,” “portenta,” of the 
sort which Odysseus encountered on his travels, “Scyllas et Celaenos rapaces, et 
Laestrygonas populivoros,” (“Scyllas and voracious Harpies and people-eating Laestrygonians”) (48).    
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hunc abicit saeua dignum ueraque Charybdi, 
fingentem inmanis Laestrygonas et Cyclopas? 
nam citius Scyllam… crediderim… 
tam uacui capitis populum Phaeaca putauit?’ 
sic aliquis merito nondum ebrius… 
solus enim haec Ithacus nullo sub teste canebat.  
[When] Ulysses told of such a crime over dinner to Alcinous, he must have provoked 
frustration or perhaps laughter in certain listeners, as an obviously deceitful teller of 
tall tales. ‘No one threw this guy into the sea? He deserves a real Charybdis, in all her 
savagery, for making up the gruesome Laestrygonians and Cyclops. I’d sooner 
believe in Scylla herself [than to trust Odysseus]. Does he think the Phaeacean people 
so empty headed?’ In this way someone not yet drunk might have spoken, for the 
Ithacan was singing his deeds on his own authority, with no other witness. (14-26)   
Within the context of Juvenal’s satire, this rendering of Odysseus, or Ulysses, as he is known 
in the Roman tradition, unmistakably reflects the poet’s own anxieties that his listeners will 
not believe his account, for he immediately follows his depiction of Ulysses before the 
Phaeaceans singing his tale on his own authority with a turn to the strange tale he himself 
wants to relate: “nos miranda quidem sed nuper consule Iunco gesta super calidae referemus 
moenia Copti,/ nos uolgi scelus et cunctis grauiora coturnis” (“But I will relate astonishing 
acts done recently during the consulship of Iuncus, beyond the walls of hot Coptus, I [will 
relate] a mob’s crime and deeds gloomier than any tragedy”) (27-29). The fact, though, that 
he would depict Ulysses in this manner is noteworthy. Not a single Phaeacean raises the 
slightest doubt about the veracity of Odysseus’s tales in the Odyssey itself; rather, Odysseus’s 
account is met only with a spell-bound silence (13.1-2). Juvenal’s Ulysses, then, is a figure 
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from the literary tradition, one meditated on for so many centuries, even by the time of 
Juvenal, that his deeds have come to seem fantastic, his story unbelievable. 
 This version of Ulysses begins to loom large in significance for Utopia when one 
thinks about the similarities between him and the figure of Raphael Hythlodaeus. Just like 
Ulysses, Hythlodaeus has travelled to a foreign land and has seen wondrous things. Like 
Ulysses, Hythlodaeus has a marvelous story to tell. But, also like Ulysses, Hythlodaeus was 
the sole witness to what he saw, not because he is the only one to have survived his journey, 
presumably, but because he and his companions have long since parted ways. Moreover, 
within Utopia and its parerga Hythlodaeus is twice compared to Ulysses. Interestingly, both 
comparisons to Ulysses are made by Peter Giles, More’s friend in life and fellow character in 
the dialogue. In Giles’s letter to Jerome Busleyden, he says of the Portuguese traveler that he 
is “homo mea quidem sententia, regionum, hominum, et rerum experientia vel ipso Ulysse 
superior” (“a person, in my opinion, in his experience of places, peoples, and affairs of all 
sorts even the superior of Ulysses”) (24).6 In making this statement, he is likely following the 
lead of what his character says of Hythlodaeus within Utopia when he is commending the 
sailor to his friend Morus. In this part of the narrative, Morus has been observing “Petrus,” 
the fictional version of Giles, in conversation with Hythlodaeus and, since Hythlodaeus is as 
yet unknown to him, Morus has been studying the Lusitanian’s bearing and clothing quite 
closely. Morus has reached the conclusion that Hythlodaeus must be a “nauclerus,” a “ship’s 
captain” (42). Morus informs Petrus of his deduction when Petrus approaches to introduce 
Hythlodaeus, but Petrus quickly corrects him, “Atqui inquit aberrasti longissime: navigavit 
 
6 It is now commonly accepted that in interpreting More’s Utopia one must take into account the “parerga” or 
supplementary letters that participate in More’s fiction and that were appended to the first editions of Utopia, 
especially the letters from More to Giles and those between Giles and his correspondents. Particularly in the 
case of Giles, it is apparent that he was knowingly participating in the construction of More’s fiction. On this 
issue, see McCutcheon’s “More’s Utopia and Its Parerga (1516-1518)” and her more thorough “My Dear Peter.” 
See also Sylvester’s discussion of this matter in “Si Hythlodaeo Credimus: Vision and Revision in More’s 
Utopia,” pages 277-278.    
 Verhine 29 
 
quidem non ut Palinurus, sed ut Ulysses: immo velut Plato” (“‘And yet,’ he said, ‘you were 
far wrong, for he sailed not as a Palinurus but as a Ulysses; or, rather, like a Plato.’”) (42).  
Even without the additional context supplied by Juvenal’s satire, this description of 
Hythlodaeus is complex and freighted in its deliberate allusiveness, especially since this is the 
first time that Morus and the reader meet Hythlodaeus. What exactly is Petrus saying here, 
and what is More trying to relate through his remarkably oblique statement? Palinurus was 
Aeneas’s pilot, renowned for his skill in the craft of sailing, yet he was most renowned in the 
Roman tradition for falling asleep while at the helm of his ship and tumbling overboard into 
the sea to his death.7 Presumably, then, in saying that he sailed “non ut Palinurus,” Petrus is 
asserting both that he sailed with more in mind than mere sailing and its craft and that he did 
so wisely. Then why include this reference to Palinurus at all?  
Letting in the Ambiguity  
The best place to look for understanding a reference like this, that is, a denial, “non 
ut,” which affirms something positive about the person referred to, is to Elizabeth’s 
McCutcheon’s now canonical essay “Denying the Contrary: More’s Use of Litotes in the 
Utopia.” The assertion that Hythlodaeus sailed “not as a Palinurus” possesses the same 
logical structure and complication of meaning that all litotes possess, especially if one takes 
the term “Palinurus” to stand in for a negative like “not wisely” or “not inquisitively.” 
McCutcheon argues that More uses this rhetorical device of litotes to various effects, but one 
of the most common is to generate ambiguity in the reader’s mind concerning some facet of 
the text (116). She explains this by using a simple example of litotes, “not uncommon” (118). 
When the reader meets this adjectival construction in a sentence, she will perform a rather 
complicated feat to grasp its meaning. First, she must understand the logic of the structure, 
 
7 See Aeneid, V.833-861 and VI.337-383.  
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that a negative is being denied, which means that something is being affirmed. But then 
things get more complicated because to say “not uncommon” is not the same as saying 
“common.” The range of meaning here is broadened by the litotic structure, for, just as “not 
white” may logically refer to blue or brown or red as well as black, so “not uncommon” 
opens up a range of meanings broader than the simple adjective “common.” Thus, 
McCutcheon argues, with this figure More urges the reader to linger over the negative that is 
being denied and through that act to notice in a fully conscious way that, even when one 
grasps that a litotic structure is being employed, one is still somewhat in the dark precisely 
because that structure is intended to let in ambiguity (118). 
The realization that More must intend his ambiguity and that his readers recognize 
these ambiguities as inescapable, McCutcheon maintains, leads one to a much better 
understanding of how Thomas More wrote Utopia:  
In a larger sense we're never quite sure where we stand in the Utopia, either… On the 
smallest syntactical level ambiguity does exist of a sort which can never be altogether 
resolved, and probably was not meant to be. For this ambiguity vivifies the text, 
arouses its readers, and agitates its points, however casually they appear to be made, 
so that they neither evaporate nor solidify.  
What, then, can be fairly said about this reference to Hythlodaeus as “non ut Palinurus?” 
Although she does not discuss this passage at length, McCutcheon herself seems to take the 
reference to Palinurus in context, as one should, but to reduce it down to meaning that 
Hythlodaeus “has sailed in search of truth” (111). This is certainly a plausible reading. Petrus 
likely fears that Morus’ terming Hythlodaeus a “nauclerus” will reduce him in Morus’ mind 
to something like a Palinurus, and so he tries to counter this thought by stating that 
Hythlodaeus was more than a mere helmsman. But matters are more complicated than 
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McCutcheon allows here, as the presentation of Ulysses in Juvenal’s “Satire 15” suggests. 
Hythlodaeus, says Petrus, sailed “non ut Palinurus sed ut Ulysses.” After his mention of 
Ulysses, though, Petrus immediately pulls back, corrects himself, and changes course again: 
“immo velut Plato.” The Latin conjunction that Petrus employs here, “immo,” often 
translated as “rather,” is commonly used to correct a previous assertion. To get at the 
conversational sense of what Petrus is saying here, one might render this entire passage, “He 
sailed not like Palinurus but Ulysses; well, no, not Ulysses, but like Plato!” This hesitation 
over Ulysses should be understandable to someone familiar with Juvenal’s “Satire 15.” Petrus 
hesitates and doubles back on his statement because he recalls the ambiguity that surrounds 
Ulysses as a traveler in the Latin tradition. As the editors of the Cambridge Utopia put it in 
their explanation of this comment, Ulysses could be seen as the man who travelled widely 
and knew the minds of many peoples, but “he could also be regarded… as a notable liar” 
(45). Petrus is aware in that moment, perhaps, that Hythlodaeus is very much in the position 
of Ulysses in that he is the only witness to his own tale, and so he does not want to plant in 
Morus’ mind the idea that Hythlodaeus might be less than truthful.  
 But the comment is out there, not to be taken back, and as such this comment colors 
both what Petrus has already said about Hythlodaeus and what he says to correct himself. 
Now that Petrus has likened Hythlodaeus to a legendary liar, the reference to Palinurus seems 
less than stable. One is prompted to wonder why Palinurus had even come into Petrus’s head 
in connection with Hythlodaeus. Perhaps the pilot of Aeneas came to mind because 
Hythlodaeus has something of his ill luck or even negligence about him, for the Roman 
literary tradition recognizes Palinurus as both deeply unfortunate, in that he was chosen as the 
sacrificial stand-in for his whole people, and as a negligent steersman who paid the ultimate 
price for his inattention (Brenk 776, 782). Petrus’s slip of the tongue concerning Ulysses also 
colors his attempt to correct himself by dubbing Hythlodaeus a contemporary Plato, for, as 
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with Palinurus and with Ulysses, the Plato to whom Petrus refers is inevitably the Plato of the 
literary tradition and not merely the author of Republic. Jane Raisch expounds the fuller 
meaning of this third choice of a figure to whom Petrus likens Hythlodaeus,  
But the Plato Giles calls to mind here is a reference not to the Plato of the Platonic 
dialogues… but to the Plato of Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of the Eminent 
Philosophers. In Diogenes Laertius, Plato becomes a seasoned traveler, sailing all 
over the Mediterranean and continuously running into trouble… His various mishaps 
while traveling are almost without exception the result of the lackluster reception of 
his philosophy. In one particularly problematic encounter, Plato explains the 
philosophical and political limitations of tyranny to a tyrant in Sicily who doesn’t take 
very kindly to Plato’s volunteered wisdom and shortly after sells Plato off as a slave. 
(938) 
So much, then, for McCutcheon’s idea that Petrus merely means to suggest that Hythlodaeus 
sailed in search of truth, although one must always remember that it is her way of envisioning 
the language of Utopia that opens up its full complexity, ambiguity, and irony. Each of the 
three figures to whom Petrus likens Hythlodaeus has proved to be polyvalent and indistinct, 
so that the reader who closely considers just some of the possible implications of these 
allusions is left in a state of aporia, which is probably what More wants.   
My analysis is not meant to suggest, of course, that any single reader, not even one 
from More’s circle of humanists, would or even could have brought together, in the instant in 
which he encountered the brief interruption afforded by the long-tailed ape, all of these varied 
allusions and echoes in perceiving More’s complex attempt to signal Hythlodaeus’ 
suspiciousness. Rather, as I have shown, More riddles his account with these sorts of hints, 
some remarkably subtle, like his use of the term “cercopithecus” rather than “simius,” some 
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less than subtle, as when he has Petrus liken Hythlodaeus to Ulysses or when he has 
Hythlodaeus himself describe the island of Utopia in dimensions that are physically 
impossible. This is how More works, always and everywhere through insinuation and 
understatement intimating his meaning rather than spelling it out. As discussed above, this 
reaches all the way down to the level of the smallest rhetorical device, as Elizabeth 
McCutcheon has long since demonstrated. Her essay, far the most essential study of More’s 
modus operandi in Utopia, convincingly argues that, whatever else can be said about what 
More was up to in Utopia, one is on firm ground, relatively speaking, in saying that he 
labored to keep his meaning as obscure as possible while still making it available to the 
learned reader.  
This claim about More’s approach to his work has the character of a truism and would 
probably pass without disputation in scholarship on Utopia. What other scholars have not 
seen, however, is that this literary modus operandi points to the poetic or aesthetical 
framework from which More was writing and thence to the context in which he wrote this 
work. To note and critically probe More’s approach to depicting the persona of Hythlodaeus 
ought to be the interpreter’s first and most necessary concern. To understand Utopia, one 
must render Hythlodaeus a question, for it is the question that surrounds his person that both 
ties together the problems of the work as a whole and that points most meaningfully to what 
More was attempting to accomplish in this work. Once one has come to understand why 
More created such a problematic and complex narrator, one will understand where the whole 
work is tending. This brief look at Hythlodaeus wrestling with a long-tailed monkey over an 
ancient Greek work on botany has, perhaps, adequately evoked some of the complexities, 
problems, and questions that one regularly meets with when reading Utopia and its narrator 
closely. I will return to a close reading of Hythlodaeus again soon, but first I should sketch 
out an explanation of what inspired More to create such a problematic narrator. It may well 
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have been, as I have suggested above, that something of More’s conception of Hythlodaeus 
as an unreliable narrator came from his reading of Juvenal’s fifteenth satire, but this 
supposition, following the lead of a “cercopithecus,” may be an error. What is indisputable, 
however, is that More encountered this version of Odysseus in an author who exercised a 
considerable influence over the poetic and the character of Utopia, an influence that is often 
ignored. Near the beginning of Lucian’s A True Story, the narrator, who will prove himself to 
be unreliable, leaves no doubt about whom he takes to be the original unreliable narrator. He 
says pointedly that “ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου Οδυσσευς” (“Homer’s Odysseus”) was the    
“ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωμολοχίας” (“leader and teacher of this 
sort of silliness”) (250). To understand why More might have decided to create a narrator so 
rife with ambiguities, so like the liar Ulysses as he had come down through the Greek and 
Roman traditions, one must get a sense of the influence Lucian of Samosata exercised on 
More around the time he was writing his Utopia. It is to this influence that I now turn.  
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Chapter 2: The Greek Revival and Lucian of Samosata 
Arthur F. Kinney, one of Utopia’s most insightful readers, argues persuasively in 
Humanist Poetics that “More’s Utopia is frequently misgauged because the context in which 
it was written – and an understanding of the audience for whom it was intended – is ignored” 
(55). Kinney maintains that if one is to comprehend something of the meaning of More’s 
Utopia, one must understand it as being closely, even categorically, connected to Erasmus’s 
Encomium Moriae: “when the Encomium Moriae is placed directly alongside Utopia, certain 
puzzling elements in More’s fiction become clear, both in how they work and in what they 
mean to do and say” (55). To begin making his case, Kinney notes both ideas and techniques 
that More must have borrowed from Erasmus in constructing his own literary masterpiece. 
“More’s Utopia,” he writes, “also begins with a joking prefatory matter to introduce what 
appears at first to be a lighthearted debate about the possibilities of Nowhere, yet this work 
too grows increasingly serious and even grim when it comes to portray the crime and 
poverty” that were so prevalent in the time of Henry VIII (54). Kinney also maintains that 
More uses Hythlodaeus in much the way Erasmus had used his narrator in her rambling 
speech: “More causes the patterns of humanist rhetoric so to intersect that the signals to his 
humanist audience their fundamental understanding that all orations are potentially single 
sides of a controversia” (54). Perhaps Kinney’s most important observation, however, 
concerns the way in which both the Encomium Moriae and the Utopia “rely on a divided 
perspective, neither of which alone would be sufficient as a blueprint for action” that forces 
the reader who seeks to assess and learn from these works to “develop a third viewpoint in an 
act of triangulation” (55). This third viewpoint, though, is a contextualized view like the one 
this chapter will develop, “not the viewpoint of the narrator, for another Erasmian strategy is 
to place the narrator squarely within the narrative and to make him or her, Hythlodaye or 
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Folly, a subject of the argument the narrative is meant to provide” (55). According to Kinney, 
then, the narrator in Utopia is himself not the bearer of clarity, but of more ambiguity.         
Although far less specific than Kinney about what constitutes the strong likenesses 
between Encomium Moriae and Utopia, H.A. Mason expresses a parallel conviction when he 
discusses how alike in spirit More and Erasmus are in their most celebrated works. Indeed, 
Mason contends that the two shared not a likeness of spirit, but an “identity of spirit:” “I 
come now to the contention that the More who counts as a literary force in England is 
virtually identical with Erasmus” (59). Mason, moreover, even has a sense that this identity 
of spirit comes from a shared source, for he writes, “And the point at which I should like to 
being the enquiry is the moment when More and Erasmus began to translate Lucian” (59). 
Both critics, it seems to me, are taking the most direct and probable course for understanding 
More’s literary work by noting its original literary techniques and by relating it to Erasmus 
and to the common humanist interests he and More shared.  
Both critics, however, fail to understand where this pathway ends. Kinney, for all 
intents and purposes, traces the path only as far back as to Erasmus’s own thinking: “the 
ideas and techniques established by Erasmus were formative for English fiction” (54). And, 
to be clear, in the sentence following on this quotation Kinney includes Utopia in the 
category of “English fiction” (54). Mason, on the other hand, sees plainly that this critical 
direction ends in Lucian, and yet, because Mason himself so devalues the Greek sophist, he 
underestimates the extent of his influence on these two most influential humanists. Mason’s 
attitude toward Lucian comes across in vivid colors in the following critical question he poses 
for himself: “Why can such a small fry as I so easily shrug off Lucian to-day, while such 
great men as More and Erasmus confounded him with the best authors of antiquity?” (60). 
While I have grown fond of the snub suggested in Mason’s use of the verb “confounded” to 
designate their act of canon-formation, it becomes clear as one reads through his account of 
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the early works of More and Erasmus that Mason radically underappreciates their vital roots 
in Lucian. My aim in this chapter is to build on insights like those of Kinney and Mason into 
the commonness of style, design, and purpose of Utopia and Encomium Moriae and to begin 
to demonstrate the plausibility of imagining More’s Utopia as an attempt to work out a poetic 
rooted in a Lucianic sensibility that justifies the study of Greek literature and injects into that 
study a renewed moral potency.  
A Friendly Competition  
It all began with what Erika Rummel calls a “friendly competition” (49). Erasmus 
spent much of the first two decades of the sixteenth century in England. He made his second 
visit to this country in 1505-1506 and then, “aside from one short trip to Paris, Erasmus 
remained in England between 1509 and 1514” (Rummel 49; Christ-von Wedel 80). Erasmus 
lived in the house of Thomas More while in England from 1505-1506, and, sometime during 
this stay, the two agreed that they would together translate a handful of the dialogues of 
Lucian (Robinson 370). Rummel notes that one “cannot say with certainty which of the 
friends suggested the idea of collaborating on a translation and which of them proposed the 
subject matter,” but speculates that the two most likely “developed a taste for Lucian’s 
writings independently, and on discovering their preference made a joint decision to translate 
some of his essays and dialogues” (49-50). Lucian of Samosata, the Greek satirist, 
rhetorician, and philosopher lived (b. c. AD 120) during the Second Sophistic, which Ewen 
Bowie defines rather unspectacularly as “the period c.ad 60–230 when declamation became 
the most prestigious literary activity in the Greek world” (Bowie). Lucian himself wrote 
declamations, as Erasmus was to point out in excusing his Encomium Moriae, but he also 
wrote “essays and dialogues, the majority satirical and witty, in relaxed and undemanding, 
moderately Atticizing Greek prose” (Edwards). After the fall of the Roman Empire, Lucian’s 
works were scarcely to be found in the west, but “in the Eastern empire, they continued to be 
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read and appreciated, as the proliferation of Byzantine imitations demonstrates” (Robinson 
363). Hence, Italians searching the libraries of Byzantium during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries found a ready supply of manuscripts containing Lucian’s works. By the time More 
was born, a canon of Lucian’s “complete works” had been formed and translated mostly by 
Italian scholars into Latin (Robinson 363). 
When More and Erasmus released their own translations of Lucian in 1506, they were 
so successful that they “displaced the Italian canon both north and south of the Alps,” as 
Robinson explains: “This collection, principally in the form of the augmented second Badius 
edition (Paris 1514) had an unparalleled success. The translator himself [Erasmus], with 
customary modesty, notes: ‘rapiebantur hae nugae primum magna studiosorum applausu.’” 
(Robinson 365).8 Although Erasmus is, of course, not being modest in this statement, neither 
is he exaggerating. These translations were wildly popular among the literati and promoters 
of the learning of Greek throughout Europe. Indeed, so well-liked were these translations that 
they proved “More’s most popular work during his lifetime. Reprinted nine times between 
1506 and 1534, the translations exceed even Utopia on this count” (Collected works 17; 
Mason 60). This simple fact should cause anyone who is trying to think seriously about 
Utopia and the works that might have had significant influence on it to pause and think, even 
if no further evidence existed as to the overreaching significance of these translations on 
More’s oeuvre. Erasmus and More published their translations in 1506. Three years later in 
1509 Erasmus’s most Lucianic work, Encomium Moriae, was published, a work in which the 
author directly states his reliance on Lucian as a model and justification (68). Five years later 
in 1514 the most successful print of their translations of Lucian is issued. And then two years 
later in 1516 Erasmus sees Utopia through the press for an eager Thomas More. The 
 
8 Erasmus’s “modest” statement translates to “These literary trifles [their translations of Lucian] were from the 
first snatched up to the great adulation of the learned.”  
 Verhine 39 
 
closeness in time of these publications, not to mention their aesthetic similarities, makes at 
least a prima facie case that Lucian and his dialogues would be near to More’s heart in the 
years when he was writing Utopia, 1514-1516. 
Another Lucian and the “Graecistes”   
What’s more, when Utopia was published and for some time thereafter Thomas More 
was closely associated with Lucian and his texts. Everywhere in the historical record one 
encounters other authors likening More, usually negatively, to the notorious Greek sophist. 
John Frith, for instance, clearly not intending to compliment More, says of him in A Mirror 
or Glass to Know Thyself that he was “another Lucian, regarding neither God nor man,” 
(267). This close connection to Lucian affected More’s own reputation as an author 
appreciably. Drawing on an anecdote concerning a print of Utopia from 1519, Raisch 
helpfully reorients the contemporary reader to what was more likely to be More’s status as an 
author in the early part of the sixteenth century, that is, in his lifetime. An unlicensed edition 
of Utopia was printed in 1519 in Florence. This printing was not of Utopia alone; rather, 
Utopia was appended in this print almost “as an afterthought” to a collection of More’s and 
Erasmus’s translations of Lucian (932). Raisch explains the significance of this print:  
Utopia… had, in this one [print], become a kind of paratext itself, subordinated to, 
and included within, the greater project of translating Lucian. From a twenty-first-
century perspective, this 1519 Utopia reveals a surprising fact about More’s sixteenth-
century authorial status. As B. R. Branham observes, ‘in More’s lifetime he was 
probably more widely read as the translator of Lucian than as the author of Utopia’ 
and indeed, more than 30 editions of More and Erasmus’s translations of Lucian were 
published during Erasmus’s lifetime (in comparison with only five of Utopia). In this 
edition, Utopia becomes practically an extension of Lucian’s corpus, the logical telos 
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of Erasmus and More’s efforts to introduce Lucian, and Greek, to the sixteenth 
century. (932)  
Raisch’s claim at the end of this quotation is essential to the thesis of this study, although I do 
differ with Raisch on one fundamental point. More and Erasmus dearly loved their Lucian, 
without question, but introducing his works to the sixteenth century was by no means their 
central goal. Rather, as Raisch implies here but does not effectively emphasize, Utopia, 
Encomium Moriae, the translations of Lucian, amongst other publications, were all in the 
service of introducing ancient Greece, its language and its culture, to contemporary northern 
Europe for the moral and civic betterment of that culture. To understand the significance, 
then, of More’s and Erasmus’s enterprise to promulgate the works and aesthetic stance of 
Lucian, one must understand the larger purpose to which this enterprise was subordinated, 
and so I must again broaden the scope of this investigation in order to articulate fully the 
context in which More composed his Utopian fantasy. 
At the same time that More and Erasmus were developing their Lucianic works, 
Erasmus was toiling over a publication even dearer to his heart, the Novum Instrumentum of 
1516 (and then Novum Testamentum of 1519), his newly edited Greek version of the New 
Testament, along with his fresh translations and annotations in Latin on this text (Christ-von 
Wedel 82). Contemporary readers have a difficult time grasping the consequence of 
Erasmus’s work in editing and retranslating the New Testament. Suffice it say here that 
Erasmus’s new Greek New Testament implicitly claimed priority over the thousand-year-old-
monolith that was the Latin Vulgate, for, whatever might be said in defense of the Vulgate, it 
was indisputably a translation of Greek originals. De Jonge succinctly explains the 
intellectual daring and significance of Erasmus’s project: “He wanted to open a direct path to 
the important early sources of knowledge. He wanted to supersede the circuitous route, via 
the corrupted tradition of a translation into dubious and easily misinterpreted Latin” (394). 
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The problem, of course, was that most of his contemporaries considered the “circuitous 
route” that was the Latin Vulgate to be the sole source of authority for the Christian religion. 
Moreover, Erasmus was not at all shy about pointing out all the instances he could find of 
“misinterpreted Latin.” Comparisons between the Vulgate and Erasmus’s revised Greek text 
revealed many places where either the Vulgate had erred in its translation or the Latin of the 
translation had been taken to mean something other than what it originally meant owing to 
later readers’ ignorance of koine and classical Greek. These sorts of textual problems, so 
common and so trivial when the text was that of a pagan author, grew proportionally when 
the text under consideration was what most people took to be the unchanging Word of Truth: 
“Erasmus had applied philological principles to a sacred text, an approach conservative 
theologians considered inappropriate at best, sacrilegious at worst” (Rummel 41). Robert 
Coogan aptly intimates how many contemporaries would receive and understand Erasmus’s 
Novum Instrumentum, by linking it in spirit to Encomium Moriae and notes the “remarkable 
storms” provoked by both works:  
The waspish sarcasm at the center of the Encomium stings and offends as had the 
daring of in principio erat Sermo, his correction of the Vulgate's, in principio erat 
Verbum, words sanctioned in private worship and in theological discourse for 
centuries. Turbulence radiates likewise from the proof text for the dogma of original 
sin, Romans 5:12, where... quatenus (for, because, inasmuch as) [replaces] in quo (in 
whom) of the Vulgate. (25) 
One is scarcely surprised, then, when one learns that early reactions to Erasmus’s Novum 
Instrumentum, like those of Dorp at Louvain, stressed that in introducing changes to “the 
established text” of Catholic Christianity, Erasmus “would create confusion in the minds of 
believers and shake the very foundations of the church” (Rummel 42).  
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 Even Erasmus’s pen was not swift or pugnacious enough to respond to all the 
criticisms his work, particularly his Greek New Testament, incited. To mount a successful 
defense, Erasmus needed friends, and he had them in England. In the early part of the 
sixteenth century, Erasmus befriended several men in London, Oxford, and Cambridge who 
“became the first Englishmen to dedicate themselves to the study of Greek, and to make a 
polemical point of preferring Greece to Rome” (Nelson 897). These men, “whom More 
dubbed Graecistes,” included the likes of Thomas Linacre, William Grocyn, John Colet, 
Richard Pace and, of course, Thomas More himself (Nelson 897). Although Erasmus was still 
searching for patronage during this period, his reputation and influence among the learned 
were great, and it was largely around his work and in accordance with his judgment that the 
other “Graecistes” seem to have pursued their own humanistic projects (Christ-von Wedel 
80). I am not trying to suggest that Erasmus dictated to his fellows what they should and 
should not write about, although there is some evidence of this sort of imperiousness on the 
Dutchman’s part,9 but that More and friends rallied around Erasmus as their center, sharing 
with him the belief that the language and the thinking of the ancient Greeks, particularly as it 
was embodied in the Greek New Testament, was the prime means through which European 
society would be reformed. In De Jonge’s words, Erasmus’s justification of Greek and his 
campaign to spread the knowledge of it was ultimately about “the purification of language 
and knowledge, the cultivation of manners and spirit and the improvement of man and 
society” (394).  
 The belief of Erasmus and his friends, especially More, that ancient Greek and its 
propagation in Europe could lead to societal reform is sufficiently strange as to beg for 
 
9 According to Manley and Sylvester, for instance, Pace’s “De Fructu embarrassed Erasmus in every possible 
way” (xv). Erasmus was particularly bothered by its references to his poverty and its chatty, everyday treatment 
of important figures like Erasmus and More. In response, Erasmus wrote to More and asked him to advise Pace 
“that he devote himself to translating from the Greek” (xvi). Pace acquiesced, never making “any direct attempt 
to defend his little book” (xvi). In other words, Pace did what Erasmus told him to do.    
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exposition and sufficiently related to this study as to merit it. One may easily perceive why 
the “Graecistes” judged that a revised and corrected New Testament might lead to the reform 
of Europe theologically and morally. More himself, in his “Letter to Oxford University,” 
maintains that a knowledge of ancient Greek is necessary for understanding “the surer and 
more convincing presentation” of the New Testament in its original language (75). In his 
“Letter to Martin Dorp,” More contends even more staunchly the church has always 
privileged the Greek text of the New Testament over its Latin translation: “nam primum 
Ecclesia sic in Latinis codicibus contineri credit Evangelium, ut fateatur tamen e Graeco 
translatum. credit ergo translationi, sed magis tamen archetypo” (“For, first of all, the church 
trusts that the gospel is contained within the Latin texts in such a way that it nonetheless 
admits that it was translated from Greek. Hence, it trusts the translation, but it trusts the 
original more so”) (30). For humanists, a firmer Greek text of the New Testament and a more 
accurate Latin translation of it were certain boons to European Christendom. Likewise, the 
science of philology, which Erasmus was inventing in passing when he collated, compared, 
and corrected Greek manuscripts, presented an obvious example of how robust humanistic 
learning could purify the language and the knowledge which had been handed down from 
antiquity (Bentley 15-17). But the most substantial impetus behind the “Graecistes’” fervent 
support of the Greek language seems to have been that the Greek tradition proffered so many 
and such various “moralizing works of history and biography… interested in civic behavior 
and statecraft” (McCallum-Barry 52). Guy helpfully spells out why, in historical terms, the 
humanism of More’s day was so concerned with morality and politics, “The philosophy to 
which More was exposed by his humanist education is the crux of his early life and career. In 
the age of Lorenzo Valla… the focus had been on law and philology, but by 1500 it had 
shifted towards the moral and political philosophy of the canonical authors” (24). Particularly 
“In the Greek texts,” Guy continues, “the emphasis was on virtue, social justice, and the 
 Verhine 44 
 
perfection of a respublica” (24).Like the Italian humanists who preceded them, More and his 
friends genuinely believed that the Greek tradition contained a wisdom within itself that was 
keen enough to reshape Europe in its moral behavior, which is precisely where the 
“Graecistes” thought reform needed to occur (Ackroyd 157).  
The vision of reform, that is, which the “Graecistes” shared was not Luther’s, who 
sought first to undo even the established theological order of the church and then to reform it. 
Their sense of what needed to be reformed in the church was far less radical, and it was 
nearly always presented in moral terms. Their ideal of reform is best captured in John Colet’s 
statement of purpose for his “Convocation Sermon” of 1510: “To exhort you, Reverend 
Fathers, to the endeavor of reformation of the Church’s estate, (because that nothing hath so 
disfigured the face of the Church as hath the fashion of secular and worldly living in clerks 
and priests)” (1). Colet goes on to elaborate the secular and worldly failings of priests and 
leaders in the church under four well worn, morally charged categories: “devilish pride… 
carnal concupiscence… worldly covetousness… secular business” (2). The “Graecistes” 
thought that the trespasses arising from these moral traps were precisely the sorts of 
trespasses that the Greek moralistic tradition, especially writers like Lucian, would aid in 
combatting and reducing. Again, it is More himself in his letter to Oxford who says that the 
secular learning of the Greek tradition “animam ad virtutem praeparat” (“prepares the soul 
for virtue”) (6). To see what he meant, one need look no further than the Utopians 
themselves. I have explained above how closely More connected the Utopians to ancient 
Greece and its culture, and it is this people, in all its integrity and wisdom, that stands as a 
foil to Christian European culture, in all its arrogance and folly.  
Most broadly conceived, the goal of Thomas More, Erasmus, and their circle was to 
celebrate and promulgate among the learned the knowledge of ancient Greek attained in the 
Renaissance, for they believed that this learning could reform the mores, particularly those of 
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the well-educated, in Europe. To that ultimate and common end, the “Graecistes,” especially 
More and Erasmus, published works in the early part of the sixteenth century that promoted 
Greek thought, Greek genres, and the central importance of the Greek language. The 
translations of Lucian were meant to contribute to this end, without doubt: “More's 
translation activities in the first decade of the sixteenth century appear as a response to 
concerns for sound scholarship and Christian renewal” (Chuilleanáin 49). Erasmus’s 
Encomium Moriae, which openly acknowledges its debt to Lucian and other ancient Greek 
models, was in the service of this end (68). That More’s Utopia had a similar purpose one can 
surmise not merely from arguments like those of Kinney and Mason, who point up the 
apparently endless resemblances between these works, but also from an understanding of the 
context afforded by Erasmus’s controversial work on the Greek New Testament. Nelson 
points out that from “1514 to 1520, the general period of Utopia's preparation and 
publication, this circle’s [the “Graecistes”] advocacy of Greek culture took on a new 
intensity, as several of its members were called upon to defend Erasmus's controversial 
project of using the Greek New Testament to correct the Vulgate” (897). Far the most 
prominent of these defenses of Erasmus’s works, particularly the Encomium Moriae and 
Novum Instrumentum, is Thomas More’s “Letter to Martin Dorp,” which he wrote in the 
same year, 1515, that he was writing Utopia (Paul 6). In this letter, More goes to great 
lengths to champion the program of learning and method embodied in the controversial 
works of Erasmus over against that of scholastic learning, and it was this letter, in all its 
complexity of argument, that More was thinking through as he worked out his dialogue about 
a Portuguese traveler who happens upon a just commonwealth (Kinney 201). All of More’s 
works, then, from the period of 1506 to the first years of the Reformation share a common set 
of concerns and aims that have largely to do with promoting Greek learning for the moral and 
civic betterment of Europe. 
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More’s Letter to Ruthall  
 The works of Lucian were at the heart of this set of concerns. To understand how 
central those works were to the thinking of More (as well as Erasmus), one needs to grasp 
with greater precision what Lucian meant to Thomas More. This is a difficult question to 
handle, though, and one to which different scholars have given different answers. The 
difficulty arises mainly from the subject-matter, Lucian, and the disrepute in which many of 
More’s contemporaries held this controversial author (Chuilleanáin 62; Rummel 50). This 
same Lucian, after all, in The Passing of Peregrinus, depicts Christians as childish dupes, as 
they unquestionably must be to credit the fantasies of the Christian faith, easily taken 
advantage of by any passing huckster:   
πεπείκασι γὰρ αὑτοὺς οἱ κακοδαίμονες τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀθάνατοι ἔσεσθαι καὶ βιώσεσθαι 
τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον… ἔπειτα δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης ὁ πρῶτος ἔπεισεν αὐτοὺς ὡς ἀδελφοὶ πάντες 
εἶεν ἀλλήλων, ἐπειδὰν… τὸν δὲ ἀνεσκολοπισμένον ἐκεῖνον σοφιστὴν αὐτὸν 
προσκυνῶσιν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἐκείνου νόμους βιῶσιν. καταφρονοῦσιν οὖν ἁπάντων ἐξ ἴ
σης καὶ κοινὰ ἡγοῦνται, ἄνευ τινὸς ἀκριβοῦς πίστεως τὰ τοιαῦτα παραδεξάμενοι. 
For the miserable wretches have convinced themselves above all that they will be 
deathless and will live on forever… And then their first lawgiver [Christ] convinced 
them that they would all be brothers to one another if they worshipped him, that 
sophist who was fixed up on a cross, and lived in accordance with his laws. And they 
despise all things equally and consider that all should be held in common; they accept 
these sorts of ideas without any strict proof. (11, 13) 
People foolish enough to hold to views like the ones Christians routinely hold to, Lucian says 
in the next sentence, are easy prey for conmen. One is scarcely surprised, then, to come 
across judgments from More’s contemporaries about the dangers of dipping into Lucian. Sir 
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Thomas Elyot, who does recommend the reading of prudently selected dialogues, adds the 
cautious advice that those dialogues should be “without ribawdry, or [given] to moche 
skornying… [for] thus moche dare I say, that it were better that a childe shuld never rede any 
parte of Luciane than all Luciane” (quoted in Surtz 469). And this was a generous judgment 
that More himself might have echoed. More typical are the sentiments expressed in Luther’s 
use of Lucian against Erasmus: “By such tactics, you only succeed in showing that you foster 
in your heart a Lucian… who, having no belief in God himself, secretly ridicules all who 
have a belief and confess it… You reek of nothing but Lucian, and you breathe out on me the 
vast drunken folly of Epicurus” (quoted in Chuilleanáin 54). Anna Peterson deftly 
summarizes the way many regarded Lucian in the early part of the sixteenth century, 
“Lucian’s name became a slur used to denote someone not only as an atheist but also as a 
ridiculer of the faithful – a label that would be applied to both Erasmus and More” (173). One 
must conclude from Lucian’s reputation in the early sixteenth century that More must have 
thought his work particularly significant to have associated himself so closely with it.    
 Lucian’s questionable reputation in More’s time meant that More had to speak about 
Lucian guardedly, and this guardedness renders much of what More says he thinks about 
Lucian ambiguous and evidently incomplete. Nonetheless, it is fortunate that More recorded 
at least some of his thoughts on Lucian in a letter from 1506 to Thomas Ruthall, a noted 
supporter of the new learning who was at that time the King’s Secretary and who later served 
as the Bishop of Durham (Baker-Smith 159). Scholars have here and there noted similarities 
between the aesthetic ideals set forth in this letter to what seem to be More’s own guiding 
principles as an author, but my contention is much stronger (Raisch 931-932; Walker 331). 
To my mind, this letter is the best glimpse More offers, however indirectly, into his own 
aesthetic values and into the poetic that he embodies in Utopia. I will dwell, then, for the 
remainder of this chapter on More’s letter to Ruthall, reading it as closely as possible in order 
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to draw out his aesthetic ideals and will then round out these findings with some thoughts 
from modern scholars about More’s literary debt to Lucian.  
 The opening of More’s letter proffers his most crucial statements about his judgments 
of Lucian and what counts as good writing, and, since More jumps straight into his analysis 
without any sort of preface, so will I: “Si quisquam fuit umquam, vir doctissime, qui 
Horatianum praeceptum impleverit, voluptatemque cum utilitate coniunxerit, hoc ego certe 
Lucianum in primis puto praestitisse” (“If ever there was anyone, most learned sir, who fully 
heeded Horace’s teaching that one should join pleasure to useful instruction, I think that 
Lucian certainly was among the best in this”) (2). It is far too easy to pass over More’s 
opening statement, sounding as it does like an ornate if succinct and typically humanistic 
introduction to what will follow, and yet the adoption of this maxim from Horace and the 
claim that Lucian best exemplifies the application of this maxim is momentous. Erasmus 
offers the same assessment of Lucian in one his letters: “omne tulit punctum (ut scripsit 
Flaccus) qui miscuit utile dulci. quod quidem aut nemo, mea sententia, aut noster hic 
Lucianus est assecutus” (“He carries every point, as Flaccus [Horace] wrote, who mixes 
usefulness with sweetness. In my opinion, [it was] either no one or our beloved Lucian who 
pursued this aim” (425). H.A. Mason struggles in his valuable study of humanism in the 
Early Tudor period to suggest the historical significance of what More and Erasmus mean in 
adopting this Horatian stance on literature and then taking Lucian as their exemplar:  
through Lucian they [More and Erasmus] came to understand the basic principle of 
Roman literary theory… that literature is justified because it combines pleasure and 
instruction… The particular application of Horace’s maxim they had learned to make 
was to the combination of levity with seriousness[, which] they found in Lucian (70).  
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While Mason is guilty of oversimplification when he speaks of a the “principle of Roman 
literary theory,” his point about More and Erasmus is worth considering, especially his claim 
that their particular understanding of what it means to combine pleasure with useful learning 
derives not from their reading of Horace but from Lucian. They might have found this 
approach exemplified in numerous other Latin and Greek authors, but it was Lucian and his 
peculiar blend of intellectual satire, skeptical humor, and absurdist tendencies that mainly 
attracted More and Erasmus. The two seemed genuinely to have enjoyed Lucian, so much so 
that they would hazard their literary, if not their social, reputations by putting out new 
translations of his works and commending him to posterity.   
 Yet more striking in this opening statement is how More uniquely emphasizes the 
pleasure he enjoys when reading Lucian. Whereas Erasmus simply quotes Horace’s maxim 
verbatim, “qui miscuit utile dulci,” More summarizes it in a Latin clause that highlights the 
pleasure derived from the act of reading: “voluptatemque cum utilitate coniunxerit.” More 
might have used the noun “dulcedinem,” “sweetness,” in place of “voluptatem,” “pleasure,” 
here, if he wanted to echo Horace more resoundingly. That he chose the noun “voluptatem” 
and fronted it in the clause, setting “utilitate,” “utility,” in a mere prepositional phrase, 
suggests that he wants to stress the importance of pleasure in the activity of reading. This 
supposition is further strengthened by the fact that More has obviously reversed Horace’s 
ordering of the concepts. Horace had written, “who mixes usefulness with sweetness,” but 
More rephrases it as, “who joins pleasure with usefulness.” In Horace, the direct object of the 
verb is “utile,” which suggests a slight privileging of that concept over “dulci;” in More, not 
only is the noun in the prepositional phrase (or oblique case) bolstered – “dulci” to 
“voluptatem” – but it is made the direct object of the verb. This careful reworking of Horace 
suggests that More means plainly to set forth his conviction that the aesthetic value of a 
literary work, not to mention the value of the act of reading, may come as much from the 
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pleasure it instills as from the practical instruction it affords, or that instruction is most 
effectively delivered when accompanied by pleasure.   
 To gain a sense of how daring this aesthetic revaluation was, one should consider the 
extensive argument that Erasmus prefaces to his Encomium Moriae in the form of a letter to 
Thomas More, for in this preface Erasmus spells out several ideas commonly brought to bear 
in this period on the acceptable uses of literature and the propriety of satire and literary play. 
Erasmus was well aware that his declamation in praise of folly, his most Lucianic work, 
would meet with stern resistance. He tells More in his letter that he expects criticism to come 
from two different quarters. First, he predicts, some will criticize him for writing trifles not 
worthy of a theologian. These men will calumniate him by claiming that he is “veterem 
comoediam aut Lucianum quempiam referre, atque omnia mordicus arripere” (“restoring the 
old comedy or pretending to be Lucian and tearing everything apart with [his] teeth”) (68). 
Others, Erasmus knows, will criticize him for the very mordancy of his wit. Because he 
anticipates these sorts of criticisms, Erasmus structures his entire letter to More as an 
apology-in-advance for the Encomium Moriae. He starts off the letter emphasizing that he 
only engaged in the composition of his declamation in the first place because he was riding 
on horseback from Italy to England and did not want to waste that time on non-literary 
activities (67). He maintains that although composing on horseback was not well suited to 
serious work, it did afford him space for literary play and the production of a humorous, 
ironical declamation (67).  
Erasmus also excuses his work by associating it as closely as possible with Thomas 
More. He says first that the Latin genitive of More’s name, “Mori,” brought to mind the 
Greek word for folly, “moriae,” although Erasmus is careful to point out that, in fact, Thomas 
More himself is as far from folly himself as the Latinized form of the word is close to More’s 
Latinized name (67). But Erasmus gives a much more significant second reason for 
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dedicating this work to More: “deinde suspicabar hunc ingenii nostri lusum tibi praecipue 
probatum iri, propterea quod soleas huius generis iocis, hoc est, nec indoctis, ni fallor, nec 
usquequaque insulsis, impendio delectari” (“And then I suspected that this amusement would 
be especially approved by you because you tend to be uncommonly delighted by jokes of this 
kind, that is, learned [jokes] and, if I am not mistaken, [jokes] not wholly without wit”)  (67). 
To complete his identification of Encomium Moriae with Thomas More, Erasmus closes this 
section of his letter with a fully verbalized dedication to More in which he asks his friend to 
take up the job of defending his little work, “hanc igitur declamatiunculam non solum lubens 
accipies, ceu mnemosunon tui sodalis, verum etiam tuendam suscipies, utpote tibi dicatam, 
iamque tuam non meam” (“And so [I trust that] you will not only gladly accept this little 
declamation as a memento of your friend, but also will undertake its defense, inasmuch as it 
is yours, not mine, now that it has been dedicated to you”) (68). Erasmus’s argument here is 
that his Encomium Moriae is uniquely designed to appeal to the literary taste of Thomas 
More, and More, Erasmus stresses, has a taste for the sort of learned humor exemplified in 
the writings of Lucian. Hence, to attack Erasmus’s work is to attack More himself. Anyone 
who does so should expect a retaliation like the one Martin Dorp received from the pen of 
Thomas More.  
The other pieces of evidence to be teased out of Erasmus’s letter to More concerning 
the adventurousness and uniqueness of their literary tastes come when Erasmus directly 
addresses the claim that the sort of writing he does in Encomium Moriae is beneath him. 
Although Erasmus designs the entire letter, through its very structure and the account he tells 
about why he wrote this declamation in the first place, to excuse his literary play, this topic is 
essential enough to him and, as I will show, to More that he sees fit to address the charges 
that will be brought against him openly. First, he points out that he is not setting a precedent 
in writing with such levity but following a very old one set by numerous ancient authors, 
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among whom Lucian is the only author named twice (68). Then Erasmus adds a rhetorical 
question that has significant bearing on the aesthetic from which he and More were working, 
nam quae tandem est iniquitas, cum omni vitae instituto suos lusus concedamus, 
studiis nullum omnino lusum permittere, maxime si nugae seria ducant, atque ita 
tractentur ludicra, ut ex his aliquanto plus frugis referat lector non omnino naris 
obesae, quam ex quorundam tetricis ac splendidis argumentis?”  
Finally, why are things so unfairly arranged that, although we grant to every other 
association of persons its own peculiar amusements, we permit to scholars no play 
whatsoever, even when their trifles lead into serious matters and they handle 
ridiculous matters in such a way that any reader who is not wholly obtuse may draw 
from these trivialities a great deal more fruit than might be drawn from the gloomy 
and showy subjects of certain writers? (68) 
In this passage, one sees most clearly the grave context against which More and Erasmus 
professed their affection for Lucian and for pleasure in reading. What is most pregnant in this 
passage, however, is Erasmus’s claim that a good reader is able to get more out of reading 
works like those of Lucian and Encomium Moriae than he is out of more traditional courtly 
and scholastic works. This suggestion, which Erasmus does not spell out in greater detail, has 
the potential to give birth to an entire poetic whose source is the amusing or pleasant 
treatment of serious matters and the enjoyment of intellectual play. And this is a fundamental 
element of the aesthetic that is embodied in Thomas More’s Utopia, as I will demonstrate 
after elaborating more fully on More’s appreciation of Lucian as he expressed it in his letter 
to Ruthall.   
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 When More stresses the importance of pleasure first and then utility in literature and 
in the works of Lucian, he tries to spell out what he means in the particular case of the author 
whom he has just translated:  
qui et superciliosis abstinens philosophorum praeceptis, et solutioribus poetarum 
lusibus, honestissimis simul et facetissimis salibus, vitia ubique notat atque insectatur 
mortalium. Idque facit tam scite, tantaque cum fruge, ut quum nemo altius pungat, 
nemo tamen sit, qui non aequo animo illius aculeos admittat.  
He [Lucian], while abstaining from the arrogant teachings of the philosophers and the 
unrestrained play of the poets, everywhere observes and attacks the vices of mortals 
with a most principled and a very clever wit. And this he does so skillfully and with 
such great fruit that, although no one stings more vigorously, nevertheless there is no 
one who does not accept his stings calmly. (2)  
This passage lays bare what commended Lucian the satirist and tireless critic of human 
foibles to Thomas More, whose vision of reform was so markedly moralistic: Lucian’s 
keeping his sights always set on the “vitia,” the “faults” or even the “sins” of humankind. As 
Peterson puts it, More focuses in on Lucian as a singularly “moralizing writer” (184). More 
thought that Europeans needed new ways to observe their moral failings and then to set about 
rectifying them. They needed the jarring experience of having their characteristic vices 
criticized by an alien culture that could perceive them only too distinctly. Erasmus took 
exactly the same approach to commending Lucian to his contemporaries, as Robinson 
explains,    
[According to Erasmus, precisely] the vices satirized by Lucian were those rife in 
Erasmus' day, and he saw in the dialogues an immediate contemporary application. 
The Toxaris is a lesson in what Christian love should be and clearly is not… The 
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Alexander is a comment on hypocrisy and the exploitation of superstition by the 
Church… The De Mercede Conductis is a picture of contemporary court life… And, 
particularly, in the Gallus and Conuiuium the contentious and pretentious 
philosophers are the scholastics and theologians.10 (366) 
More himself offers similar tags for each of the dialogues he translates, as I will soon show, 
but what is essential here is that it was not only the target of Lucian’s wit that appealed to 
More, as he makes plain in this statement to Ruthall. Most of what More says to Ruthall has 
to do with how – the manner in which – Lucian noticed and attacked the endless frailties of 
human beings. This is essential to grasp because it connects back to More’s opening 
statement that Lucian joins pleasure to instruction more effectively than any other author. He 
does it so effectively, More claims, that he can show his readers their own vices, always a 
painful experience, without offending them and in such a way that they are able to improve 
themselves. For More, then, it is all about how Lucian works on his readers that makes him 
such a successful practitioner of Horace’s maxim. Unfortunately, More says less than one 
would hope when he explains how Lucian works on his readers, but what he says is 
instructive and repays close reading.         
 More fronts the fact that Lucian went about his satirical way “abstaining from” or 
“keeping himself from” the “arrogant teachings of the philosophers and the unrestrained play 
of the poets.” Since these ideas are fronted, they must be significant, but what precisely do 
they mean? To my knowledge, no one has accurately elucidated the significance of where 
 
10 Since in this chapter I rely so heavily on the likenesses between More and Erasmus and often elaborate on 
More’s meaning by consulting the works of Erasmus, I should note here that I am familiar and in general 
agreement with Anna Peterson’s persuasive argument that, although they agreed so extensively when it came to 
Lucian, More and Erasmus had subtly different interpretations of his ultimate meaning: “While Erasmus in 
particular plays up Lucian’s satiric credentials and Syrian identity, More places greater stress on the moral 
utility of Lucian’s writings, at the same time as he looks to Lucian as a model for fictional tales. Because his 
translations follow those of Erasmus in the volume, one effect of this is that More’s moralizing Lucian revises 
and focuses the varied image of Lucian that Erasmus’s translations convey” (175). Her central point, that Lucian 
was a figure of debate even for More and Erasmus, is well put and well taken.     
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More begins this sentence even though he all but points his reader in the direction of what he 
means later in the letter when he elaborates on these ideas while tagging the dialogue he 
translated second in the collection, Necromantia (4). There he insists that this dialogue wittily 
reproaches the “inania poetarum figmenta, vel incertas quavis de re philosophorum inter se 
digladiationes” (“useless creations of the poets or the doubtful disputes of philosophers 
among themselves about any matter whatsoever”) (4). This is a rather obvious reference to 
several of the early sections of Lucian’s Menippus sive Necromantia, as More terms it in his 
actual translation, that explain what More is commending in Lucian (3-5).11 In these sections 
of the dialogue, the protagonist of the story, Menippus, recounts to a friend a predicament he 
fell into when he was a young man. Menippus says that as a young man he listened to Homer 
and Hesiod singing about wars and adultery and rape and incest, amongst other themes, and 
was taken in: “haec me hercle omnia bona pulchraque putabam, et studiose erga ea 
afficiebar” (“By god, I thought that all these things were perfectly lovely, and I was 
compelled in all eagerness towards them”) (3). When he came of age, however, much to his 
befuddlement he made the discovery that the laws he was subject to did not permit adultery, 
rape, and theft, and so he was unsure as to how he should conduct himself (“me gererem”) 
(3).  
 In this state of fledgling aporia, Menippus decided to go to the philosophers and to 
entrust himself to them in the expectation that they would show him “vitaeque viam aliquam 
simplicem ac certam” (“some uncomplicated and sure way of life”) (4). Here again, though, 
Menippus found more trouble than help: “haec igitur mecum reputans ad eos venio, 
imprudens profecto, quod me ex fumo (ut aiunt) in flammam conicerem. apud enim hos 
 
11 When citing from More’s translations of Lucian, I will cite the section numbers of More’s Latin text rather 
than the page numbers because the section numbers also correspond to modern editions of Lucian. This practice 
will not only allow for more precise referencing, but, if the reader wants to look up what More is translating 
from Lucian, she will be readily able to do so.    
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maxime diligenter observans summam repperi ignorantiam, omniaque magis incerta” (“And 
so, reasoning thus with myself, I go to them [the philosophers], absolutely ignorant that I was 
sending myself out of the smoke, as they say, into the fire, for, as I was carefully 
investigating [things] among these men, I found the utmost ignorance and even greater 
uncertainty”) (4). Menippus gives two main reasons as to why the philosophers were so 
harmful to his cause. First, all of the philosophers disagreed with one another, even though 
they were each able to produce sound arguments, or so they seemed to Menippus, for each of 
their contentious opinions. One philosopher, Menippus relates, encouraged him to pursue 
pleasure without vacillation or apprehension, but another one dissuaded him from pleasure, 
commending the toilsome path of virtue. One philosopher called money a great evil, he saw, 
while another pronounced it a good that all good men ought to pursue. And the main trouble 
about all this was that Menippus agreed with the arguments on all sides for all their varying 
and even mutually exclusive positions, while at the same time he recognized that he could not 
hold to two or more positions that stood in direct contradiction one to the other.  
Second, Menippus found that the philosophers did not live up to their teachings. Here 
it is important to consider More’s actual translation of Lucian, for he emphasizes this 
particular point in his translation and, in so doing, sheds light on his own statement about the 
“arrogant precepts” (“superciliosis… praeceptis”) of the philosophers. In Lucian’s original, 
Menippus merely says he found that the philosophers “ἐναντιώτατα τοῖς αὑτῶν λόγοις 
ἐπιτηδεύοντας” (“practiced things entirely opposite to their words”) (5). As skilled a 
translator as More shows himself to be throughout his work on Lucian, he might have 
rendered this Greek participial phrase into Latin easily, word for word. Instead, he departs 
from Lucian’s more abstractly commonplace wording, rendering the phrase as, “comperi eam 
[vitam eorum] cum ipsorum verbis praeceptisque summopere pugnare” (“I found that it [their 
life] fought very greatly with their words and teachings”) (5). I have translated this clause 
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very literally, rendering “pugnare” with its most basic meaning of “fight,” to bring out 
something of the distinctiveness of More’s translation here. A better translation, of course, 
would be to allow that here “pugnare” merely means “to oppose” or “to contradict,” as it does 
oftentimes in Latin literature and that More has added the somewhat awkward “summopere” 
to account for the superlative character of “ἐναντιώτατα.”12 The more literal translation, 
though, demonstrates how More belabors this phrase, for “cum… summopere pugnare” is 
certainly more vivid and slightly wordier than Lucian’s workaday abstractions. But this is not 
the only part of the phrase More belabors. Where Lucian writes that the philosophers’ lives 
were “opposed to their words,” More translates that their lives were “opposed to their words 
and precepts,” making use of the very same word, “praeceptis,” that More terms “arrogant” 
when he is speaking about philosophers to Ruthall (5). What More seems to be suggesting 
here is not merely that the philosophers were hypocritical, but that their hypocrisy is most 
related to their own teachings. The general sense that More communicates of philosophers is 
that they are mere windbags who lack the personal capacity to practice themselves what they 
pressure others to practice. He treats them at many points in his writings, and especially when 
he is drawing on Lucian, in much the same way the canonical gospels typically treat the 
Pharisees, as duplicitous guides motivated by judiciously hidden faults.      
When More says that Lucian holds himself back from the “arrogant precepts of 
philosophers and the dissolute games of the poets,” he means that Lucian intentionally avoids 
errors that his characters encounter time and again in the words of the poets and philosophers. 
This is a statement, on both ends, about the moral decency of Lucian’s writings. First, More 
suggests, Lucian is not licentious like many of the most renowned Greek poets. Not only does 
he avoid their reprehensibly immoral tales, but he even scoffs at them and points up the harm 
 
12 For this Ciceronian expression, “pugnare cum” as used in intellectual contexts, see, for instance, Fin. 2, 21, 
68, where he writes, “pugnant Stoici cum Peripateticis.” See also Fin. 3, 12, 41; N. D. 3, 1, 3; Phil. 2, 8, 18. 
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they can do to a young person seeking after the good.13 And, lest someone object that in his 
Necromantia Lucian portrays Menippus as a remarkably stupid young man because he does 
not recognize the fictional nature of the poetry he is reading and the implications of that 
fictionality, suffice it to say that the way Lucian depicts the experience of Menippus is a 
hasty, shorthand way of suggesting a debate that reaches back at least as far as Plato’s 
Republic. More to the point, whatever Lucian was making of Menippus, More seems to take 
this criticism about the moral dangers of ancient poetry seriously, or he at least uses it 
rhetorically to evoke Lucian’s moral decency. But it is More’s exposition of Lucian’s 
treatment of the philosophers that will have the most bearing on this study. Philosophers too, 
for More, are dangerous for the person seeking after both wisdom and goodness, all the more 
so because they are deceitful, arrogantly proposing standards and practices that they 
themselves do not live up to. They too are creators of fictions, but their fictions are the more 
lethal to the soul because they seem real and within reach. 
According to More, then, Lucian, while avoiding the poets’ Scylla and the Charybdis 
of the philosopher, makes his way through humor: Lucian “everywhere observes and attacks 
the vices of mortals with a most principled and very clever wit.” Two features mark the 
writings of Lucian, then, his focus on human vice and his humorous treatment of it. So 
crucial is this approach to More that he expands on it in his next sentence. Lucian, he says, 
keeps sight of these foci and writes in light of them so skillfully that no conscientious reader 
could avoid enduring the sting he takes from Lucian’s reprimands calmly and in good humor. 
 
13 For the purposes of this chapter, I will skirt most questions about the accuracy and even the honesty of More’s 
portrait of Lucian in his letter to Ruthall. Lucian certainly does tell risqué tales here and there, not least in 
Lucius or the Ass, which Erasmus himself mentions in the letter to More that forms the preface to his Moriae 
Encomium (68). It is possible, even likely, that More was familiar with Lucius or the Ass and other of Lucian’s 
less than decent writings and is merely presenting a polished version of Lucian for the churchman to whom he is 
writing. But, then, it is also likely that Ruthall himself was familiar with these same sorts of stories. For my 
purposes it makes no difference even if More and Ruthall are here involved in a mutual lie. What matters here is 
what More sees in Lucian as worthy of emulation. That is the real heart of the letter. More will go to great 
lengths in this letter and even be more open and aboveboard than Erasmus to show that what he sees in Lucian 
and what he takes from him are perfectly acceptable for a Christian in his time.  
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This sort of writing, More presses, produces “fruit” (“tantaque cum fruge”) in the reader, by 
which he means, of course, moral fruit. One should stop for a moment to consider the theory 
of reading More is setting forth here, for those scholars who think that More is merely 
playing the rhetor here in defense of Lucian often miss the internal coherence of what he is 
arguing and its implications for his own writing. Recall that More began his letter holding 
together the significance of pleasure and instruction, but slightly privileging the pleasure over 
the instruction. Now it is clear why. First, from the outset More assumes that the purpose of 
reading is moral improvement. This moral improvement, he suggests, does not come through 
the mere imposition of instruction. Instruction in and of itself is unpleasant to the human 
heart, just as being stung by an insect is unpleasant to the body. If instruction is not softened 
by or even diluted in pleasure, the reader will feel it only as a sting, and, if he feels it only as 
a sting, he will only be annoyed and slap away the bug that got him, just as the Athenians did 
with Socrates. Lucian is no Socrates. Rather than simply pointing up the failings of his 
audience, Lucian, like the good rhetor Socrates was not, uses humor to divert and ease his 
audience while he hurts it. Satiric humor, then, along with the pleasure it induces, does not 
take away the sting of moral instruction; it merely provides one with something else to focus 
on while the instructive sting is taking place. 
As Travis Curtright has recently explained, the view that More expresses here about 
the rhetorical usefulness of humor accords well with his general thinking. Not long ago, 
scholars like G.R. Elton and Richard Marius became fond of ferreting out dark psychological 
explanations for Thomas More’s famous humor, the sort of humor expounded in the first 
chapter of this study. Curtright counters this view with the more sensible and ground 
contention that humor or “mockery… need not be considered a vice, a mood, or a 
consequence of how More’s father raised him; it could be a sign of excellent rhetoric” (5). He 
goes on to explain that “the once widely held revisionist opinion of More obscures how 
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deeply classical rhetoric influences More’s own sense not just of humor but also of 
humanism” (5). More understands humor, says Curtright, as a form of eloquence that can be 
used on the side of reason:  
More follows rather than contradicts conventional humanist teaching, which echoes 
precisely what Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, among others, claim, namely, that the 
use of humor remains an essential means of persuasion. For the relationship between 
ridere (to laugh) and deridere (to deride), it was believed, presents orators with the 
means of victory. (5) 
Although Curtright’s study focuses mainly on More’s later, polemical writings and the ways 
in which he employed humor against his opponents, the consonance between Curtright’s 
exposition of More’s view of eloquent humor and what More writes of Lucian’s use of humor 
is well worth noting. For More, it would seem, humor was an essential tool, but as a tool its 
use was always subordinated to a higher moral purpose. This is the interpretive lens through 
which More understood Lucian, and the governing aesthetic he would himself put into 
practice. 
 Given the aesthetic More extracts from Lucian’s writings, it should come as no 
surprise that More goes on to emphasize the moral lessons to be learned from each of the 
dialogues he has translated and how those lessons line up with Christian teachings. Of 
Cynicus (The Cynic), he asks what could be more pleasing to a Christian man than 
is dialogus, in quo dum aspera, parvoque contenta Cynicorum vita defenditur, mollis, 
atque enervata delicatorum hominum luxuria reprehenditur? Nec non eadem opera, 
Christianae vitae simplicitas, temperantia, frugalitas, denique arcta illa atque angusta 
via, quae ducit ad vitam, laudatur.  
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this dialogue, in which while the hard life of the Cynic, contented with little, is 
defended, the soft and effeminate luxury of the pampered is criticized? And indeed at 
the same time the simplicity of the Christian life, its self-denial, its virtue, and that 
close and narrow way that leads to life, are praised. (4) 
For More, it matters little that the cynic who is featured in this dialogue would have scoffed 
at the teachings of Christianity, at best. Morals teachings are what count, particularly those 
teachings that would bring about the reform of the church and its leaders. Recall that, like 
Colet, More did not think the church’s core teachings or doctrinal authority needed 
substantive revision. What needed revising for More and the other “Graecistes” were the 
moral habits of the clergy and the church as a whole. Although it is debated whether More 
himself genuinely considered entering the monastery and why he might have done so, one is 
safe in asserting that More always had a deep respect for the intensity and integrity of this 
way of life (Ackroyd 96; Guy 28-32). No scholar doubts that More wore a hairshirt and 
whipped himself to tame his desires (Guy 22, 29). The least one can say on this matter about 
Thomas More says much about how potentially serious he was when he praised Lucian’s 
Cynicus as moral guidance for the clergy, for the educated theologians, and for the church in 
general that had lost its way morally. The cynic of ancient Greece comes closest to the 
severity and the ardor of the cloistered monk and thus is well-suited in that regard to 
challenge the complacency of More’s contemporaries.       
Of the Necromantia, as I have already discussed, More maintains that it finds fault 
with the empty fictions of the poets, the philosophers’ kerfuffles, and, he adds revealingly, 
“magorum praestigias” (“the deceptions [or illusions] of the magicians”) (4). In fact, contrary 
to the way I have written it out in the previous sentence, More fronts “the deceptions of the 
magicians” at the beginning of the tricolon and ends it with his reference to philosophical 
disputes. This move unquestionably emphasizes philosophers’ quarrels most, but it also 
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places a significant measure of emphasis on the “praestigias” of the “magorum.” But what, 
precisely, is More referring to here? To understand More’s use of these terms, it is well again 
to recall that he lived in a world very far from that of modernity or postmodernity. Ackroyd 
notes in his description of the Carthusian monks and their spiritual susceptibilities, for 
instance,  
In the records of the sixteenth-century Charterhouse there are accounts of visitations 
and apparitions. The crucified figure of Jesus turned its back upon on recalcitrant 
monk, in sight of the community, while another was always struck with blindness on 
entering the church… The brothers [once] saw in the air ‘a globe as of blood, of great 
size,’ and in the same period swarms of flies covered the entire surface of the 
monastery, ‘all which things we feared were the signs and forecasts of other events…’ 
Such accounts come from intelligent and well-educated contemporaries of More 
himself; his was still a world of marvels and apparitions. (100) 
These sorts of records should remind one that, when More refers to the “magorum 
praestigias,” he is probably not waxing rhetorical about matters that have no relation to his 
actual existence, especially since he uses the term “magicis… praestigiis” again later in the 
same letter when he is describing the moral usefulness of the third dialogue he has included 
for Ruthall. To perceive the relationship between these “praestigiae,” however, and More’s 
own lived experience is no simple matter. Gerald Malsbary’s translation of More’s letter and 
Lucianic dialogues in The Essential Works of Thomas More seems unsure of what to do with 
this term, first translating it, somewhat meaninglessly, as “the jugglery of magicians” and 
later simply as “magic” (20).  
That More uses this same term twice in the same letter when he is explicating what he 
takes to be of the utmost importance in the dialogues he has translated implies the central 
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significance of this term to More’s overall argument. My contention, indeed, is that 
“praestigiae” is a signal or shorthand for the heretically tinged, immoral falsehoods that More 
thought had invaded the church of his day and that were most in need of being eradicated for 
the better reformation of that church. Lucian’s skepticism, More seems to think, would be the 
perfect moral antidote for the poison of superstition that so marks the church in the early 
sixteenth century. Evidence for this reading comes most to light when More is discussing his 
translation of Philopseudes and once again relating the moral fruits it will produce in his 
readers: “hunc certe fructum nobis adferet iste dialogus: ut neque magicis habeamus 
praestigiis fidem, et superstitione careamus, quae passim sub specie religionis obrepit” 
(“Certainly the dialogue [under discussion] produces this fruit: that we should not put our 
faith in magical deceptions and that we should free ourselves from superstition, which sneaks 
around everywhere under the guise of religion”) (4). Here the conjoining of “magicis… 
praestigiis” to “superstitione” strengthens the attentive reader’s sense of what More might 
mean by the first term. In his discussion of Necromantia, More juxtaposes a variation this 
term to the fantastical creations of poets, “inania poetarum figmenta” (4). Here in his 
discussion of Philopseudes, More juxtaposes the term even more significantly to unbounded 
and excessively fearful religious belief, “superstitione” (4). Based on these juxtapositions, 
one begins to suspect that the “deceptions” or “illusions” which More is terming “magicis” 
are fantasies and chimeras of an unmistakably religious nature.   
This suspicion is decisively confirmed by the remainder of the letter. More’s very 
next statement is that Philopseudes should help his contemporaries “tum vitam ut agamus 
minus anxiam, minus videlicet expavescentes tristia quaepiam ac superstitiosa mendacia” 
(“in leading our lives less anxiously, less apprehensive, that is, of certain melancholy and 
superstitious untruths”) (4). Then, at long last, More offers some adeptly chosen examples of 
what he means. He writes that superstitious falsehoods are “generally” “plerumque” told with 
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such conviction and authority that they can mislead even the most learned, as when someone 
long skilled in lying “nescio quisnam veterator” once convinced Saint Augustine that “ut 
fabulam illam de duobus Spurinis, altero in vitam redeunte, altero decedente, tamquam rem 
suo ipsius tempore gestam pro vera narraret” (“that he could relate as an event that truly 
happened in his own day that story about the two Spurinnae, the one returning to life, the 
other departing from it”) (4).14 The problem with this story was that “Lucianus in hoc 
dialogo, mutatis tantum nominibus, tot annis antequam Augustinus nasceretur, irrisit” 
(“Lucian in this very dialogue [Philopseudes] ridiculed [this story], with only the names 
changed, so many years before Augustine was born”) (4). If Augustine had only known his 
Lucian, or perhaps had possessed a greater measure of Lucian’s skepticism, he would not 
have been taken in by such a fib. More goes on to work out a lesson from this story about 
Augustine that applies much more generally to the problems of his day:  
quo minus mireris, si pinguioris vulgi mentes suis figmentis adficiant ei, qui se tum 
demum rem magnam confecisse putant, Christumque sibi devinxisse perpetuo, si 
commenti fuerint, aut de sancto aliquo viro fabulam, aut de inferis tragoediam, ad 
quam vetula quaepiam aut delira lacrimetur, aut pavida inhorrescat.  
You should be the less surprised if the minds of the dull herd are influenced by the 
inventions of those who think they have done a great work and have put Christ in their 
debt permanently when they have fabricated either a tale about some saintly man or a 
gloomy fib about hell to render some old lady senseless with tears or shuddering in 
fear. (4) 
Although More ends on this note about frightening some poor old woman, his concern is not 
for his gullible and emotive contemporaries. His concern is that these falsehoods inevitably 
 
14 For this story, see Augustine’s De mendacio 10.17.  
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lead to the falsification of the Christian faith. When those who insert these sorts of lies, 
letting no tale of a martyr or virgin pass without rendering it more incredible than it already 
is, they fail to consider, writes More, the harm that they are doing (6).   
 More at first allows that those who create untruths of this sort do so with pious intent, 
“pie scilicet,” but the end result of their fabrications, he argues, is to weaken the authority of 
the church’s teachings: “Nempe (ut memoratus pater Augustinus testatur) ubi admixtum 
subolet mendacium, veritatis ilico minuitur ac labefactatur auctoritas” (“Of course, as the 
aforementioned father Augustine bears witness, when the lie that had been mixed in is 
smelled out, the authority of the truth is instantly reduced and undermined”) (6). More then 
shifts ground and gives a much darker reading of some of the fabricators’ motives, saying 
that he has always harbored the suspicion that a great many of these fables were written by “a 
vafris ac pessimis quibusdam nebulonibus, haereticisque” (“by certain guileful and immoral 
rascals and heretics”) both to amuse themselves at the gullibility of the common herd and to 
“fidem veris Christianorum historiis adimere” (“to deprive the true stories of Christians of 
their trustworthiness”) (6). For, More argues, they often write stories that are so like in 
character to Christian stories that they show they are merely playing around (6). The ultimate 
conclusion More draws from this argument is that Christian readers should fully trust in the 
stories of scripture, but should test and weigh all other stories handed on in the Christian 
tradition, keeping some, rejecting others, if they “carere volumus et inani fiducia et 
supersticiosa formidine” (“wish to be free from both naïveté and superstitious fear”) (6). The 
implication of this rather long argument is as well-defined as it is historically ironic: Lucian, 
the notorious “atheist” and satirist of Christians and their beliefs, is the finest author available 
to More’s contemporaries for inculcating in them the skepticism necessary to reform the 
church by purging it of the countless fables and falsehoods that is has accumulated over the 
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centuries (Wegemer 62). Lucian is now no longer an enemy of the church; he is to be an 
indispensable partner in its reformation.    
 For those capable of following More’s reasoning but still reluctant about Lucian’s 
credentials, More takes up the problem of Lucian’s ill repute far more directly than Erasmus 
does in any of his writings. More’s first move, early in the letter, is to maintain that John 
Chrysostom, “vir acerrimi iudicii, doctorum ferme omnium Christianissimus, et 
Christianorum (ut ego certe puto) doctissimus” (“a man of the sharpest judgment, of nearly 
all the learned the most Christian and of the Christians, as I see it, the most learned”), 
included a large portion of Lucian’s Cynicus in a homily he wrote on the Gospel of Saint 
John. Although Peterson notes that this is an “association for which there is no evidence,” 
what More probably means here is that he detects the usage of some of Lucian’s ideas in 
Chrysostom’s sermon, no doubt a debatable contention, not that he directly quotes from 
Lucian’s dialogue (187). Whatever is the case in this matter, More’s rhetorical intentions here 
are evident: if so Christian and so learned a person as Chrysostom used Lucian’s dialogue in 
a homily, then the Syrian sophist must surely have some valuable teachings for Christians to 
consider.  
More also deals with an inescapable fact about Lucian, however useful he might 
prove to be, that he was certainly not a Christian. This fact More dismisses in an interesting 
manner: “in quo non valde me movet… ut non satis immortalitati suae confideret, atque in eo 
fuisse errore, quo Democritus, Lucretius, Plinius, plurimique itidem alii. quid enim mea refert 
quid sentiat his de rebus ethnicus, quae in praecipuis habentur fidei Christianae mysteriis” 
(“It does not much concern me that [Lucian] did not believe in his own immortality and was 
in that same error in which Democritus, Lucretius, Pliny, and many others likewise were. 
Why should I care what a pagan thinks about these sorts of issues, especially as they are 
considered to be mysteries of the Christian faith?”) (4). The position that More is arguing for 
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here is that it simply does not matter how Lucian’s views line up with those of the church on 
matters of faith. More, as Travis Curtright has explained, wants his fellow learned Christians 
to assess pagan writings with discrimination, adhering to what is uncontroversial and useful 
and simply disregarding what runs counter to Christian teachings (19). As I will show in the 
next chapter, this position does not merely proffer advice on how to read pagan authors with 
profit; it also opens up limitless possibilities for writing in a style and about topics that are 
not traditionally Christian. This position allows for a different aesthetic that takes different, 
that is, non-Christian authors as starting and as endings points.  
Socratica Ironia  
 Before setting out that aesthetic in something like its fulness, however, I should 
discuss another significant assertion in More’s letter to Ruthall and how it has given 
contemporary scholars warrant to discuss many of the things they suppose More is not saying 
about Lucian in his letter. While I allow that these discussions should inform one’s 
understanding of More on Lucian and the influence Lucian had on More, I want to emphasize 
from the outset that, in this debate, I generally side with Joshua Avery’s pithy observation 
that “understated precision is also consistent with More’s general modus operandi; he need 
not say everything on his mind” (227). More’s letter to Ruthall is undoubtedly and by design 
a rhetorically accomplished, self-contained apology for Lucian that cunningly turns the 
sophist scoffer into a advocate of the church. And of course More thought more about Lucian 
than what he says in this letter; surely he and Erasmus had absorbing conversations in Latin 
about their beloved Syrian. But, as Avery says, More tends toward “understated precision” in 
most of his early writings, and, more importantly, what one finds in More’s letter to Ruthall 
is what one can most safely conclude More thought about Lucian. Much else of what is said 
about More and his relation to Lucian is speculation built on speculation. More does open the 
door to this speculation, however, in his slightly more expansive discussion of Philopseudes, 
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the final dialogue he commends to Ruthall. Here for once he extends his discussion beyond 
the moral qualities of the dialogue, writing that “superest Philopseudes, qui non sine 
Socratica ironia, totus versatur (id quod titulus ipse declarat) in ridenda, coarguendaque 
mentiendi libidine, dialogus nescio certe lepidior ne, an utilior” (“There remains 
Philopseudes, which, as the title itself makes clear, is wholly concerned with ridiculing, not 
without Socratic irony, and exposing the inordinate passion for lying, a dialogue of which I 
cannot say whether it is more amusing or more useful”) (4). Since More so rarely specifies 
what he admires about the singularly literary quality of Lucian’s work, this reference to his 
appreciation of the “Socratica ironia” of Philopseudes is taken to be of great significance by 
more than one scholar, for this indication that More enjoys the ironic quality of Lucian’s 
work opens up possibilities for various other literary values More might have held or qualities 
he might have noted in Lucian’s work but not commented on in his closely argued letter to 
Ruthall.  
 The most fair-minded of these sorts of analyses comes in one of the first works of 
literary criticism to give proper weight to Lucian’s influence on Thomas More, Alistair Fox’s 
Thomas More: History and Providence (Branham 23). Even Fox’s accomplished reading, 
however, must be handled with care because it is predicated strongly on a biographical “fact” 
of More’s life that is nowadays not considered so factual. Fox was of the opinion that More, 
after passing the bar in 1501, had lived in the Charterhouse Monastery in order to 
contemplate taking holy orders and becoming a monk (38, Paul 17), and he builds 
significantly his interpretation of More’s thinking on this “fact.” He argues, for instance, that 
when More “was in the Charterhouse, [he] would have read the Cynicus as a praise of 
temperance and the avoidance of worldly pleasures. Such is the entirely harmless 
interpretation he invites the reader to accept in the Letter to Ruthall” (38). Fox then surmises 
that, when More departed from the Charterhouse, he was making a conscious decision not to 
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become a Christian cynic but to lead a public life. Thus, Fox maintains, when More actually 
read the Cynicus he “had just come out of the Charterhouse, having decided to reject the life 
of a cynic, and to wed instead” (38). Thus, More took up a Lucian precisely at the time when 
he was attempting to fashion a new “modus vivendi less exclusive than the one he had been 
contemplating” (35-36). The problem with Fox’s reading is that no solid evidence exists to 
support it. Not only is he reading facts into the life of More that were not facts, but he is 
seeing in those supposed facts much more than he could possibly demonstrate. The truth is, 
as Paul explains it, that “although most of More’s sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
biographers speak of him as living in the Charterhouse, Cresacre More’s 1630 biography 
states that More lived ‘near the Charterhouse’” (17). Hence, the question as to whether More 
even lived for a time in a monastery rather than spatially near it is an open one, not to 
mention that no evidence exists explaining why More chose to live there. Fox creates a whole 
existential crisis in the life of More and grounds it on weak to insubstantial evidence. Without 
this crisis, one need not surmise, as Fox does, that More was being “provocatively 
disingenuous” in his letter to Ruthall, writing a “piece of propaganda pleading… aimed at 
securing Lucian admission to pious society, if only through the didactic back door” (36). 
Without this biographical crisis, one can see More’s letter, as contemporary critics do, as an 
expression of what he actually thought, even if he does not say all (Avery 227).     
 Nonetheless, Fox is a luminous literary critic, and his literary observations are well 
worth taking into consideration. Fox, in particular, is the first to observe what might be the 
most significant technique More learned from Lucian, to write “a form of dialogue that 
dramatized ambiguity as a function of meaning,” within an ironic worldview that was 
uniquely capable of comprehending “all aspects of human experience” (36). To grasp what 
Fox means, it suffices to consider his examination of what he thinks More learned from 
Lucian’s Cynicus. According to Fox, More had a “deep sympathy for the defeated Lycinus” 
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in this dialogue, and so he saw in the lead character, the Cynic, a “self-characterizing 
dramatic character whose mode of justification emanates from his willful determination to be 
justified. Ironically, the Cynic grows increasingly intemperate as he argues for temperance… 
until he has silenced Lycinus altogether… and monopolizes the stage” (40). How does Fox 
know that More took this lesson in irony from Lucian? He knows this because the Cynic’s 
“later Portuguese descendant” behaves in precisely the same way (40). To put this plainly, 
Fox’s first point is that More learned from Lucian (not, as Kinney thought, from Erasmus) to 
obfuscate and even to undermine his narrator by embedding him or her solidly in the 
narrative and imbuing him or her with characteristics that either do not comport with the 
character’s own words, one with another, or with what seems to be the message of the work 
as a whole.  
 Even more important than what More learned from Lucian about problematizing his 
narrator, however, is the end to which he learned to put this problematization: to dramatize 
and depict ambiguity as central to the meaning of a work. Fox maintains that More 
sympathized with the defeated Lycinus and went so far as to change this character’s name to 
Lucian in order to win the sympathy of his audience: “The effect [of this change] is to 
reinforce our inclination to sympathize with the defeated questioner, because we associate his 
perplexity with that of the author himself – a strategy More would later adopt himself in his 
own Utopia” (41). Because one identifies with the defeated “Lucian,” the questioner in the 
dialogue, and not with the victorious Cynic, on finishing the dialogue one mainly feels “the 
rational and emotional tension involved in trying to ascertain the truth,” or, as Fox puts it 
later, one experiences “feelingly the problematic nature of the question” (41). When reading a 
work like Cynicus, one will feel on some level the frustration of meeting with ambiguity and 
aporia, even if one intends to read it for moral instruction. To put Fox’s position in my own 
terms, the chief form of moral instruction on offer in Cynicus and in the works that More 
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wrote under Lucian’s influence is precisely the expanded consciousness that comes from 
recognizing this ambiguity and subsuming it within one’s view of the world. Fox maintains 
that this was “a breakthrough for More, because it reflected a recognition that contradictory 
impulses can be experienced simultaneously, and that such ambivalent experience is not 
necessarily a cause for dismay or despair” (41). Through his experience of reading Cynicus, 
More came to see that “to experience the reality of both possibilities is better than to be 
bound narrowly… within the confines of any single definitive alternative: that produces a 
cynicus on the one hand, a voluptuary on the other” (41). 
 Fox plainly does not realize that he has actually ended his analysis of More’s relation 
to Cynicus on a point which more or less contradicts where he began. Recall that, according 
to Fox, More merely dressed Lucian up in a moral garb to appeal to his sternly Christian 
audience when what truly moved him about the Syrian was his dramatization of ambiguity 
and his ironic outlook. At this point in his analysis, though, Fox himself shows that these two 
positions need not be at odds. The whole point, Fox argues, of writing works like Cynicus 
and Utopia is to instruct, albeit pleasurably, one’s readers in how to become more expansive 
in their thinking and more skeptical of even those fables and positions that most appeal to 
one’s sensibilities. This is a moral end. It may be a higher or more subtle moral end that one 
expects to find in More, but, contra Fox, it is cogently argued for in More’s letter to Ruthall 
and is itself further subordinated to the highest moral end of reforming the church. Moreover, 
because Fox ignores what More says in his letter to Ruthall and puts forth his own 
understanding of what was going on in More’s mind, the scope of his interpretation of 
Lucian’s influence on More extends no farther than Cynicus. Fox’s discussion of this first 
work is incisive, but his insistence that More was not interested in the moral use to which he 
and his contemporaries could put Lucian prevents him from saying much that is meaningful 
about More’s other translations. In his discussion of Necromantia, Fox focuses on the vision 
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of life as a play that Menippus sees in the underworld, arguing that Lucian’s peculiar version 
of this trope, which More knew from Augustine, Cicero, Erasmus and other humanists, taught 
him “how much more comfortable it was to laugh at absurdity rather than feel laughed at by 
it” (Fox 43, Paul 15). Again, Fox offers no direct evidence as to how he knows what occurred 
in More’s mind upon reading this trope in Lucian. Of the third and longest dialogue More 
translated, Philopseudes, and of More’s declamation in response to Lucian’s Tyrannicida, 
Fox can only say that they “are not immediately relevant to an understanding of More’s 
intellectual development” (44). That Fox’s interpretation of the evidence comes up so short is 
itself evidence that More was not writing tongue in cheek in his letter to Ruthall. Rather, 
More had located in the writings of Lucian a congenial aesthetic that was in the service of 
moral instruction and reform.  
 In my next chapter, I will show in detail how More applied this aesthetic in his 
writing of Utopia, but for now it might be helpful to summarize what More found in Lucian 
that he would later put to use. First, More noted and approved of how Lucian used humor to 
make the experience of reading for moral instruction more pleasurable. Second, as Fox 
explains, More learned from Lucian how to complicate his narrator by embedding him in the 
action of the dialogue and by imbuing him with qualities designed to make the reader think 
twice, and then a third time, about his authority and trustworthiness. More figured out with 
the help of Lucian how to write works that did not resolve moral problems but that goaded 
the reader into developing a broader, more independent moral stance of his or her own. Third, 
More believed that Lucian himself had a strong moral purpose in writing and that the 
skepticism he was so infamously associated with had a positive purpose that could be put to 
use in More’s day. From the evidence that rises up when one reads More’s translations of 
Lucian next to his Utopia, More seems to have thought that Lucian’s humor, his treatment of 
his narrator, and his use of irony and ambiguity could all be put into the moral service of 
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training a more piously educated and skeptical clergy, which would eventually work towards 
the reform of the whole church. Along with this greatest of benefits, securing for Lucian a 
place in the work of the church would bolster the study of Greek authors and support his 
friend Erasmus’s agenda of reform. 
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Chapter 3: The Reality of Nowhere     
 This final chapter aims to develop and detail the numerous ways in which More’s 
interpretation of Lucian functioned as an aesthetic from which he composed his own Utopia 
and then to explain how applying this understanding of a Lucianic aesthetic resolves the main 
interpretive problems of More’s work. Although the influence of Lucian on More is, as a rule, 
played down in the literature, other scholars since Fox have worked in this soil. In 1985, 
following on the heels of Fox’s book, R.B. Branham wrote an article in which he examined 
the influence of Lucian on More’s thinking about the aesthetics of writing dialogues, finding 
that More was very selective in his use of Lucian and markedly keen to “purge” his own 
work of “qualities unsuited to his own very different purposes” (23). Joshua Avery has 
recently taken issue with one sub-argument of Branham’s analysis; he argues, as will I, that 
More learned from Lucian’s character the Cynic how to create a character who seems right 
about so many things but whose behavior belies or otherwise undermines much of what he 
says (225). Anna Peterson has written a very recent article in which she argues for a morally 
stern, almost puritanical Thomas More whose main concern in writing to Ruthall and in the 
dialogues he chose for translation was to “construct a very specific image of the Syrian 
satirist,” one less Bohemian than Erasmus’s construction that might therefore prove palatable 
to Christian readers (191).  
Perhaps the scholar who argues most vehemently in support of the claim that Lucian, 
not Plato, was More’s preeminent guide as he was writing Utopia is Jane Raisch. Her essay 
focuses on the reception of Lucian in More’s day and how More learns from Lucian’s 
Necromantia to represent the Greek tradition in Utopia. Raisch concludes that 
Utopia confidently displays its Lucianic Hellenism: intertextual compilation and 
collaboration remain firmly within the Greek tradition; Greek commentators and 
 Verhine 75 
 
authors, not Christian texts or figures, provide Utopia’s hermeneutic mediators… 
Utopia mediates its Greek preoccupations exclusively through a lens of Greek 
reception. Indeed, despite the popularity amongst Renaissance Hellenists of projects 
that sought to Christianize Plato… More remained committed to the more literary and 
more skeptical mode of Lucian. (931-932) 
All of these studies, as well as Fox’s, have proven helpful in thinking about how More 
adapted Lucian’s aesthetic, but none of them have attempted anything like a systematic 
treatment of Lucian’s influence on More. Each of these studies, whatever its conclusion, 
usually focuses in on how More takes up a single dialogue or theme in Lucian and puts it to 
his own purposes. To my mind, Lucian’s influence on More is far broader and farther 
reaching than any of these studies allow, and my aim here is to sketch out the character of 
that influence in as much detail as possible, rather than to home in on some single 
characteristic or scene in Utopia. This discussion will be broad ranging because the hand of 
Lucian is ubiquitous throughout the Utopia. 
 I should say a word also about method. First, for the purposes of this study, I will, 
with one exception, compare More’s Utopia only to the works of Lucian that More himself 
translated, for the simple reason that there is no evidence of what else More read in Lucian. 
So far as my own research has found, one cannot even say for certain that More read 
Erasmus’s translations, although it seems likely that he would have read at least some of 
them. In the works of Lucian which More translated one has a unique security to assert where 
More might have found a certain theme or technique. Second, and more importantly, I 
labored in the last chapter to detail the context of sponsoring Greek learning and church 
reform that informed More’s translations of Lucian and the writing of his Utopia. I recognize, 
however, that this context is by no means conclusive in and of itself. Just as in the initial 
chapter of this study the hypothetical researcher created a false but plausible context within 
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which to understand More’s quip to the prison warden about not allowing the prisoner back 
in, so it may be that I have created above a false if plausible context for understanding the 
central influence on More’s Utopia. But just as with that dilemma the only way to perceive 
something of the actual context in which that anecdote was first told is to find a matching or 
corresponding passage, so here the measure of the truthfulness of the context I have 
elaborated will depend on how closely the themes and techniques and methods of Utopia 
match those found in Lucian’s writings. As Mitchell Miller in his reading of Plato’s 
Parmenides maintains, “For any interpretive stance, what counts is the actual richness of 
sense and range of coherence that it allows to come to light on the text” (12). The historical 
context in which I have situated More’s writing of Utopia affords certain limits for what one 
should take into consideration when interpreting this work,15 but it will only be vindicated by 
the various ways in which it explicates the fulness of Utopia, particularly in its more 
troublesome passages.  
 As was suggested earlier in this study, many of the themes and techniques More 
picked up from Lucian find their most significant applications in the figure of Hythlodaeus. 
Perhaps the best place to begin a discussion of this predominant figure, whose significance is 
so fundamental to the overall work Utopia seeks to do on its reader, is to recall where I last 
left him, somewhere in the lower decks of his ship fighting with a long-tailed monkey over a 
 
15 For instance, some of the techniques I suppose More to have found in Lucian he might well have found in 
some of the writings of Chaucer, not to mention Horace. See Elizabeth’s McCutcheon’s discussion of this issue 
on page 18 of “My Dear Peter.” Ars Poetica and Hermeneutics for More’s Utopia. Angers: Moreana (1983) 
and, more generally, the following studies: Ryan, Francis X. "Sir Thomas More's Use of Chaucer." Studies in 
English literature, 1500-1900 35.1 (1995): 1-17 and Marc’hadour, Germain. “Geoffrey Chaucer (ca. 1340-1400) 
and Thomas More (1477-1535).” Moreana 41.3 (2004): 37-63. The problem with looking at More’s work 
through the lens of Chaucer’s writings is that, as Alistair Fox explains, it is difficult to prove that More read 
much of Chaucer, even if it seems highly likely that he did (66). With Lucian, on the other hand, one has 
evidence not merely that More read him sensitively, as one must when translating, but of what he thought about 
Lucian’s significance as an author. At the end of the day, of course, one must admit that even strong 
correspondences between ideas and techniques found in Lucian and those found in More’s Utopia only imply 
the probability that More was borrowing from Lucian. Given the historical situation in which More was writing 
and the strong correspondences between his work and Lucian’s, however, Lucian seems the final and most 
likely source for More’s borrowing.           
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work of Theophrastus. I argued above that this episode, in a minimum of space and largely 
through symbol and allusion, intimates the unreliability and even the deviousness of 
Hythlodaeus, who at this point in the work is acting as the sole narrator of the story. Now it is 
time to consider how this anecdote opens out and may be taken as a textual or anecdotal 
synecdoche for the ways Utopia dramatically undermines and ambiguates its own central 
character. For ease of reference, I will retranslate that passage here:     
librorum sarcinam mediocrem loco mercium quarto navigaturus in navem conieci 
quod mecum plane decreveram numquam potius redire quam cito… [inter quos] 
Theophrastum item de plantis, sed pluribus, quod doleo, in locis mutilum. In librum 
enim dum navigabamus neglegentius habitum, cercopithecus inciderat: qui lasciviens 
ac ludibundus, paginas aliquot hinc atque inde evulsas laceravit.  
I tossed a medium-sized bag of books, in place of goods I might sell, onto the ship as I 
was about to set sail on the fourth voyage, since I had firmly decided that I would 
never return rather than return quickly… [Among these books was] likewise 
Theophrastus’s De Plantis, torn apart in many places, much to my displeasure. For, 
while we were sailing, a long-tailed monkey had attacked this book, which I had put 
away thoughtlessly, and had, as he was running wild, eager for play, ripped apart 
several pages he had torn out here and there. (180) 
Philosophus Gloriosissimus   
The first point to note about this passage is how Hythlodaeus himself associates 
himself with Greek and, first and foremost, with Greek philosophers. In this passage, 
Hythlodaeus is explaining how it happened that the Utopians were able to learn ancient 
Greek. This came about because Hythlodaeus himself carried with him, on this journey from 
which he might never return, “Platonis opera pleraque, Aristotelis plura, Theophrastum item 
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de plantis” (“most of Plato’s works and more of Aristotle’s, [and] likewise Theophrastus’s De 
Plantis” (180). In this work, so evidently patterned after Plato’s Republic, as the introductory 
parerga twice note, the mention of Plato’s name first is undoubtedly intentional (18, 24). 
Since Plato’s works (as well as those of other Greek philosophers) are the first Hythlodaeus 
names, and since they come in the largest quantities mentioned, it is reasonable to assume 
that they are important to Hythlodaeus and that he wants his hearers, Morus and Petrus 
Aegidius, to make this association.  
 That Hythlodaeus is successful in communicating this version of himself to his 
hearers is obvious from early on in Utopia. Petrus Aegidius, at the least, wholly buys into 
Hythlodaeus’s presentation of himself. Recall that it is Petrus, as he is about to introduce 
Hytholdaeus to Morus, who says that “Raphael iste” has sailed not as a Palinurus, “sed ut 
Ulysses, immo velut Plato” (“but as a Ulysses, or, rather, as a Plato”) (42). In partial 
explanation of his meaning, Petrus goes on to say, “Raphael iste… et Latinae linguae non 
indoctus, et Graecae doctissimus cuius ideo studiosior quam Romanae fuit, quoniam totum se 
addixerat philosophiae, qua in re nihil quod alicuius momenti sit, praeter Senecae quaedam, 
ac Ciceronis exstare Latine cognovit” (“This Raphael [is] not unlearned in the Latin tongue 
and is very learned in Greek. He was more eager to learn [Greek] than Latin because he had 
given himself entirely over to philosophy; on this subject, he knew that there was nothing in 
Latin of much significance besides certain works of Seneca and Cicero”) (44). Later in the 
dialogue after he has gotten to know Hythlodaeus, Morus seems to accept the same 
identification. At one point in their conversation, Morus refers to Hythlodaeus’s “animo tuo 
tam generoso, tam vere philosopho” (“your noble and truly philosophical nature”) (52). Then, 
after he has been talking and arguing with Hythlodaeus for some time, Morus tries a different 
tack to convince Hythlodaeus that he should go into the service of some great prince to offer 
his philosophically informed wisdom to an actual ruler for the betterment of an actual people. 
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To sway Hythlodaeus, Morus says, “tuus censeat Plato,” (“your friend Plato thinks”) that 
states will never become just until either philosophers become kings or kings become 
philosophers (80-82). Here Morus emphasizes the somewhat flattering “tuus” by separating it 
from the noun it properly modifies, calling attention to the identification he is making. 
Hythlodaeus promptly counters that Plato himself learned better when he tried to make a 
philosopher of Dionysius, but he nowhere rejects More’s close association of himself with the 
greatest philosopher of the ancient world and the first inventor of a fictional, perfectly 
functioning commonwealth.  
 But the writer of Utopia is even smarter than Raphael, and using various techniques 
borrowed from the writings of Lucian he suggests to the audience that Raphael may be less, 
or perhaps much more, than he seems. First is the mere fact that More exhibits to his reading 
audience the extent to which and the ways in which Hythlodaeus attempts to control and even 
bully his audience into perceiving him appropriately. In the passage above, which recounts 
how he carried along his books, this attempt to control his audience’s perceptions of him is 
evident. He says that he took this bag of books with him “loco mercium,” in place of goods 
he might sell” when he might simply have said that he carried some books along with him 
(180). The point of including “loco mercium,” of course, is to suggest that, while other sailors 
were merely interested in making a little extra cash to spend on their journey, he was intent 
on improving mind and soul. Throughout Utopia one encounters these sorts of efforts on the 
part of Hythlodaeus to shape his own ethos. So, for instance, Raphael does not simply say 
that he spoke out in the presence of Cardinal Morton. Rather, as he puts it, “ego ausus enim 
sum libere apud Cardinalem loqui” (“for I dared to speak out freely before the Cardinal”) 
(56). Likewise, when Petrus is first telling Morus about Hythlodaeus, he describes him by 
quoting two aphorisms the sailor frequently recycles: “cui haec assidue sunt in ore, “caelo 
tegitur qui non habet urnam” et “undique ad superos tantundem esse viae” (“These words are 
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regularly on his lips, “He who has no urn is covered by the sky” and “The path to heaven is 
the same length, wherever [on starts from]”) (44). Petrus makes it clear when he relates these 
aphorisms that Hythlodaeus means them to suggest his attitude that he is more concerned 
about his travels than where he might be buried, and, even though Petrus does not approve of 
this mindset, he gets the message and sends it on to Morus (44).  
Hythlodaeus is particularly good at implicitly characterizing himself through his 
criticisms of others. When Morus is just beginning the argument that Hythlodaeus should 
serve some prince with his philosophical wisdom, he tells Hythlodaeus that the combination 
of learning and experience he embodies could not but incite a prince to noble actions and 
sound rule (52). Hythlodaeus quickly counters, “bis erras… mi More, primum in me, deinde 
in re ipsa. nam neque mihi ea est facultas, quam tu tribuis, et si maxime esset, tamen quum 
otio meo negotium facesserem, publicam rem nihil promoveam” (“You are twice in error, my 
dear More, first in me and then in the matter itself, for I do not possess the ability you 
attribute to me, and [even] if I did possess it in the highest degree, nevertheless when I had 
given up my leisure to do my duty, I would still not progress the state one bit”) (52). At first 
sight, this passage may seem to argue against the idea that Raphael is keen to have others 
think well of him, especially since he maintains against Morus praise that he does not possess 
the competence Morus attributes to him, but, when one reads this denial in the context of the 
two paragraphs that follow, one readily sees that this is nothing more than false modesty on 
Hythlodaeus’s part. He tells Morus that he errs on two points, his understanding of 
Hythlodaeus and of the situation, and yet he devotes a total of nine words, generously 
counted, to denying Morus misunderstanding of his abilities and then follows up with two 
extensive paragraphs explaining how the shortcomings of prince’s and their advisors would 
always prevent them from taking Hythlodaeus’s superior advice (52-54).  
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At one point, for instance, he argues that if someone, some wise someone, should 
proffer advice based on his reading or his travels (and of course it is clear by this point who 
that wise someone is), the prince’s other counselors would feel that their own wisdom was 
being challenged and so would labor to find some fault with what he is saying, not because 
what he says has faults in it but to protect their own reputations for wisdom. All of his 
objections to Morus praise of his potential usefulness in court are of this kind. It becomes 
clear at once that Hythlodaeus in no way blames himself for his uselessness before a prince. 
The fault is always with the arrogance of others and their unwillingness to take advice from a 
man so knowledgeable and well-travelled. More to the point, the way Hythlodaeus repeatedly 
denigrates others who have a reputation for wisdom, or who should have, characterizes 
himself as the foil to their folly, and thus as the wise man. So effective is he in this self-
characterization that, by the end of the dialogue, Hythlodaeus has bullied Morus into not 
challenging his account even though More lets his reading audience know that Hythlodaeus 
has failed to persuade Morus on many points. The reason Morus will not challenge 
Hythlodaeus is carefully spelled out for the reader. Morus says that he was unsure as to 
whether Hythlodaeus “would be able to bear” “possetne ferre” any sort of contradiction, 
especially because “recordabar, eo nomine quosdam ab illo reprehensos, quasi vererentur, ne 
non satis putarentur sapere, nisi aliquid invenirent, in quo vellicare aliorum inventa possent” 
(“I recalled how he had condemned certain men who were afraid that they would not be 
thought sufficiently wise unless they found some way to carp and nip at the original ideas of 
others”) (248). This consideration on Morus part shows most effectively how Hythlodaeus 
wins control over his interlocutors’ perception of him through his characterization of those he 
presents as his foils.  
But that More expected his readers to see through Hythlodaeus’s bullying attempts to 
earn their sympathies is apparent from the fact that, although Hythlodaeus works hard to 
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associate himself with the best of Greek philosophy – Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and so 
on – the writer of Utopia allows those associations to stand but himself labors to suggest that 
Hythlodaeus should be sorted in the reader’s mind among lesser figures (Sylvester 273). One 
figure he is particularly likened to is the Cynic from Lucian’s Cynicus. Indeed, the very first 
impression More gives his readers of Hythlodaeus calls up for those familiar with his 
translations of Lucian the image of the Cynic philosopher. Here is how More translates the 
opening lines of Cynicus, where Lucianus first encounters the Cynic and describes him, both, 
within the dialogue, to call the Cynic to account and for the benefit of the reading audience: “ 
Quid tu, tandem? Barbam quidem habes, et comam, tunicam non habes, nudusque 
conspiceris, ac sine calceis… nunc huc, nunc illuc circuis, in arido praeterea solo 
cubans, adeo ut plurimum etiam sordium, tritum istoc pallium referat, alioqui nec 
ipsum, vel tenui filo, vel molle vel florulentum.  
What’s with you? You have a beard and hair, but you don’t have a shirt on and appear 
[almost] nude, and without shoes… you wander about, now here, now there, sleeping, 
I should add, on the bare ground, and so that worn out cloak of yours, which is not 
fine in its threading nor soft nor florid, is covered in a great quantity of filth.  
More precisely parallels this dramatic situation when he has Morus first meet Hythlodaeus. 
Rather than simply presenting Hythlodaeus and having him begin speaking, More makes sure 
to have the audience first see the wandering philosopher through the eyes of Morus, just as 
readers first encounter the Cynic through the eyes of Lucianus, before Morus is even aware 
that the man he is considering will soon step into his life as a new and significant 
acquaintance.  
 Morus tells his readers that, as he was leaving from mass in Antwerp one Sunday, he 
saw his friend Petrus Aegidius talking “with some stranger” (“cum hospite quodam”) and 
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then offers a description of him that echoes in significant ways Lucianus’s more 
contemptuous description of the Cynic philosopher (42). Morus says that the stranger was 
“vergentis ad senium aetatis, vultu adusto, promissa barba, paenula neglectim ab humero 
dependente, qui mihi ex vultu atque habitu nauclerus esse videbatur” (“inclining to old age, 
his face burnt by the sun, his beard flowing out long, his hooded cloak hanging sloppily from 
his shoulder; from his face and appearance I took him to be a ship’s captain” (42). This 
description, of course, is not as pejorative or intentionally provocative as Lucianus’s, but it 
still suggests a rootless, wandering figure who is careless about his appearance and who is not 
exactly the picture of respectability. It is difficult to know what to make of the fact that 
Morus thinks him a “nauclerus.” Is this a slight referring to his probable social standing or 
merely a deduction without much value attached to it? Petrus’s reaction when Morus tells 
him he took Hythlodaeus by his appearance to be a ship’s captain would suggest that it is 
something of a slight: “atqui… aberrasti longissime” (“But you were far off the mark”) (42). 
Petrus is quick, that is, to correct Morus mis-impression with the line that Hythlodaeus has 
sailed as an Odysseus or Plato, suggesting that to term Hythlodaeus a ship’s captain is, 
somehow, to misprize or underappreciate him. This is the place in text when the negotiations 
over Raphael’s image and ethos begin, but significantly before Hythlodaeus himself starts to 
weigh in with his own heavy-handed methods. Morus pictures for the reader a man who is 
perhaps a skilled sailor, but who is also questionable in terms of his appearance, maybe even 
somewhat antisocial, much like Lucian’s Cynic. Petrus insists that he is Plato reborn. The 
reader is left to take up a position of her own with both of these conflicting portraits in mind, 
just as Lucian’s readers must make up their own minds about whether the Cynic is simply 
noble or base, or something in between.  
 Avery has noted several other ways that More’s Hythlodaeus recalls Lucian’s Cynic, 
although, as I mentioned above, he does not ground his observations solidly or systematically 
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in the text, as I will try to do here. His most essential observation is that the Cynic and 
Hythlodaeus “are both rootless wanderers by choice… For both characters, individual self-
determination is very highly valued, clearly represented by wandering and deliberate 
homelessness” (228). More seems particularly keen to emphasize Hythlodaeus’s rootlessness 
both in itself and in contrast to the figure of Morus. Throughout the early paragraphs of 
Utopia, More stresses Morus many and complex ties to his community, first to his king and 
his associates, like Tunstall, in pursuing the king’s business in Bruges, and then to his family 
and friends (40-42). Moreover, although having Morus meet Hythlodaeus as he is coming out 
of mass is a rather obvious and cheeky reference to the opening of Plato’s Republic, it also 
suggests Morus comfort, even though he is away from home, with an even larger social order 
that grounds and sustains him. Hythlodaeus, by contrast, is noticeable even from his external 
appearance as a person who does not sit so comfortably within the social order. As it 
continues, the narrative places a measure of emphasis on this fact. As he is about to introduce 
the two, Petrus tells Morus that Hythlodaeus was so eager to see the world as a young man 
that he left his patrimonial inheritance to his brothers, mentioning by the way that Raphael is 
Portuguese, so that he would have no ties binding him to his family (44). More than one 
commentator has noted that this detail is probably patterned on the life of Pico della 
Mirandola, “whose biography,” the Cambridge editors inform the reader, “More had 
translated and whom he greatly admired” (45 n.8). At first sight, then, this detail would seem 
to count in Hythlodaeus’s favor, except that when Hythlodaeus himself speaks of giving up 
his patrimony his antisocial attitude flashes unmistakably. 
 This occurs when Petrus kicks off what will become an argument about whether or 
not Raphael should put himself in the service of some king or prince. After listening to 
Hythlodaeus discourse on his travels for some time, Petrus, in some excitement over 
Raphael’s qualifications, asserts that he really should enter into some king’s service in order 
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to further his own interests as well as those of his family and friends (50). Petrus, in other 
words, attempts to bind Hythlodaeus within that social order with which he and Morus are so 
at ease. Hythlodaeus’s rejoinder typifies his responses, not simply in countering the common 
wisdom of his interlocutor but also in seizing the opportunity to control how his interlocutors 
think of him: 
quod ad meos attinet… non valde commoveor, nempe in quos mediocriter opinor me 
officii mei partes implevisse. nam quibus rebus alii non nisi senes et aegri cedunt, 
immo tum quoque aegre cedunt, quum amplius retinere non possunt, eas res ego non 
sanus modo ac vegetus, sed iuvenis quoque cognatis amicisque dispartivi, quos debere 
puto hac mea esse benignitate contentos, neque id exigere atque exspectare praeterea, 
ut memet eorum causa regibus in servitium dedam.             
As far as what pertains to my family, I am not much concerned. I think I have fulfilled 
my duty towards them moderately well, for, those goods which others do not give up 
unless they are old and sick, and even then they give them up grudgingly and only 
when they can no longer keep them, those things I divided among my relatives and 
friends when I was not only healthy and vigorous, but still a young man. [So,] I think 
they ought to be satisfied with my generosity rather than demand and expect that for 
their sake I would put myself in servitude to some king. (50)  
In one sentence, in the Latin, Hythlodaeus denies those ties that seem such a happy part of the 
lives of men like Petrus and Morus, the harmless humanists, but it is the way he does so that 
is most striking. First and foremost, Hythlodaeus reduces one’s obligation to one’s family to 
purely financial transactions that can be dated and totaled up. He says that he has done his 
duty well – or “moderately” well, and note the carelessness of that adverb, “mediocriter” – 
simply because he divided up his inheritance among his relatives and friends, as if this were 
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all one might owe to one’s family. Contrast Hythlodaeus’s sentiment with the emotion that 
grips Morus concerning his relations earlier in Utopia. Morus is praising young Petrus 
Aegidius, and he notes that Petrus’s conversation was so pleasant that for a time it lightened 
“patriae desiderium, ac laris domestici, uxoris, et liberorum quorum studio revisendorum 
nimis quam anxie tenebar (iam tum enim plus quattuor mensibus afueram domo)” (“the 
strong desire [I felt] for my own country, my home, my wife and my children, whom I very 
much wished to see again, (for by that time I had already been away from home for more 
than four months”) (42). One wonders if this sort of emoting would even make sense to 
Hythlodaeus, who finds no other obligation to those nearest him than to ensure that each has 
his appropriate share of the family’s wealth.  
 This passage says still more about Hythlodaeus. First, of course, Hythlodaeus makes 
his typical move of characterizing himself positively by negatively characterizing the 
common run of human beings who surround him. Rather than simply saying that he divided 
up his goods among his relatives, Hythlodaeus emphasizes almost pleonastically throughout 
the passage that he was so free from greed that he was able to do when a young man what 
most cannot do even when they are old and done for. He then returns to his theme that his 
family should be content with what he has already done for them, the one-time transaction he 
made in their part, rather than seek to bind him to their own wishes. At this point in his 
account Hythlodaeus is starting to sound like he divided up his inheritance precisely so that 
he would have no further obligations to his family. He made his great gesture, and that should 
suffice. But what is undoubtedly most noteworthy in Hythlodaeus’s account, as Petrus’s 
response to him will indicate, is how Hythlodaeus describes putting himself in a king’s 
service: “ut memet eorum causa regibus in servitium dedam.” Note first the form of the 
pronoun Hythlodaeus uses here; rather than simply using “me,” he uses the emphatic form, 
“memet.” This is a difficult distinction to bring across in translation, and I have yet to find 
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one that does so. Perhaps it would not be too strong a translation to put it thus, “that for their 
sake I should put myself – me, of all people! – into servitude to kings.” The use of “memet” 
here, in other words, speaks to an ego that accords itself unquestionable worth. Above all, 
though, there is the way Raphael describes service to a king. When Petrus raises this issue, he 
speaks of it in entirely positive terms, “miror profecto mi Raphael… cur te regi cuipiam non 
adiungas” (“I wonder, my friend Raphael, why you don’t attach yourself to some king or 
other”) (50). Like a moody teenager, Hythlodaeus takes this mild suggestion and turns it into 
nothing less than sheer servitude, as Petrus himself notices, “mihi visum est non ut servias 
regibus, sed ut inservias” (“I meant not that you should be a slave to king, but that you should 
put yourself in their service”) (50). Raphael’s response to Petrus’s correction is to be clever: 
“hoc est… una syllaba plus quam servias,” which should simply be paraphrased as “the 
difference is only one syllable” (50). With this response, Hythlodaeus reasserts his position 
that service to kings is servitude, but without elaborating on why he might hold a position 
like this.   
 Petrus does not give up, however, and his continued pressing of Hythlodaeus shows 
just how much difficulty he is having in comprehending the Portuguese sailor’s way of life. 
Petrus next puts a challenge to Hythlodaeus that reveals the gulf that exists between the two, 
and between Hythlodaeus and Morus as well, and that forces Hythlodaeus to show his hand: 
“At ego sic censeo… quoquo tu nomine rem appelles, eam tamen ipsam esse viam, qua non 
aliis modo et privatim, et publice possis conducere, sed tuam quoque ipsius condicionem 
reddere feliciorem” (“Well, whatever name you want to call it, I think that [service to kings] 
is the very way you would be able not only to benefit your loved ones and the general public, 
but also to render your own place in life more successful”) (50). Now Petrus has thrown 
down a gauntlet of sorts. The form into which he molds this response assumes a couple 
central values that the interlocutors have been dancing around, that the purpose of one’s life 
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is to be of service to those nearest one and to one’s commonwealth and that a flourishing life 
results from this service. This is Ciceronian humanism 101, and Petrus, the good humanist, 
seems genuinely befuddled at his inability to fit what Hythlodaeus is saying with those 
humanistic assumptions that seem so self-evident to him (Wegemer 5-6). Hythlodaeus’s 
response to Petrus’s challenge is among the most telling passages in all of Utopia about the 
nature of his outlook on life: “feliciorem me… ea via facerem, a qua abhorret animus? atqui 
nunc sic vivo ut volo, quod ego certe suspicor paucissimis purpuratorum contingere.” 
(“Would I make myself happier by [following] a way that is repugnant to me? As it is now, I 
live just as I please, something I firmly doubt is true for even a few courtiers” (50). Raphael, 
then, denies that happiness comes through service to others and the commonwealth and 
implicitly suggests that it comes through “sic vivo ut volo,” living as one pleases.  
 This statement, “sic vivo ut volo,” (“I live just as I wish”), is adapted from a statement 
that Cicero makes in his De Officiis, and, although in context Cicero writes positively of this 
sentiment, it still tells in significant ways about what is motivating Hythlodaeus to guard 
himself with such care against any sort of service to a prince. Cicero is writing in this portion 
of the De Officiis about the importance of being free from the passions that control the lives 
of most people (i.xx.69-70). Some, writes Cicero, pursue the tranquility he is speaking of by 
withdrawing from public life and living away in retirement. Many philosophers fall into this 
category, he continues, as well as “quidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum 
mores ferre potuerunt” (“certain stern and serious people [who] were not able to endure the 
behavior of the people or their leaders”) (i.xx.69). Then Cicero explains what these sorts of 
people are ultimately aiming at, “his idem propositum fuit quod regibus: ut ne qua re egerent, 
ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere ut velis” (“These [men] have 
the same objective as kings: to lack nothing, to obey no one, to enjoy liberty, in essence, to 
live as you please” (i.xx.70). This passage suggests rather clearly what motivates 
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Hythlodaeus to take up the socially disagreeable lifestyle he adopts: his aim is to be a king to 
himself. As both the passage from Cicero and the subsequent developing of his character 
suggest, Raphael cannot but see himself as better than everyone else around him because of 
his education and experience, and yet he is not in a position of power. Moreover, as various 
events in Utopia (like the debate at Cardinal Morton’s) which I will discuss later show, when 
Hythlodaeus has been in a position to influence a powerful person, he has always been 
challenged, and so sensitive is he to challenge that he ends up writing off the whole 
experience as a waste of his time. His pride is such, that is, that he can only be content with 
absolute agreement. He would be king or nothing.  
 Furthermore, More is evoking more than one intertext when he characterizes 
Hythlodaeus by having him say, “sic vivo ut volo.” Of course, the editors of the Cambridge 
Utopia note that Hythlodaeus’s statement of his basic outlook echoes passages in More’s The 
Life of John Picus, but the passages they recommend bring out the wisdom of Raphael’s 
wisdom, not its folly (51, n.6). As it is one of the basic premises of this study that, in his 
depiction of Hythlodaeus, More wants a complicated figure and aims to exhibit both the good 
and the bad in his way of life and since most scholars read the passage from Cicero as 
imbuing Raphael with some measure of nobility, it is essential to point out an additional 
intertext from Lucian that again likens Raphael to Lucian’s Cynic. Although, so far as I can 
tell, no one else has noticed this intertext, it is of particular importance both because it 
strengthens the association between Raphael and the Cynic and because it hints at the darker 
motives driving Hythlodaeus. Late in Cynicus, the Cynic, like Cicero in the passage above, is 
inveighing against being controlled by one’s desires. Like Hythlodaeus, the Cynic often 
characterizes himself positively by pointing up the faults of everyone else, so at this point in 
the dialogue he sets about comparing men like the supposedly soft Lucianus to riders who are 
driven about contrary to their wishes by their horses, that is, their desires, which are always 
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running about willy-nilly (18). What keeps him off such rollicking horses, the Cynic says, are 
precisely the poverty of his cloak and hair, which so many soft young men like Lucianus are 
fond of poking fun at (19). He says, “at hoc detritum pallium quod vos ridetis comaque 
habitusque meus tantam habet vim, ut vitam mihi quietam praebeat, utque agam quicquid 
volo, verserque cum quibus volo” (“But this worn down cloak which you all [i.e., indulgent 
people like you] ridicule and my hair and my outfit are able to secure for me a quiet life, so 
that I do whatever I please and associate with whomever I please” (19). This statement, 
especially “utque agam quicquid volo,” not only recalls the sentiment of Raphael’s statement 
but also the very syntactical form in which he couched it. The two statements are precisely 
parallel, with an adverb or conjunction coming in the first position (“sic” and “ut”), then the 
word for conducting one’s life (“vivo” and “agam”), followed by an adverb or object 
functioning adverbially (“ut” and “quicquid”), and finished in both cases with the verb 
“volo.” So that the plainness of this parallelism is truly plain, I should emphasize that in the 
context of this passage “agam quicquid” has exactly the same meaning as “vivo:” “I conduct 
myself,” or “I live my life.” The only relevant difference between the two passages is that, 
while the Cynic is talking about being controlled by one’s desires, Raphael is referring to 
being controlled by the desires of others. It is not difficult to imagine, however, how these 
two types of control are closely related to and involve one another.  
 Nothing likens Hythlodaeus to Lucian’s Cynic, however, so much as the central 
message Raphael seeks to impart in the second book of Utopia. This message the Portuguese 
philosopher expresses most clearly in his peroration when he is claiming that the Utopians are 
happier even than the superrich in Europe because they have cut out of their society the 
source of all evils, money. With this one move, Raphael exclaims,   
quanta moles molestiarum recisa, quanta scelerum seges radicitus evulsa est! quis 
enim nescit fraudes, furta, rapinas, rixas, tumultus, iurgia, seditiones, caedes, 
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proditiones, veneficia, cottidianis vindicata potius quam refrenata suppliciis, 
interempta pecunia commori? ad haec metum sollicitudinem, curas, labores, vigilias, 
eodem momento quo pecunia perituras. Quin paupertas ipsa, quae sola pecuniis visa 
est indigere, pecunia prorsus undique sublata, protinus etiam ipsa decresceret. 
How great a mass of troubles was cut away, how great a crop of wickedness was 
completely uprooted! For who cannot see that swindling and theft, looting, violent 
brawls and quarrels, civil riots, murders, treasonous acts, poisonings, and the crimes 
that are avenged rather than held back by the usual punishments would die together 
with the slaying of money? And in the same moment in which money succumbed, so 
too would dread, nervousness, worries, distress, and sleepless nights. Even poverty 
itself, for which money seems the only cure, would at once lessen if money were 
everywhere and entirely done away with. (244) 
This same thought, expressed in a comparable manner, is first found on the tongue of 
Lucian’s Cynic. In More’s words, the Cynic makes the following wish: “aurum vero, 
argentumque ne desiderem umquam, neque ego, neque meorum amicorum quisquam. Omnia 
namque mala inter homines ex horum cupiditate nascuntur, et seditiones, et bella, et insidiae, 
et caedes. Haec omnia fontem habent plus habendi cupidinem” (“May I never desire gold, 
sincerely, and silver, neither I nor anyone of my friends, for all the evils that beset humankind 
arise from a desire for these very things [i.e., gold and silver] – civil riots and wars and 
treachery and murder. All these things have as their source the desire to have more” (15). 
Clearly then, even if he does not expect his readers to understand exactly what he is doing in 
this identification and how he is bringing it about, More is endeavoring to create a character 
much like Lucian’s Cynic for his Utopia. 
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 More is styling his lead character as a Cynic for the same reason that, in the opinion 
of Thomas More, Lucian renders his own Cynic such an ambiguous personage: to body forth 
and communicate the figure of a philosopher whose behaviors belie his beliefs. Recall from 
the last chapter that Lucian, especially in his Necromantia, goes to some lengths to point up 
the central failings of philosophers. Those two failings are that they cannot agree with one 
another and that their actual choices in life contradict the teachings they push onto their 
students or interlocutors. Here I shall focus on the latter fault. As Warren Wooden explains, 
the characterization of the philosopher as a walking contradiction is a common feature of 
Menippean satire, the satiric tradition in which Lucian himself wrote and of which More 
obviously approved, as his letter to Ruthall demonstrates in more than one passage (51-52). 
Following Lucian, More is depicting Hythlodaeus as a “philosophus gloriosus” in the role of 
the “alazon:” “In this role More employs him to expose the folly of the argumentative 
technique and philosophic position he embodies” (Wooden 52, O’Brien 17). Just as, on Fox’s 
reading, Lucian’s Cynic talks so much and argues so vehemently – at one point likening 
himself to a god – that he ends up undermining his own position and creating sympathy for 
his interlocutor, so too More’s Hythlodaeus, who also dominates the conversation throughout 
Utopia, makes countless statements and argumentative moves that undermine, in his own 
person, the positions of which he is trying to convince his interlocutors (Avery 225, 231). 
This principle can be demonstrated even with regard to Raphael’s most basic convictions.  
 Consider, for instance, Raphael’s conviction that money should be eradicated and that 
this eradication would immeasurably better society. One would assume that someone who 
holds to such a belief would conduct his life in such a way that money would not even enter 
into his thinking about his relations to others since money is what causes those relations so to 
deteriorate that people find themselves fighting and disputing one another, defrauding and 
cheating on one another, betraying, deceiving, murdering, and warring against one another. 
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Hythlodaeus’s list is much longer than this, of course, just as it is much longer than the list of 
evils brought about by money which the Cynic enumerates. If Raphael truly believes that 
money is the root of so many evils, then assuredly he would attempt as far as possible to limit 
its influence on his life and thinking. And certainly, when he is on his guard, Hythlodaeus is 
careful to present himself as superior to money, as when he points out to his interlocutors that 
he took books on his last voyage rather than goods to sell for cash. He also is obviously 
pointing out his superiority to wealth when he notes, as discussed above, that he was able to 
let go of his wealth as a young man. This very same passage, however, points up Raphael’s 
duplicity, for it is in this passage that Raphael bluntly informs his interlocutors that he has 
surely done his duty by his family simply because he has divided up his inheritance among 
them.  
Moreover, it seems evident that, in the vocabulary More chooses to relate Raphael’s 
acts of financial beneficence, More is seeking to hint at the extent to which monetary thinking 
dominates Hythlodaeaus’s conscience. The main terms Hythlodaeus uses to convey his act 
are brusquely financial: “eas res… cognatis amicisque dispartivi” (“I distributed these 
possessions among relatives and friends”) (50). Here the language is almost formal, like a 
contract. The verb Hythlodaeus uses in particular is most often connected to financial 
dealings, as in Cicero’s Pro Cluentio, when one of the participants in this case is reasoning 
about its outcome: “illo absoluto pecuniam illam aut iudicibus dispertiendam aut ipsi esse 
reddundam; damnato repetiturum esse neminem” (“If he is acquitted, that money will either 
have to be divided among the judges or returned; if he is condemned, no one will ask after 
it”) (xxv.69). Here the verb is spelled in an alternate form, “dispertiendam” versus 
“dispartivi,” but it is the same verb with the same essential meaning of dividing up or 
distributing financial resources among several persons. Likewise, when Hythlodaeus refers to 
his “benignitate” and demands that his family be contented with it, he is using that term to 
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refer to his financial generosity. Cicero uses the same term in the same way when he is 
discussing munificence in his De Officiis (ii.xv.52).  
 The key term that suggests Raphael’s mindset, though, shows up when he says that he 
thinks (“puto”) his relatives “debere… hac mea esse benignitate contentos” (“ought to be 
content with this munificence of mine” (50). The word “contentus” often carries with it 
financial associations as well, but the term to note in this clause is “debere,” which More calls 
attention to by fronting it in a clause where a more naturally Latinate word order would have 
it coming at the end of the clause. The verbal play here is very clever. The verb “debere” of 
course may mean “ought” or “ought to” in a purely moral sense, but this is an abstracted 
sense of the word. Its most literal and primary meaning connects it unequivocally to money. 
This more basic meaning is so well attested in the ancient literature as to require little 
exposition, so I will here let one example stand for many. In Philippic 2, Cicero inveighs 
against Marcus Antonius for murdering people on the battlefield whom Caesar would have 
allowed to live. Antonius committed one of those murders, says Cicero, because “appellatus 
es de pecunia quam pro domo, pro hortis, pro sectione debebas” (“You were called upon 
about the money you owed for the villa, the gardens, and the portion of the property put up 
for auction”) (ii.xxix.71-72). Here the word “debebas” has its most rudimentary meaning of 
“to owe someone money.” From this fundamental sense of the word was abstracted the 
notion that a moral obligation was something one owed to another, much like a debt. More is 
playing on the two senses of this word to demonstrate how Hythlodaeus confounds and 
intermixes the two. As Neumann puts it, for Hythlodaeus “the claims of blood and friendship 
apparently cease when one makes a free distribution of one’s goods. The feeling for family 
ties and friendships implicit in this attitude is lukewarm to say the least” (499). Hythlodaeus 
believes that, because he has given to his family what he “owed” them in the financial sense, 
he has given them what he owes them in the moral sense, and so now, because the financial 
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sense of the term dominates Raphael’s thinking, his family and friends owe to him a 
satisfaction with what he has already done for them and the great courtesy of leaving him 
alone.  
Qualis Artifex!   
 The concreteness of this insight, that Raphael’s own life does not always or simply 
line up with what he goes about preaching, takes one into the very heart of More’s 
“designedly enigmatic” Utopia (Logan 3). Indeed, when one recognizes that More designed 
these sorts of enigmas while listening intently to the spirit of Lucian whispering in his ear, 
this insight opens up the mysteries of Utopia for a renewed consideration. This is so because, 
and here I come to the heart of this study, the enigma that is the narrator of Utopia accounts 
for the other enigmas that arise in the course of the narrative. Take the issue of money and the 
Utopians. Recall what Raphael says above about money being the root of all societal evils 
and, more to the point, his claim that the Utopians had eradicated money from their social 
existence. Raphael delights to dwell on this theme throughout his narrative about the island of 
Utopia, and yet it is not at all true. In fact, the Utopians are rich in gold, silver, pearls, 
diamonds, and all manner of currency and backing for currency. When speaking of the travels 
and international relations of the Utopians, Raphael says that the Utopians export their 
surplus to other countries. Raphael notes that the Utopians give a seventh portion of their 
goods to the poor in these countries, but the rest “pretio mediocri venditant, quo ex 
commercio, non eas modo merces, quibus domi egent, (nam id fere nihil est praeter ferrum) 
sed argenti atque auri praeterea, magnam vim in patriam reportant” (“They sell for a 
moderate price. From this commerce, they bring back to their country not only those goods 
which they lack at home (which is nearly nothing besides iron) but an immense quantity of 
silver and gold besides”) (146). This statement and the passage that follows it are so crucial 
to understanding what More is doing in Utopia that I want to unpack it circumspectly and at 
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some length before showing how it connects back to the mind of Hythlodaeus as More 
reveals it using Lucianic brush strokes.  
 First and foremost, of course, one should note that the Utopians use money currency 
and that their economy could not function without it. Of course, what Raphael wants his 
interlocutors to buy into is the notion that the Utopians, within their own society in their 
inter-familial relations, do not use or have a need for money, that it is only the state that 
actually handles money and treats it with value, but this passage begins to suggest the sheer 
implausibility of that claim. The most important statement in the sentence above may not be 
that the Utopians have masses of silver and gold, but that they use this money to supply what 
they do not have on their own island. Here I cannot resist the admittedly unfounded 
supposition that More was smiling to himself when he wrote this line about what is lacking 
on the island of Utopia: “nearly nothing besides iron.” Nothing besides iron. This is humor 
and the cleverness of More that I labored to spell out in the first chapter of this study and that 
is so much in harmony with Lucian’s humor. The man who would say that a prison, of 
whatever sort, should be fortified so that an escaped prisoner not steal back in is the same 
man who could write that the Utopians lacked nothing on their island except the relatively 
inessential metal called iron. Hythlodaeus obviously wants to deemphasize this deficiency, 
for he tosses the comment away parenthetically and then names only one item. But the item 
he names, as Cicely Howell has shown in her study of the Kibworth region of Leicester, was 
an “essential commodity” in pre-industrial England that was avidly “used and reused” (95, 
167). In the Yale commentary, Surtz supposes that this reference to the importing of iron has 
some natural relation to England, adding that “By 1450 at latest, the iron industry appears to 
have recovered completely from the effects of the Black Death… the demand for iron 
increased; so much so that in spite of improved techniques production remained unable to 
meet the demand on the home market” (427). Whatever is true of England, the need for iron 
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would prove particularly keen for an entirely agrarian society like that of the Utopians, who 
would have to make most of their farming implements out of iron. Furthermore, a page later 
Raphael himself says “aurum argentumque… quis non videt quam longe infra ferrum sunt” 
(“Gold and silver, who does not see how far beneath iron they are”), meaning that gold and 
silver are of much less utility, and therefore value, than iron. To say, then, that the Utopians 
lacked nothing besides iron is a deliberately ironic understatement that, I believe, More 
expects his readers to pick up on, for this means that, whether the Utopian citizenry or only 
the state handles money, the daily lives and activities of all the islanders are dependent on a 
money economy. 
 Raphael next explains that, through their commercial activities, the Utopians have 
accumulated a large supply of precious metals than “credi possit” (“could be believed”) and 
offers what he takes to be the main reason why:  
in rem unam totum illum thesaurum quem habent domi servant, uti aut extremis in 
periculis, aut in subitis praesidio sit, potissimum quo milites externos (quos libentius 
quam suos cives obiciunt discrimini) immodico stipendio conducant, gnari 
multitudine pecuniae hostes ipsos plerumque… inter se committi.  
They keep the entire treasure they have for one reason, as a protection in extreme or 
unexpected dangers, especially so that they can purchase, at outrageous prices, 
mercenaries (whom they gladly expose to danger [rather] than their own citizens), 
knowing that a great deal of money will generally set their own enemies against one 
another. (146) 
Here again the key statement that works to undermine the case Hythlodaeus making about the 
virtues of his communist state is merely parenthetical, that the Utopians use their heaps of 
wealth to buy mercenaries so that their own citizens do not have to go to war. This statement 
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is suspicious on two counts. First, it again emphasizes how, even if individual Utopian 
citizens do not handle money, their wellbeing and the high quality of their lives is dependent 
on a money economy. Second, especially when read in the overall context of Book 2, it 
sounds quite fanciful. After all, what Raphael is suggesting here is that this fabulously 
wealthy state cares more about the good of its own citizens than about its own wealth or its 
claims abroad. This is, of course, a central claim for Hythlodaeus, but surely any reader who 
is paying close attention to Raphael’s conversation and narrative account has had serious 
suspicions by this point. It is all so neat, so tidy, so comfortably planned out to fashion a 
place and a people sealed off hermetically from the evils of Europe. This account of how the 
treasure the Utopians keep isolates them from war recalls all the other claims Raphael makes 
about the island that seem too perfect, too unqualified, as when he asserts that the Utopians 
alone know the channels that allow ships to reach their island or when he notes that all 
animals are slaughtered by slaves outside the city because “neque suos cives patiuntur 
assuescere laniatu animalium, cuius usu, clementiam humanissimum naturae nostrae 
affectum paulatim deperire putant” (“They do not allow their own citizens to become 
accustomed to the slaughter of animals, [as] they think that on account of this act our most 
truly human feeling, compassion, gradually wastes away”) (108, 138). A pre-industrial 
society that was able to dig channels fifteen miles in width to isolate its people and that could 
so arrange its quotidian workings such that citizens did not have to witness the slaughter of 
animals, not to mention that this society arranged itself thus in order to protect its citizens’ 
delicate sense of compassion, would be a wonder indeed (110).  
 In the passage where Raphael discusses how the Utopians use their money, the 
apparatus of the text itself rather oddly nudges the reader to doubt what the narrator is saying 
and to observe how the author is trying to communicate. The text of Utopia, that is, was from 
its first printing accompanied by numerous marginal glosses that denote a change or subject 
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or that simply comment on what is being discussed. Although Peter Giles, in his letter to 
Busleyden, takes the credit for adding these glosses, the Cambridge Utopia notes that “On the 
title page of the 1517 edition… they are attributed to Erasmus” (27 n.23, Ackroyd 175, 
Romm 177). Whether it was Giles or Erasmus or both, whoever added these glosses was 
close to More and must have had a strong sense of what he was trying to communicate in 
Utopia. This unknown glosser adds his most surprising and enlightening gloss at the passage 
in Utopia currently under consideration, where Hythlodaeus is describing the Utopians use of 
money and their attitudes toward it. Typically, the glosses note what is being discussed or 
praise the society of the Utopians almost in echo of Hythlodaeus. Hence, when Hythlodaeaus 
relates that the Utopians have no taverns or brothels, the glosser exclaims, “O sanctam 
rempublicam, et vel Christianis imitandam!” (“O saintly commonwealth, worthy to be 
imitated even by Christians!”) (144). Here, however, the glosser makes a rare move and 
comments directly Raphael Hythlodaeus and what he is saying. Perhaps realizing that he has 
underlined the Utopians need for money too definitely, Raphael changes tack abruptly and 
tries to argue that, although the Utopians have this massive wealth, they hold it lightly, even 
scornfully. This fact, he says, he witnessed with his own eyes:        
hanc ob causam inaestimabilem thesaurum servant, at non ut thesaurum tamen, sed ita 
habent, quomodo me narrare profecto deterret pudor, metuentem ne fidem oratio non 
sit habitura, quod eo iustius vereor, quo magis mihi sum conscius, nisi vidissem 
praesens, quam aegre potuissem ipse perduci ut alteri idem recensenti crederem.  
For this reason they maintain their infinite treasure, but they do not hold it as a 
treasure, but in such a way that – my sense of shame deters me from telling you how 
[they do hold it] – as I am afraid that my account may seem false; I am all the more 
afraid of this as I am the more aware that I myself would scarcely have been able to 
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be convinced to believe someone relating it to me, if I had not myself been there and 
seen it. (149).  
I have tried in this translation to bring out something of the torturous syntax that Raphael 
employs here, but this is an approximation.16 This sentence is pleonastic in the extreme and is 
an awkward accumulation of subordinate clauses that seem to lead only to more subordinate 
clauses. The syntax itself, then, suggests that Raphael might be up to something here. One 
begins to understand these syntactic hesitations better when Raphael goes on to explain that, 
by prior planning, the Utopians use some of the gold and silver they do not spend to make 
chamber pots, chains for slaves, and toys for children (148). This is done deliberately to 
devalue the worth of gold and silver in the minds of Utopia’s citizens (148-150).     
 What is most telling, however, is the marginal note provided as a gloss for this 
demanding sentence. Whoever made this gloss, when he encountered the above sentence 
responded with the exclamation, “O artificem!” which the Yale Utopia translates as “O artful 
rogue!” and the Cambridge Utopia as “O crafty fellow!” (151, 149). In context, this comment 
can only refer to Raphael Hythlodaeus and what he has just said about how he saw with his 
own eyes, in his own person, the Utopians using their gold and silver for the meanest 
purposes. And yet the commentaries are mute on this point. In fact, the only scholar who 
even takes this gloss into consideration as to the meaning of Utopia is Peter Ackroyd (175). I 
will reserve discussing his take on this insertion, however, until a little later in this study. 
Here I will simply set forth what I think this gloss means and why. First, it is clear that 
 
16 For a much more basic sense of what Raphael is saying here, but one that does not well communicate how he 
is saying it, consider the translation of the Cambridge Utopia: “For this reason, therefore, they have a vast 
treasure in reserve, but they do not keep it like a treasure. I’m really quite ashamed to tell you how they do keep 
it, because you probably won’t believe me; I would not have believed it myself if someone else had simply told 
me about it, but I was there and saw it with my own eyes” (149). This is a very elegant translation of a sentence 
that is not at all elegant. For one thing, it is essential to note that Hythlodaeus strings his sentence along by 
adverbial, relative, and participial clauses, which are difficult to reproduce in English but which suggest that 
Hythlodaeus is deliberately obfuscating what he is saying in this sentence.   
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“artificem” here does bear a meaning that creates suspicion about what Raphael is saying. 
Literally, of course, an “artifex” is a “skilled worker” or “craftsperson,” someone who is a 
capable “maker” or “contriver” of anything. The word “artifex” can be used straightforwardly 
to describe someone like a carpenter, an “artifex lignorum,” or its meaning may be extended 
to refer to such “craftspersons” as orators and actors and singers, as in Suetonius’s well-
known account of the words Nero muttered to himself as he prepared to die, “qualis artifex 
pereo!” (“What an artist dies in me!”) (49). The word sometimes carries with a sense that 
accentuates the cunning or craftiness of the “artifex” and thus her or his falseness. More 
himself uses the word dexterously in this sense in his translation of Lucian’s Philopseudes in 
his own cunning description of an exorcist: “Syrus ille ex Palestina, qui harum rerum artifex 
est, quammultos mortales suscipiat, qui ad lunam concidant, oculosque distorqueant, 
spumaque os oppleant: quos tamen erigit ac sanos remittit, magna accepta mercede, diris eos 
malis liberans” (“That Syrian from Palestine, who is cunning in these sorts of things, receives 
so many people who fall down before the moon and roll their eyes around and fill up their 
mouths with froth, and yet he straightens them out and sends them back healthy, after 
accepting a large fee, freeing them from fearful evils”) (16). In context, More is mirroring 
Lucian’s own verbal subtleties and is trying to have the speaker slightly undermine himself 
through his inadvertent word choice about the Syrian quack, just as More has Raphael do 
when he relates what he owed to his family. More is even more subtle than Lucian, though. 
Whereas Lucian has the detail about the Syrian accepting a large fee at the end of his 
sentence so that the reader will not miss it, and it is this detail that activates the more 
pejorative connotations of “artifex,” More tucks that detail quietly into an absolute phrase and 
ends the sentence with an apparently positive description of the “artifex.” More likewise calls 
up the more pejorative senses of “artifex” when in one of his letters he refers to Martin 
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Luther as “malorum machinator et artifex,” (“the engineer and contriver of evils”) 
(L143.205).  
 At its core, though, the word “artifex” refers to someone with the capacity to “make” 
or to “invent” something that was not there before. Suetonius’s Nero mourns on the world’s 
behalf because he knows that, when he dies, along with him will die all his as yet unseen 
artistic inventions. This would seem to be the primary sense in which the glosser means the 
term here. The main evidence for that claim derives from the fact that the glosser, just a 
couple of pages later, uses the Greek synonym for this term, “ὦ τεχνίτην,” in precisely the 
same sense, case, and grammatical function that he had before used “O artificem!” (152). 
Here Hythlodaeus is wrapping up his story of the Anemolian ambassadors, who try to 
impress the Utopians by wearing expensive jewelry and clothing (150-152). This attempt, 
however, ends with the Utopians, far from being impressed, assuming the Anemolian 
ambassadors to be slaves and bowing to the humblest members of their party as the 
ambassadors they were anticipating (152). Hythlodaeus rounds off his artful account with a 
child mocking an Anemolian ambassador and his mother telling the child to be quiet because 
“est opinor quispiam e morionibus legatorum” (“he is, I think, one of the ambassadors’ 
fools”) (152). It is at this point that the glosser inserts the marginal comment, “ὦ τεχνίτην!,” 
which is the precise Greek synonym of the Latin “artificem.” In both of these cases, it would 
seem that the glosser is calling attention to the inventiveness of Hythlodaeus’s account, but in 
such a way that shows Hythlodaeus to be not a reporter of events but a contriver or maker of 
them. One might understand the second gloss merely to refer to how skillfully and creatively 
Hythlodaeus has related the story of the Anemolians, which is one of the most memorable 
illustrative anecdotes of the entire account, but the first gloss, “O artificem,” places direct 
emphasis on and must be read in relation to the fact that Hythlodaeus claims to have seen all 
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of this with his own eyes. What can this mean other than that Hythlodaeus is in some sense 
fabricating his account according to his own whims and needs?  
 Here at last I come to be the heart of Utopia’s mystery – that, although Raphael 
Hythlodaeus’s account of the Utopians is productive of the most trenchant criticisms of 
contemporary Europe, it is also in some robust sense a fabrication. I will explore the extent 
and nature of this fabrication as this chapter proceeds, but here I should pause and try to 
elucidate this fundamentally Lucianic attribute of Utopia. Lucian, particularly in his 
Philopseudes, the dialogue for which More in his letter to Ruthall professes the greatest 
admiration, implicates his several narrators of tales and even the main narrator of the 
dialogue in lies and fabrications that suit their own worldviews. More evidently discerned this 
technique and approved of it, as the evidence that he is creating a narrator whose account is 
manifestly improbable and problematic is overwhelming. Here and there, scholars have 
obviously noted the unreliability of Raphael’s account, and I will discuss their work in 
suitable places. Inexplicably, however, no scholar has worked with the patent unreliability of 
Hythlodaeus’s account critically enough to follow it through to its logical consequences and 
to allow its insincerity and speciousness to have their full explanatory power on the text as a 
whole. Hence, no scholar, to my knowledge, has fully elucidated how the problems that arise 
in Raphael’s account of the island of Utopia may be contextualized and, in most instances, 
explained when they are referred back to the narrator himself.  
Take, for instance, the case I have been developing for some pages now. When More 
has Hythlodaeus discuss his obligations to his family and put them in unambiguously 
monetary terms, he is suggesting both that Hythlodaeus does not truly conceive of his life 
without currency and that he does not even want to do so, in spite of his indications to the 
contrary. Perhaps More even means to suggest that Hythlodaeus is not capable of conceiving 
of human life without money. This insight becomes significant when one realizes that, 
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although Hythlodaeus inveighs against money throughout Utopia and claims that the 
Utopians live without it, he also reveals in no uncertain terms that the Utopian way of life is 
utterly dependent upon and intermingled with money. One learns, then, the same thing both 
from what Raphael says about himself and what he says about the island of Utopia, that he 
cannot truly imagine human society functioning without money. This is not a criticism of 
communism. Some form of collectivist, moneyless society may or may not work for human 
beings. The point is that Hythlodaeus has not found or imagined one that works even though 
he claims to have done so. The point is also that in Hythlodaeus the reader encounters exactly 
the sort of philosopher Lucian pokes fun at in Necromantia and that More warns against in 
his letter to Ruthall: the philosopher who arrogantly teaches one thing but seems to believe its 
opposite, if one judges by what else he says and by his behavior.  
Moreover, the way More undermines Hythlodaeus closely parallels and arguably 
derives from the way Lucian undermines his own narrator in Philopseudes, a dialogue that is 
rarely discussed in connection with Utopia but one for which More expressed both moral and 
aesthetic approbation in his letter to Ruthall. Here is Karen Ní Mheallaigh’s succinct and 
effective summary of this dialogue, which is rich in story and characterization, but simply in 
its plot: 
the principal speaker, Tychiades, discusses with Philocles the nature of those who 
love to tell lies. As proof that such perversity exists, Tychiades repeats for Philocles 
the wild fabrications he has just heard from a group of philosophers and other 
intellectuals, who were gathered around the sick-bed of the eminent philosopher 
Eucrates. (95) 
This narrator, Tychiades, who claims to be so appalled by the lies and gullibility of learned 
men, in more ways than one shows himself by the dialogue’s end to be as enamored of tall 
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tales and stories of miraculous healings as are any of his uncritical interlocutors (Ní 
Mheallaigh 99-100, Ogden 484, Perry 234). Thus, in the words of Ní Mheallaigh, Lucian 
betrays his potential “authorial presence” in Tychiades so that he can show himself to be 
“winking slyly through the mask at the reader, exposing Tychiades as a persona he uses, so 
that he may have his cake and eat it - indulge in writing fiction, whilst maintaining a 
sophisticated, skeptical distance from it” (101). When he was writing Utopia, just as when 
Erasmus was writing his Encomium Moriae, More attempted to create the same sort of ironic 
distance from his characters using many of the same techniques Lucian commonly uses. 
Evidence for this claim comes not merely from the many passages I will examine in this 
study that point to More’s own wink, but, again, from More’s own words in his letter to 
Ruthall.     
Recall that, in his letter, More praises the “Socratica ironia” of Philopseudes (4). After 
all, properly speaking Socratic irony is the pose of ignorance the Athenian philosopher 
displayed in order to elicit responses from his interlocutors. That sense of the term “Socratica 
ironia” does not apply well to Philopseudes, however, where the speakers are all forthcoming 
with their stories and the narrator is straightforwardly and bluntly skeptical of what they say. 
In all likelihood, More means something different by “Socratic irony” than a stance of 
pretended ignorance intended to get others talking in his letter to Ruthall. What More 
probably means is brought to light in Gregory Vlastos’s influential essay on the development 
of the term “ironia” from its earliest pejorative uses in Attic Greek down through the way it is 
“laundered” and adapted by Roman orators and theorists and then passed on through the 
literary tradition (84). As Vlastos puts it,  
When Cicero, who loves to make transliterated Greek enrich his mother tongue, 
produces in this fashion the new Latin word, ironia, the import has an altogether 
different tone. Laundered and deodorized, it now betokens the height of urbanity, 
 Verhine 106 
 
elegance, and good taste… : ‘urbana etiam dissimulatio est, cum alia dicuntur ac 
sentias... Socratem opinor in hac ironia dissimulantiaque longe lepore et humanitate 
omnibus praestitisse.’ (84) 
The Latin Vlastos quotes here is from Cicero’s De Oratore (2.67), and may be rendered as 
follows: “Insincerity is also refined, when other things are said than what you intend… I 
think that Socrates far surpassed everyone else with wit and culture in this sort of irony or 
dissembling.” This simpler sense of the term “Socratica ironia,” Vlastos says, “speech used to 
express something contrary to what is said,” is the sense that shaped “the sensibility of 
modern Europe” and is probably close to what More means when he is writing to Ruthall 
(84). The significant takeaway here is that the sort of irony that Lucian employs in his 
Philopseudes is much closer to the ironic distancing of the author from his characters, the sort 
which Ní Mheallaigh notes and spells out in her interpretation of Lucian. If this is the 
“Socratic irony” that More himself perceived in Lucian, as it seems to be, then one should 
scarcely be surprised to find that More is winking at his own readers through his depiction of 
Hythlodaeus, establishing his own ironic distance from his character and hardly using him, as 
more than one interpreter has imagined, as a “mouthpiece” for his own views (Wegemer 
288). Furthermore, More’s use of this sort of irony would fit well with his reforming and 
educative intentions for Utopia, for only those who read most closely and critically will 
discern More’s wink and thereby develop the sort of critical faculties he thinks are so needed 
in the church of his day. On this reading of More’s intentions, the glosser becomes More’s 
ideal reader, one who notices what More is up to in his depiction of Hythlodaeus and so sees 
through the beautiful fabrications of the socially disagreeable, haughty philosopher. 
The Serpent and the Suckfish  
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 More asks his readers to see through his narrator time and time again. Closely 
connected to his indications that Hythlodaeus is misleading or confounded in his views on 
money are his many suggestions that, while Hythlodaeus condemns human pride in no 
uncertain terms, he is also himself eaten up with pride and its attendant vices. For, as Thomas 
I. White has argued convincingly, Hythlodaeus does not truly see money as the ultimate 
source of human evil and conflict, but something darker and deeper and much more in 
keeping with More’s Christian worldview: “It is on the heels of this and similar remarks 
against money that he then labels pride as the main problem, defines it in economic terms, 
points out the impossibility of its extirpation, and stresses the importance of institutions for 
its control” (343). That is, a more nuanced understanding of Raphael’s position is that it is 
pride working through money that is the final source of human grief. Hythlodaeus 
emphasizes this point early in his account of Utopia, “nempe avidum ac rapacem, aut timor 
carendi facit, in omni animantum genere, aut in homine sola reddit superbia, quae gloriae sibi 
ducit superflua rerum ostentatione ceteros antecellere, quod vitii genus in Utopiensium 
institutis nullum omnino locum habet” (“A fear of shortage produces greed and rapacity in 
every other kind of animal, [but] in humans pride alone brings it about, [pride] which 
prompts [people] for their own glory to outdo others in gratuitous displays of their 
possessions; this sort of vice has no place whatsoever in the institutions of the Utopians”) 
(136-138). Money, possessions, gems, pearls, diamonds, all the usual currencies and goods 
that denote wealth to the onlooker, these have become vehicles in European society, 
Hythlodaeus maintains, for the manifestation of human pride. 
 White goes on to lay out very efficiently how central pride is to Raphael’s arguments 
over the course of both books,  
We might say, then, that if the first part of the framing discussion… argues that the 
most effective guarantor of the common good is not good counselors but the 
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fundamental institutions in society, especially common property, then the second 
part… provides the rationale for this notion: since it is folly to trust the good will of 
monarchs, counselors, or citizens because all men are subject to pride and it is 
impossible to eradicate it, the best anyone can hope for, then, is to limit the material 
harm pride can do by the shape of society's institutions. (343) 
What Hythlodaeus presents in the island of Utopia, then, and here again things seem far too 
neat, is an entire society that has learned to cope with the conflagration of human pride by 
depriving it of its fuel. Without differences in income and without currency and other means 
of flaunting wealth, human pride, though always present, subsides and becomes more of a 
dormant rather than an active force in human affairs. So essential to Raphael’s thinking is the 
success of the Utopians in combatting and suppressing pride that he ends his entire account of 
the island with a vehement denunciation of this sin and the toll it has taken on Europe, 
remarking how it measures its own prosperity by the poverty of others and finally deeming it 
a “Averni serpens, mortalium pererrans pectora ne meliorem vitae capessant viam, velut 
remora retrahit ac remoratur” (“a serpent of hell, slithering through human breasts so that 
they do not undertake a better way of life; like a suckfish [pride] drags them back and delays 
them”) (246). The very vehemence of Raphael’s language here suggests his loathing of 
human pride in the abstract and the effects it has on human relations. That the Utopians, he 
concludes, have found a way to manage this serpent and suckfish is the greater part of their 
blessedness.  
 Hythlodaeus himself, however, seems to have found no comparable way to manage 
his own individual pride. However artfully he inveighs against it in others, a genuine 
“overreaching and intellectual pride” is present in nearly everything he says (Wooden 54). 
This fact about the Portuguese Socrates is first suggested through his association with the 
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Cynic philosopher of Lucian’s Cynicus. Avery has found a fascinating connection here 
between the two characters:  
Wegemer points out that the Cynic’s pride in not wearing shoes, symbolic of his 
supposed autonomy from civilized society, ironically contrasts with his need for 
civilization’s maintenance of conditions for good roads (63). A similar characteristic 
in Raphael appears when we learn that in his insistence upon operating independently, 
he narrowly escapes with his life, thanks to an unexpected encounter with Portuguese 
ships (11). (228) 
The passage that Avery is referring to is the closest any character comes in all of Utopia to 
criticizing Hythlodaeus for his overreaching pride. It occurs when Petrus Aegidius is telling 
Morus about Hythlodaeus before introducing the two. Petrus says that Hythlodaeus, on his 
last voyage with Vespucci, had with some difficulty persuaded Vespucci to allow him to be 
left behind with a garrison of twenty-four men at the farthest point to which their travels took 
them (44). Petrus then relates that Hythlodaeus begged for this “privilege” because of his 
attitude as expressed in those aphorisms, discussed above, which one always heard him 
saying, that the road to heaven is the same length wherever one begins from and that the sky 
covers the dead person who has no grave (44). Petrus says of the attitude revealed in these 
sayings, “quae mens eius, nisi deus ei propitius adfuisset, nimio fuerat illi constatura… 
mirabili tandem fortuna… pervenit in Caliquit, ubi repertis commode Lusitanorum navibus, 
in patriam denique praeter spem revehitur” (“If God had not been favorable to him, this frame 
of mind of his would have cost him dearly… At last by a remarkable good fortune… he came 
to Calicut, where he conveniently found Portuguese ships and at finally was brought back 
into his own country beyond all hope”) (44-46). One wonders, of course, why it was such a 
unusually good fortune to escape the island of Utopia for European Portugal, what with its 
infixed pride and money economy, but I will return to that point presently. Here, what is of 
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note is, as Avery writes, that Hythlodaeus is so singularly and even arrogantly independent in 
how he conducts his life that he very nearly loses that life and the last rites that any Christian 
ought to undergo before he meets his maker. This attitude is so objectionable that even 
Petrus, who is everywhere else a devotee of Hythlodaeus, mentions and criticizes it. As with 
Lucian’s Cynic, Hythlodaeus clings to his autonomy too intensely and treats his own person 
with greater fondness than he ought.  
 This fact comes out most clearly, again, when More puts Hythlodaeus in conversation 
with Morus and brings out their different ways of thinking about advising kings in court. 
After Hythlodaeus has given a long speech to demonstrate that the sort of advice he will offer 
to kings is bound to be rejected, Morus tries to take Raphael in hand and show him that his 
problem is that he does not recognize and yield to the context in which he is speaking. His 
tone is all wrong, his style of disputing is wrong, his directness and lack of tact are wrong. 
Morus says, “apud amiculos in familiari colloquio non insuavis est haec philosophia 
scholastica. ceterum in consiliis principium, ubi res magnae magna auctoritate aguntur, non 
est his rebus locus” (“When you are involved in an intimate conversation with your friends, 
this scholastic, philosophical [style of yours] is fine, but in the councils of princes, where 
great matters are conducted authoritatively, there is no place for these kinds of ideas”) (94). 
Morus then goes on to offer his most dazzling speech on the nature of political life as a 
dramatic play being performed before the people, and in so doing he characterizes Raphael as 
follows:  
alioquin dum agitur quaepiam Plauti comoedia, nugantibus inter se vernulis, si tu in 
proscaenium prodeas habitu philosophico et recenseas ex Octavia locum in quo 
Seneca disputant cum Nerone, nonne praestiterit egisse mutam personam quam aliena 
recitando talem fecisse tragicomoediam? 
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Otherwise, while some comedy of Plautus is being played and the household slaves 
are goofing off [on stage], if you advance yourself onto the stage in a philosopher’s 
costume and rehearse the passage from Octavia in which Seneca is arguing with Nero 
– would it not be better to play a silent role rather than to turn the play into a sort of 
tragicomedy by reciting things unrelated [to the original play]? (96) 
This passage says a great deal about how Morus, who has been conversing with Hythlodaeus 
for some time now, has come to think of the man he formerly thought a mere “nauclerus.” He 
is politely funny in his rebuke, just as he was with the porter who allowed Constantine to 
escape his prison, but his rebuke also has teeth. In truth, this characterization of Hythlodaeus 
borders on the absurd and thus on presenting the Portuguese traveler as ridiculous, for who 
would be so brazen as to interrupt a play that is already being conducted and to “correct” the 
performers and the audience by performing – on his own – a play that in his judgment is 
superior to the comedy already being performed? Only maniacally proud and self-absorbed 
person could perform such an act.  
 But Morus has more to add, and his next point comes even closer to suggesting the 
pride he perceives in Hythlodaeus. First, Morus says something that is easily overlooked but 
that gets at his understanding of Hythlodaeus rather pointedly: “sic est in republica, sic in 
consultationibus principium” (“So it is in the commonwealth, so it is in the councils of 
princes”) (96). Morus is here urging Hythlodaeus to think on what he already knows. Yes, he 
is saying, princes and their advisors are corrupted by pride. Yes, they are often acting from 
wrongful motives for wrongful ends when they discourse one with another. But that is, 
Morus, says, the way it is, and the essential thing for a would-be advisor to recognize is his 
own place in public affairs and what he can realistically accomplish. Morus then offers an 
image of Raphael’s outlook that carries greater and greater meaning as this conversation 
proceeds. He tells Hythlodaeus that he should not abandon the commonwealth just because 
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he cannot remake it entirely and then reinforces this idea with an image that must have stung: 
“non… in tempestate navis destituenda est quoniam ventos inhibere non possis” (“In a storm, 
a ship should not be abandoned just because you cannot control the winds” (96). Here Morus 
is pointing clearly at the most significant flaw in Raphael’s thinking, that he refuses to 
recognize his own limitations. Since Raphael is indisputably a sailor, moreover, and has 
presumably weathered more storms than Morus, the king’s “oratorem,” it borders on being an 
insult, as if Morus were rebuking Hythlodaeus for not having learned more about life from 
the trade he has practiced for so long (40). What makes this comment so pointed, though, is 
that it contains an obvious allusion to the story of Jesus calming the winds and the sea, as told 
in Matthew 8 and Mark 4. Morus is asserting to the dreamer-philosopher that he cannot effect 
such great change as he seems to think he can. He is not Jesus. And because he is not Jesus, 
he needs to realize what he can genuinely accomplish and commit himself to those 
accomplishments for the good of the commonwealth (96). The outlook expressed in Morus 
here and passim is always an unpretentious looking out for the good of others and the state as 
a whole.  
 Morus has one further point. He advises Hythlodaeus that he should not take on 
princes and their advisors so directly and with such little tact, “sed obliquo ductu conandum 
est atque adnitendum tibi uti pro tua virili omnia tractes commode, et quod in bonum nequis 
vertere efficias saltem ut sit quam minime malum” (“But by an indirect course you must try 
and even strive with all your strength to manage everything tactfully, and what you are not 
able to turn to good you should at least make as little bad as possible”) (96). This indirect 
course of action Morus not only exemplifies in his periphrastic verbs, which, 
characteristically, elide the person who is doing the action, but also justifies by an oblique 
appeal to Jesus, this time to his second coming, “nam ut omnia bene sint fieri non potest, nisi 
omnes boni sint, quod ad aliquot abhinc annos adhuc non exspecto” (“For that all things 
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should be good cannot happen unless all people become good, and this I do not expect [to 
happen] for some years from now”) (96). Owing, perhaps, to what Raisch explains as More’s 
desire to have Greek themes dominate his work, he holds off naming the time when all 
people will become good, but the allusion is still there (931-932). No pagan would have gone 
on to add the clause “quod ad aliquot abhinc annos adhuc non exspecto,” and yet it makes 
sense within the Christian worldview that is clearly shared by these three interlocutors. 
Hence, Morus is once again advising Hythlodaeus to accept his limitations and to recognize 
that the only person who might bring about the sort of change he is constantly advocating for 
is a divine person.  
 In his response to Morus, Hythlodaeus betrays the extent of his egoism and the pride 
that is so characteristic of philosophers, in the thinking of Thomas More. Rather than 
focusing on Morus central appeal to him to try to do as much good as possible for others 
through his experience and intelligence, Raphael, again characteristically, focuses on how 
such a tack would affect him individually and how it simply cannot agree with his own 
conception of himself “vera loqui,” “speaking the truth,” “hac… arte nihil fieret aliud quam 
ne dum aliorum furori mederi studeo ipse cum illis insaniam. nam si vera loqui volo talia 
loquar necesse est. ceterum falsa loqui sitne philosophi nescio; certe non est meum” (“By this 
art of yours nothing else would come about other than that while I am trying to heal the 
madness of others I myself will go mad with them. If I indeed wish to speak the truth, I must 
say things of this sort. Moreover, whether it is the part of the philosopher to speak false 
things I don’t know, [but I know] it’s certainly not my part”) (96-98). In just 35 Latin words, 
Hythlodaeus manages to refer directly to himself no less than seven times, and his deafness to 
or ignorance of the points Morus has just made shows that he cannot look outside himself for 
a justification to give himself over to political work. When he does look at others, 
furthermore, all he can see are the folly and the pride that his magical island of Utopia not so 
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unpredictably is able to quash, and then he sees himself again in outstanding contrast to 
everyone else. Here in this passage, for instance, he presents himself not as a mere advisor, 
but as a eager healer, “mederi studeo,” who is needed because the others “aliorum” he 
encounters have all gone made. This reference may reveal that Hythlodaeus was listening 
very closely to Morus. In particular, he heard Morus say that he was not Jesus, and so in his 
response Hythlodaeus sets out to correct that obvious misperception. He is very much like 
Jesus, Raphael suggests, in that he heals those who are raving mad and restores them to 
sanity, or he would, at least, if they would listen to him.  
 Hythlodaeus is most like Jesus in his teachings, or so he suggests as his speech 
proceeds. First, Hythlodaeus discusses how he points out the straight and narrow way to those 
who are on the broad road to destruction, just as Jesus does in Matthew 7. Hythlodaeus puts 
this idea in a way, contrary to Jesus’s, that highlights both the folly of those on the path to 
destruction and his own prudence in trying to correct them: “quod ad eos qui statuissent 
secum ruere diversa via praecipites, iucundus esse non potest qui revocet ac praemonstret 
pericula” (“The one who recalls those who have resolved to rush recklessly down a 
dangerous path and points out the dangers [of their course] cannot be likeable to them” (98). 
That I am not merely stretching this allusion to fit it to my own reading is evinced by what 
Hythlodaeus says next. After implying that what makes his own doctrines seem so strange is 
mere custom, he asserts, “si omittenda sunt omnia tamquam insolentia atque absurda 
quaecumque perversi mores hominum fecerunt ut videri possint aliena, dissimulemus oportet 
apud Christianos pleraque omnia quae Christus docuit” (“If we were to exclude all the 
arrogant and nonsensical things the twisted customs of human beings have made seem alien 
to us, we would have to ignore almost all the things Christ taught”) (98). So, princes and their 
advisors ignore Hythlodaeus, just as the Jewish leaders ignored Jesus, not because he is 
wrong and they can prove him so, but because custom blinds them to the truth of what he is 
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saying. Hythlodaeus presses this identification of himself with Christ more than once. In the 
same vein as his argument above, Hythlodaeus says that the greater part of Christ’s teachings 
“ab istis moribus longe est alienior quam mea fuit oratio” (“is far more distant from those 
[common] customs than was my speech” (98). Then, in yet another instance of Raphael 
characterizing himself positively by negatively characterizing others, he explains that no one 
recognizes the strangeness of Christ’s teaching because preachers in general, “contionatores,” 
have accommodated it to the culture in which they preach, adjusting the demands of Christ 
conveniently to make them fit how people actually live (98). This accommodation, says 
Hythlodaeus, is the only reason the shocking teachings of Jesus have made their way as far as 
they have into the European bloodstream. His teachings too, and in particular his vision of a 
people living at peace in a kingdom established for the good of all, also be realizable in the 
world if only those in power would throw off the yoke of custom and listen to him.     
 What is to be made of a character who holds in contempt all princes, all their advisors, 
even all the poor preachers of Europe, as madmen and liars? And what if this same character 
should liken his teachings, his potential activity in the world, and his rejection by others to no 
less a figure than Jesus Christ? And what if, as a justification for making all these 
proclamations, he should ground his authority for his teachings on his claim that he lived for 
more than five years on a faraway island named “Nowhere,” where all the ideas he had been 
advocating for were entirely realized by a morally superior people (104)? This is, in fact, the 
Hythlodaeus given to the readers, and it is essential to note that, although he presents many of 
his radical ideas from the very beginning of the dialogue, his ultimate grounding for the truth 
of those ideas rests in his experience of the island of Utopia, as he tells Morus near the end of 
the first book (104). At this point in the work, Hythlodaeus has several times mentioned the 
necessity of a community sharing all things in common in order to function well and morally 
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(102). Morus finally responds to this assertion by saying, in essence, that he simply cannot 
imagine a state of affairs working out in practice. Raphael’s response is crucial:  
Non miror… sic videri tibi, quippe cui eius imago rei, aut nulla succurrit, aut falsa. 
verum si in Utopia fuisses mecum, moresque eorum atque instituta vidisses praesens, 
ut ego feci, qui plus annis quinque ibi vixi, neque umquam voluissem inde discedere, 
nisi ut novum illum orbem proderem, tum plane faterere, populum recte institutum 
nusquam alibi te vidisse quam illic. 
I’m not surprised it seems thus to you, especially because you have either no image or 
else a false one of [such a] state. But if you had been with me in Utopia and had seen 
in person their customs and institutions – as I my did, living there for more than five 
years, nor would I ever have wanted to leave that place except that I [wished] to 
reveal that new world – then you would have confessed openly that you had nowhere 
else seen a people rightly governed besides there. (104) 
This passage is another one of those places that takes the reader right into the beating heart of 
More’s Utopia, at least insofar as its narrator is concerned. Here Hythlodaeus makes an 
argumentative move that, as Sylvester has shown and I will discuss shortly, he makes time 
and again when he wishes to authorize his teachings: he appeals to an experience he had 
while travelling, of which experience he is the only witness and which is, of course, not 
reproducible. Surtz has pointed out the peculiarity of this move,  
Hythlodaeus’ answer [to Morus] is practical, not theoretical. He points to the res, the 
reality: Utopia, a supremely successful communistic state. As a philosopher, he 
should have met More’s objections on the theoretical level. A philosopher does not 
solve the problem of Achilles and the tortoise by walking” (382). 
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This appeal, therefore, in which Hythlodaeus emphasizes the character of his experience in 
contrast to Morus lack of experience, points up his weakness as a philosopher. This weakness 
is pointed indeed, as More has the would-be philosopher strongly accentuating the first-
person nature of his evidence when he says  “ut ego feci,” “as I myself did,” for the use of 
“ego” here is entirely unnecessary except to accent the person who had the experience. Morus 
may be a learned and capable administrator, he suggests, but he lacks the experience and 
therefore the imagination to see what is truly best in governing. Ultimately, this is the sole 
source of Raphael’s authority to be a critic and guide to Europe. 
A Judas and a New Ulysses  
 Even as he has Hythlodaeus making his most blatant appeal for authority, the author 
More further undermines him or a least calls him into question through his language. The 
most interesting term Hythlodaeus uses in this attempt to authorize himself comes when he 
tells why he left the island of Utopia: “ut novum illum orbem proderem” (“to make that new 
world known”) (104). The Latin verb “prodere” has as its basic meaning, “to put something 
forth,” “to exhibit,” or even “to produce” something. Hence, it may simply mean, as I have 
translated it above, “to reveal” something or “to make something known.” This is probably 
the sense in which Hythlodaeus means the term, as he here likens himself unambiguously to 
the noble philosopher from Plato’s Republic who, having escaped the cave of shadows and 
seen by the light of the sun, nevertheless returns to the world of darkness to liberate those 
who sit chained in the gloom (514-517). But the verb “prodere” has other strong senses. It is 
often related to “offspring,” something that one has “produced” or given birth to. Hence, in 
the Aeneid, Jove says that Aeneas is supposed to “genus alto a sanguine Teucri/ proderet” 
(“produce a race from Teucer’s high blood”) (230-231). The verb “prodere,” then, contrary to 
Raphael’s claims, may suggest that the island of Utopia has sprung from the mind of 
Hythlodaeus in the heat of argument like Athena from the mind of Zeus. An even more 
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common meaning of the verb “prodere,” though, is “to betray” someone or something. This 
meaning of the word is attested throughout the Latin literature, but nowhere perhaps so 
memorably, especially for someone like Thomas More, as in the Vulgate, where this word is 
often applied to Judas Iscariot as the “proditor” or “betrayer” of Jesus. Consider, for instance, 
Mark 14:10, which reads, “et Judas Iscariotes, unus de duodecim, abiit ad summos sacerdotes 
ut proderet eum illis” (“And Judas Iscariot, one of the twelve, went away to the high priests 
in order to betray him [Jesus] to them.” Perhaps, then, as I argue below, the author More is 
suggesting that Hythlodaeus has in some way betrayed the island of Utopia. Whether the 
author is suggesting that Hythlodaeus invented the island or in some sense betrayed it, 
however, the nuances to this verb again raise the question of Raphael’s honesty. More might 
have easily chosen a different, less ambiguous verb to intimate Raphael’s relation to the 
island of Utopia. His choice of “prodere” hints that, in this most essential expression of 
Raphael’s mission statement, more is going on than the narrator intends.  
 In the second chapter of this study, I considered some of the different ways More 
likens or associates his narrator Hythlodaeus to the figure of Ulysses. Like Ulysses, 
Hythlodaeus has travelled the known and the unknown world and has seen many wondrous 
things in those travels. Like Ulysses, Hythlodaeus returns telling a marvelous story. But, also 
like Ulysses, Hythlodaeus is the sole witness to what he saw, not because he alone survived 
his journey, presumably, but because he and his companions have long since parted ways. 
More importantly, More links Hythlodaeus, albeit tangentially, to Ulysses through the 
“cercopithecus,” and he has Petrus Aegidius explicitly liken Raphael to Ulysses, only to 
quickly correct himself and change the comparison to Plato (42-44). The Ulysses to which 
More likens Raphael in various ways throughout Utopia is not so much the heroic figure of 
the Odyssey, but the liar and conman of Juvenal’s satires. Juvenal, though, is not the only 
Greco-Roman writer to present Ulysses as a phony. Lucian also presents an Odysseus of this 
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sort in A True Story. Now, A True Story is not a work of Lucian that either More or Erasmus 
translated for their collection, but a good case can be made that More would have been 
familiar with it. First, it is likely that More and Erasmus chose not to translate this work of 
Lucian’s because it was already so popular. C.R. Thompson has argued that, if one 
determines the popularity of a dialogue by the number of times it was printed, Lucian’s A 
True Story was at the top of the list, noting that A True Story had been published in Latin four 
times before 1499 (858, 868). Thompson also demonstrates, citing evidence from Erasmus’s 
letters, that at least Erasmus had read A True Story by 1499 (868). It is difficult to imagine the 
Dutchman not enthusing over this book to his English friend at some point in their work 
together on Lucian. Brian O’Brien, whose methods are more in keeping with my own, has 
shown some of the various ways in which More’s Utopia seems to be drawing on Lucian’s A 
True Story (17, 196, 207, 230, 241). With what I add to this evidence below, it seems quite 
safe to assume that More had read and understood A True Story.  
 Lucian’s A True Story is, first and foremost, a travel narrative about an unnamed 
narrator who, intellectually curious and eager for adventure, sets off westward with a ship and 
crew. On their journey, he narrator and his fellow sailors have some of the strangest 
experiences recorded in literature, including sex with women made of vines, a trip to the 
moon, two years inside the belly of a whale, a visit to the Island of the Blessed, and many 
adventures besides. What is perhaps most striking about the entire work, however, is what the 
narrator says in the proem to his work before he gets into the adventure proper. Before he 
tells his story, the narrator frankly confesses that his story is an outright lie: “γράφω τοίνυν 
περὶ ὧν μήτε εἶδον μήτε ἔπαθον μήτε παρ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπυθόμην, ἔτι δὲ μήτε ὅλως ὄντων μήτε 
τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι δυναμένων. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μηδαμῶς πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς” 
(“And so I am writing about things I have not seen or experienced or learned from others, 
things which, indeed, that do not and even cannot exist. Therefore, whoever reads this should 
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in no way believe it”) (4). The narrator relates that he learned this style of storytelling from 
writers like Ctesias, who wrote much nonsense about India, a place he had never visited 
himself nor even heard reliable reports about, and Iambulus, who wrote many unbelievable 
things about places in the far sea (3). Many other writers, the narrator goes on, have written 
fanciful stories about travels to far off places, telling about imaginary beasts, wicked people, 
and, significantly, “βίων καινότητας,” “strange ways of life” (3).  
 The narrator then gives what he takes to be the ultimate source of these sorts of travel 
narratives in a passage which I mentioned earlier but which is so essential that I will now 
give it in full:   
ἀρχηγὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ διδάσκαλος τῆς τοιαύτης βωμολοχίας ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου 
Ὀδυσσεύς, τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀλκίνουν διηγούμενος ἀνέμων τε δουλείαν καὶ 
μονοφθάλμους καὶ ὠμοφάγους καὶ ἀγρίους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους, ἔτι δὲ πολυκέφαλα ζῷα 
καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ φαρμάκων τῶν ἑταίρων μεταβολάς, οἷα πολλὰ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς ἰδιώτας 
ἀνθρώπους τοὺς Φαίακας ἐτερατεύσατο. 
Their leader and a teacher of this sort of silliness is Homer’s Odysseus, when he tells 
to the members of Alkinous’s court stories about the servitude of winds and one-eyed 
creatures and cannibals and certain savage people, and about many-headed animals 
and how his companions were transformed [into different creatures] through magic 
drugs. That man [Odysseus] wowed the Phaiakans with many things of this kind. (3) 
After reading accounts like those of Odysseus, Ctesias, and Iambulus, the narrator says he 
was not angry because they told lies, for, and signaling clearly that Lucian is the author of 
this text, even philosophers are fond of lying (4). It was not the others’ fondness for lying that 
provoked the narrator to pen his own fantastical travel narrative, but to see if he could be as 
successful a liar as they were and even surpass their performances by stating that he would at 
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least be honest about the fact that he was lying (4). These passages and the general logic of 
Lucian’s proem, much like Juvenal’s satirical depiction of Ulysses, provide a good 
explanation for why Petrus Aegidius is so reluctant to identify Raphael with Ulysses when he 
is introducing the Portuguese seafarer to Morus: Ulysses is the first in a long line of mariners 
from the literary tradition to return home with stories of his travels that are scarcely 
believable.  
 When he made his own contribution to what would nowadays be called the fictional 
universe of Utopia, the historical Peter Giles played with this association and even furthered 
it to imply that Raphael Hythlodaeus belongs in the tradition of Ulysses, Ctesius, and 
Iambulus. In his brilliant letter to Busleyden, Giles takes on the persona of Petrus Aegidius, 
pretending that he was actually there when Hythlodaeus was holding forth and that he greatly 
honors this adventurer, but, just like More and Lucian, Giles keeps his tongue firmly in his 
cheek as he is writing and undermines Raphael when he most seems to be supporting him. 
After telling to Busleyden that he was present at the meeting between Morus and 
Hythlodaeus, Giles, or Petrus, says that it was   
facile appareret eum non ea referre, quae narrantibus aliis didicisset, sed quae 
comminus hausisset oculis, et in quibus non exiguum tempus esset versatus, homo 
mea quidem sententia, regionum, hominum, et rerum experientia vel ipso Ulysse 
superior, et qualem octingentis hisce annis nusquam arbitrer natum, ad quem collatus 
Vespucius nihil vidisse putetur.  
readily apparent that he [Hythlodaeus] was not reporting things he had heard from 
others, but things he had in person taken in with his very own eyes and spent no little 
time [observing]. [He is] a man, at least in my opinion, [who] is superior to Ulysses in 
his knowledge of places, people, and human affairs, such a man, I judge, as has not 
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been born in the last eight hundred years, in comparison with whom Vespucci may be 
thought to have seen nothing. (24) 
If one takes this statement as coming from the mouth of Petrus Aegidius, it is merely praise 
of the sort he lavishes on Hythlodaeus in his description to Morus. Recognizing, however, 
that Giles was very much in on More’s game and was, arguably, its next most significant 
player, one can see that in this passage he is indulging in hyperbole and embellishment of the 
most palpable sort. But Peter Giles apparently lacked Thomas More’s sophistication as a 
writer. His hints to the reader are much more transparent, as when he writes, later in the same 
letter, “et hercule crediderim Raphaelem ipsum minus in ea insula vidisse per omne 
quinquennium quod illic egit, quam in Mori descriptione videre liceat” (“And, by heaven, I 
believe that Raphael himself saw less on that island in the five years he spent there than one 
is able to see in More’s description”) (24-26). One is able to discern something of More’s 
own intentions from this sort of heavy-handed attempt on the part of Giles to imitate him and 
play along.  
 The first thing to note is how Giles overdoes the hyperbole where More would be 
much subtler. Hence, when Giles goes to emphasize what Hythlodaeus will emphasize about 
himself later in the narrative, that he himself saw the island and its workings with his own 
eyes, Giles does so clumsily, piling on unrelated terms that evidently laugh and point at the 
notion that Hythlodaeus saw anything himself, “comminus hausisset oculis,” “he had drunk it 
all down with his eyes in close contact” with the Utopians. This awkward translation gets at 
the awkwardness of Giles’s Latin, as he mixes at least three metaphors to call attention to and 
poke fun at the idea that Hythlodaeus saw anything himself. And then there is the strange 
description of Raphael as the greatest man born in the last eight hundred years. Surtz 
addresses the befuddlement this seemingly precise number has caused and can only 
hypothesize that Giles means it to stand in for “a large quantity” (280). Because, though, 
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Giles’s wink is so affected, one ought to be suspicious of his comparison of Hythlodaeus to 
Ulysses and then to Vespucci. I have said enough in this study to explain why the comparison 
to Ulysses is not at all favorable, especially in this obviously tongue-in-cheek account. The 
association with Vespucci is equally unfavorable, and it is brought up more often (24, 44, 
46). As Baker-Smith explains, More knew that, of the four voyages Amerigo Vespucci 
claimed to have made to the New World, “the first was a hoax,” and so for Giles “to include 
in the comparison [with Ulysses] Amerigo Vespucci, with whom Raphael sails to the New 
World, suggests that Giles, like More, knew that at least some of his claimed travels were a 
hoax” (2500, 2532). Ackroyd is even more critical about the implications of associating 
Hythlodaeus with Vespucci:  
By the time Utopia was being composed… the voyages of Vespucci to the New 
World were dismissed as fabrication or as mendacious attempts to acquire glory… in 
the first and second decades of the sixteenth century… the manifold inconsistencies 
and incoherencies in Vespucci’s supposed account led most people to suppose that he 
was a boastful liar… So for Hythlodaeus to be described as the constant companion 
on his travels was in no sense a compliment. It might even imply that the island of 
Utopia was his own invention. (174-175)  
Giles’s hyperbole and comparison of Raphael Hythlodaeus, therefore, to two infamous 
seafarers with dubious reputations make the question of Raphael’s honesty of the utmost 
importance to this study, especially since a dishonest Hythlodaeus, who is both a philosopher 
and a mariner and thus, conceivably, a liar twice over, would fit so well within a Lucianic 
aesthetic. What evidence is there, then, that Hythlodaeus is less than trustworthy? 
 Considerable evidence, to be sure. First and foremost, of course, are the metatextual 
signals More sends his readers through his naming of people and places. McCutcheon 
 Verhine 124 
 
provides a helpful reminder of how More has crafted the names of things in this most crafty 
of works: “We know how cunningly More named the persons and places in Utopia, creating a 
paradoxical best- place, no-place where the chief city is a phantom, the river waterless, and 
the ruler without a people” (21). Perhaps the simplest example mentioned by McCutcheon 
that gets across what More was about with his name-game is the name of the main river on 
the island of Utopia. The word “Anydros,” is a coinage from ancient Greek that means 
“without water” or “waterless.” U-topia, then, is a “no-place” with a river that has no water, 
pointing for the learned to the obvious fact that Utopia nowhere exists. Likewise, the name of 
the principal speaker in Utopia, Hythlodaeus, is variously translated to mean something like 
“well-learned in nonsense” or “nonsense-peddler” or, my favorite, “narrator of nonsense” 
(Kinney 430, McCutcheon 21, Rudat 41, Sylvester 283). Wolfgang E.H. Rudat contends that, 
if More had not named his principal speaker “expert in nonsense,” it would be unfair to 
associate Raphael17 with the liar Ulysses from the Greco-Roman tradition (41). If 
Hythlodaeus had a more neutral name, one would probably want to follow Adams, says 
Rudat, in seeing this as a positive association with a “man who learns from travelling” (41). 
Since Hythlodaeus has this name, however, Rudat maintains that the reader is fully justified 
in seeing the nastier Ulysses superimposed onto the Portuguese sailor, the Ulysses who is 
false, an unsuccessful traveler and unnecessary risk-taker, and “socially irresponsible both to 
his men and to his family at home” (42). All of these descriptions apply equally well to 
Hythlodaeus, Rudat maintains, and they are authorized mainly through the ironic name More 
assigns to his lead character. This technique of naming is yet another technique More picked 
up from Lucian, as James Romm explains, “More's model for this catch-me-if-you-can 
 
17 I should also note that just as the name “Hythlodaeus” clearly undermines the authority of the narrator, so too 
does his first name, even if he is meant to be named after the angel. Elizabeth McCutcheon has made this case in 
her convincing “Thomas More, Raphael Hythlodaeus, and the Angel Raphael,” which concludes that More is 
presenting Hythlodaeus as the angelic guide ironically and that his “vision” is “a tall tale” (21, 38). It is not the 
case, then, that the name “Raphael” somehow balances out or redeems the surname.    
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etymological game was undoubtedly Lucian, and in particular the one Lucianic work which 
peers out from behind Utopia's ironic veils at every turn, the Vera Historia [i.e. A True 
Story]” (180). Through the technique of signaling meaning to his more learned readers 
through etymological play, More first suggests that Hythlodaeus may need to be handled with 
care.  
 Another textual detail that suggests Raphael’s tendency towards falsehood occurs 
when he is relating the incident with the “cercopithecus,” Hythlodaeus himself says that he 
was setting out on his “fourth” (“quarto”) journey with Vespucci (180). This small detail 
should induce significant suspicions in any reader who knows, as Baker-Smith points out, 
that the first of Vespucci’s journeys was known by More to be a fabrication. When he is 
talking to Morus about Hythlodaeus before introducing them, Petrus Aegidius more plausibly 
reports of Raphael that “in tribus posterioribus illarum quattuor navigationum quae passim 
iam leguntur perpetuus eius comes fuit” (“he was his [Vespucci’s] constant companion on the 
last three of his four journeys, which are now read everywhere”) (44). Petrus is the only 
character who can be right on this point, so that means that Hythlodaeus is either misspeaking 
or lying when he says that he travelled with Vespucci on four separate journeys. In either 
case, he is unreliable. Another of his statements that seems highly questionable, even 
assuming that he is telling the truth about the island of Utopia, is when he explains why he 
ever left the island. Kinney goes so far as to put this question together with Raphael’s current 
location, Antwerp: “Beneath and beyond this, however, we must ask why Hythlodaeus is in 
Antwerp, then headquarters of international commerce and banking, the center of the world’s 
capitalism; we are tempted also to ask why he left Utopia” (430). Of course, Hythlodaeus 
does give an explicit answer to this question; as discussed above, he says that he would never 
have wished to leave except to “reveal” (or “create” or “betray”) the new world in Europe. 
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This statement, though, defies belief once one has finished reading Raphael’s account of the 
island of Utopia and tries to imagine him living on that island for five years or more.  
 Recall again that pivotal passage in which Hythlodaeus explains to Morus and Petrus 
how he distributed his familial inheritance so that he would be free from his friends and 
family and could simply live as he pleased (50). Recall his vehement resistance throughout 
the first book to ever putting himself in “servitude,” as he terms it, to some king or prince 
(50). Recall that Hythlodaeus is so fiercely independent that he is willing to flout religious 
convention and risk dying without last rites in order to go where he wants to go (44-46). Now 
consider this account of Utopian society from Hanan Yoran, who leans hard on Stephen 
Greenblatt’s darker depiction of this society in Renaissance Self-Fashioning: 
Utopia regulates the most minute details of its citizens’ lives: their free time… the 
garments they wear… the games they play… their sitting place in the common dining 
halls… Even in the few cases in which deviation from routine is formally permitted, it 
is either informally prevented—as when citizens are deterred from eating at home, 
“because it is not thought proper”… - or accompanied with numerous prerequisites 
and restrictions, such as the restraints on traveling. (8) 
Perhaps the greatest irony in all of Utopia is that Hythlodaeus in speech after speech praises a 
place one could never imagine him wanting to live. If he were to become a Utopian citizen, 
that would be the end of his exploring: he would never leave the island. He would be a farmer 
and a craftsman, and, if he wanted to travel to another Utopian city, he would have to get a 
letter from his governor to do so (144). If he ignored this mandate, he could be corporally 
punished and even enslaved (144). If he merely wanted to stroll about his own region he 
could, with his father’s and his wife’s permission, but he would not receive food from anyone 
until he had put in a full day’s work (144). It is difficult to imagine how the free-ranging 
 Verhine 127 
 
mariner would handle these conditions, but one can safely assume that they would chafe 
against his nature. Perhaps, then, this is merely an irony of the work, or, more likely, it is that 
classic, Lucianic case of the philosopher who presses onto others norms and standards that he 
himself does not and could not live up to. My own inclination is towards the latter 
supposition, but that can only come fully clear once I have shown all the evidence against 
Raphael’s trustworthiness.  
 Many of the supposed “facts” of his narrative also tell against Raphael’s credibility. 
Kinney is fond of pointing out how the shape of Utopia is an impossible, if suggestive, shape:   
The island also images Luna which for More's day shone with borrowed, not original 
light and signified inconstancy and minor misfortune. Beyond that, Hythlodaeus' 
account is in factual error: if there is indeed a crescent shape and an inner bay, then 
the greatest breadth of land must be substantially less than the diameter of the 
circumference, or approximately 160 miles… Thomas More, close friend of the 
mathematician Cuthbert Tunstal, would surely know that.  
Alan F. Nagel has come to the same conclusion about the shape of the island, but he shows 
his work and makes a good case that More simply could not have made this mistake himself 
(176). This must either mean, as with the detail about his fourth journey, that Hythlodaeus is 
simply wrong in the information he is dispensing, gullible in accepting what others have told 
him, or simply making up his narrative – not to mention bad at basic geometry, which one 
would not expect of a sailor. In support of the ideas that he is gullible or simply false is much 
of his account of the island’s site and founding. This account seems legendary at more than 
one point. First, there is Utopus himself, the founder of Utopia, who, the listener is asked to 
believe, conquered the land of Utopia, which was not at that time an island, and then labored 
to make its citizens the most humane and sophisticated people the world has yet to see (110). 
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That no conqueror in human history has ever acted so benevolently towards a conquered 
people does not slow Hythlodaeus down. He goes on to tell how, in order to accomplish his 
benevolent wishes towards the Utopians, Utopus separated them from other lands by having a 
channel cut “passuum milia quindecim qua parte tellus continenti adhaesit” (“15 miles in 
width where the land joined the continent”) (110). As the Cambridge editors note, this is a 
clear allusion to Roman attempts to construct a comparable, though much smaller, channel in 
the Isthmus of Corinth, a task that even the Roman empire under Nero could not complete 
(111 n.4). The notion that Utopus could have completed this task with the help of the Utopian 
natives and his soldiers is unthinkable. 
 Then again, Hythlodaeus also believes that the Utopians are an unusually strong 
people. He tells at one point in his narrative how the Utopian “populi manibus alibi radicitus 
evulsam silvam alibi consitam” (“people, with their hands, tore up a forest by the roots and 
placed it elsewhere”) (178). O’Brien says of this incident,  
As if to remind us of the Lucianic provenance of Hythloday, More… inserts a detail 
worthy of A True History: in order to have wood close to seas, rivers and cities, the 
Utopians have uprooted whole forests and transplanted them. Hythloday utters this 
without a hint of irony on his part, and we are reminded that the reality of this ideal 
state is purely fictional, that not everything in it is to be taken seriously. (230) 
While he is making them laugh, therefore, More is asking his readers to note the folly of 
much of what Hythlodaeus has to say. Even if many of his ideas are appealing to readers, as 
they are bound to be, More seems to want those same readers to recognize not merely the 
fictional quality of the work as a whole, but that Hythlodaeus himself, who otherwise can 
seem such a fair critic of Christian Europe, is the fabricator of these fictions. More even goes 
so far in this regard as to make it clear in one of his letters, where he is posing as Morus, that 
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he is smart enough (“non sum tam stupidus”) to understand that the names Hythlodaeus 
assigns to things, like Utopia, Anyder, Amaurot, and Ademus, are “barbaris illis… nominibus 
et nihil significantibus” (“are barbarous names signifying nothing”) (268). The only reason he 
kept these names, he insists, is that he was acting as a historian and so trying to keep faith 
with his source, Raphael Hythlodaeus. That this claim itself is a fiction which the author 
More is overseeing does not change the fact that, within the fictional world of Utopia, More 
and Giles are always insistent that the account they are transmitting derives in full from the 
narrator of nonsense. 
 What most betrays Hythlodaeus as a liar, though, is how he argues with others. In 
what I consider to be a decisive essay on the interpretation of Utopia, Richard Sylvester has 
shown that the argumentative moves Hythlodaeus makes are profoundly questionable. He 
takes his lead and the title of his essay from the parerga, mainly the letter from Bude to 
Lupset, as he considers Bude to be one of the keener interpreters of More’s work:  
Twice Bude hedges his praise for Utopian institutions with the words ‘if we may 
believe Hythlodaeus’ (si Hythlodaeo credimus) or ‘if we may believe the story’… and 
he distinguishes carefully between Hythlodaeus, whom he calls ‘the real builder of the 
Utopian city,’ and Thomas More, who, as author, has adorned Hythlodaeus’ account 
with style and eloquence. (279-280) 
Everything depends, says Sylvester, on whether or not the reader may trust Raphael: “Not 
only is almost all of Book II presented, without direct comment, as Hythlodaeus’ speech, but 
he is also the driving force behind and the monopolizer of the conversation in Book I” (280). 
Since it is Book I that most patently reveals the character of Hythlodaeus to his interlocutors 
and readers, Sylvester focuses on this book and notes some interesting things about how 
Hythlodaeus argues with others. First, he points out that there are three “main moments” in 
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the first book, each of which is punctuated by Hythlodaeus telling a story to clinch his point. 
The first story he tells is historical, the second is hypothetical “yet tied to history by being set 
in France,” and the third is “totally imaginary, offered without reference to locality or to 
time” (284-285). Sylvester summarizes the progression thus: “Hythlodaeus’ argument, in 
other words, moves from a firm grasp on a past historical situation, to a hypothetical revision 
of contemporary history, to a totally aloof fabrication” (285). Moreover, as Sylvester is keen 
to point out, the point that Raphael is attempting to prove through all of these stories is that 
princes and their advisors would never listen to his advice, and so he is justified in declining 
such service. His first story, though, in which he relates his visit to England and his stay with 
Cardinal Morton in the summer of 1497, actually proves the opposite of his point, for 
Cardinal Morton listens intently to Hythlodaeus and even goes so far as to say that “it would 
be a good thing to try this system!” (285). Hence, Raphael’s one concrete, historical instance 
actually argues against the views he typically expresses about princes and their ineptness and 
deaf ears.  
 Sylvester then comes to what I take to be his most important insight: “in each of his 
three anecdotes he offers, to clinch his argument, not so much a rational analysis as an alien 
example” (285). By “alien example,” Sylvester means that Hythlodaeus cites places and 
peoples he which he alone has met on his travels, each of which is “farther and farther away 
from the known world,” as justifications that his seemingly impractical ideas can be put into 
practice (285). Thus, to argue that societies can thrive without a death penalty, Hythlodaeus 
cites the Polyerites, whose name means “a people of much nonsense” (70-72). Then, to argue 
against war-mongering, Hythlodaeus tells an anecdote from the history of the Achorians, 
whose name means “a people without a country” (86-88). Finally, to argue that no king 
should ever have too much wealth, Raphael cites a law of the Macarians, “the blessed or 
happy ones,” who tellingly “ipsi non longe admodum absunt ab Utopia” (“are not at all far 
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from the Utopians”) (94). The very progression of these lands takes the reader closer and 
closer to the island of Utopia while at the same time preparing the reader for the 
argumentative strategy that Hythlodaeus everywhere uses, that of justifying his seemingly 
unrealistic ideas as grounded in genuine experience and as based on real-life exemplars. 
Recall that this is precisely the tack he takes when he is arguing with Morus about the 
feasibility of a communalist society. Hythlodaeus first states his idea, “quamquam profecto, 
mi More (ut ea vere dicam quae meus animus fert), mihi videtur ubique privatae sunt 
possessiones, ubi omnes omnia pecuniis metiuntur, ibi vix umquam posse fieri ut cum 
republica aut iuste agatur aut prospere” (“And yet, my friend More, to tell you what I truly 
think, it seems to me that, everywhere possessions are held in private and everyone measures 
everything by money, it cannot come about that a state is governed either justly or 
prosperously” (100). Then his idea meets with Morus objection, “at mihi… contra videtur,” 
(“but it seems otherwise to me”) (104). And then Raphael plays the experience card, asserting 
to Morus that he cannot conceive of such a system working because he has never seen one in 
action (104). And so Book II begins, in which Hythlodaeus tells a massively larger anecdote 
about a country no one else has seen to justify his claim that a communist society can work in 
practice.  
 The sheer cunning of all this on Thomas More’s part, and this is not something that 
Sylvester discusses, is that the reader, especially the humanist reader, is so inclined to accept 
Raphael’s ideas because they accord so well with his own worldview that he can easily fail to 
notice how slippery Hythlodaeus really is. This, I think, is precisely what Thomas More 
wanted, for recall that he says in his letter to Ruthall that Lucian can train him and his 
contemporaries to reject stories or ideas piously inserted into Christian narratives that appeal 
to Christian sensibilities but that, ultimately, undermine the truth of Christianity. More has 
prepared his text to provoke readers to be critical – to probe even those ideas that are most 
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appealing – in order to see that those ideas come from a speaker and a psyche that is rather 
problematic. Hence, the suggestion must be, if those ideas and ideals appeal the reader, she 
should look closely into why. This is same lesson one finds in Lucian’s Philopseudes: 
numerous educated men and even the supposedly skeptical narrator himself are drawn to 
stories of miracle cures and marvelous sights so strongly that they lie to one another without 
seeming to be aware of it or to care to question themselves about the truth of what they are 
saying. More has set the same sort of trap that Lucian shows his own interlocutors caught up 
in, but he has also, like Lucian, built into his text another level of meaning that allows the 
reader to escape this trap.  
In the words of Sylvester, this is the trap More has set: “Book II [is] an extended 
image of Hythlodaeus’ own personality: Utopia enshrines his ideals and virtues” (286). And 
this is the recognition that frees one from the trap: “but it [Book II] also –and [Hythlodaeus] 
himself is completely unaware of this – hints at the defects in his thinking and at the moral 
flaws in his character” (286). What Sylvester does not do in his essay and what I have tried to 
do in this study are two things. First, he does not flesh out in any detail how Book II is “an 
extended image of Hythlodaeus’ own personality.” This task is one central thrust of this final 
chapter. Second, he does not get very far into the question of where Thomas More might have 
learned to write a dialogue like Utopia. Sylvester speculates that More might have learned his 
techniques from Chaucer, but quickly drops that suggestion and in a footnote focuses on how 
More might have learned from “the classics, especially Lucian and Horace” (281 n.15). It is 
here that Sylvester says, “Although Lucian's influence on More is highly probable, it too 
must be demonstrated through detailed criticism and not merely claimed as a most likely 
possibility (282 n.15). This has been the second central thrust of this chapter and the one that 
preceded it. One might well say, then, that this study is an attempt to flesh out the bones of 
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Sylvester’s perspective more fully and thereby to demonstrate how much light it sheds on the 
Utopia as a whole.  
That a need exists to defend Sylvester’s interpretation is evidenced in George M. 
Logan’s classic work, The Meaning of More’s Utopia. Logan’s work is useful to consider 
because he so clearly evinces the bias against interpreting Utopia as firmly in the tradition of 
Menippean satire and Lucian, especially when he expresses his austere scholarly disapproval 
of Sylvester’s reading and of the school of interpretation that sees Utopia as a “conscious and 
consistent work of satire” (6-7; see especially note 6). For Logan, More’s Utopia should be 
situated squarely within the tradition of European political writings and read as a work of 
political theory in conversation with other great works of political theory, not as a character 
study of a political theorist. Of course, Logan fails to mention that no one writing in the 
interpretive tradition which sees Utopia as primarily satire denies that it is a great work of 
political theory as well, not to mention a great work of societal critique, nor do Logan’s 
criticisms of this interpretive trend amount to more than acts of begging the question. He 
says, for instance, that one simply needs to read some of the soberer passages of Utopia 
alongside the writings of Lucian to see the clear difference between the two, betraying the 
apparent belief that satire must be everywhere riotous, absurdly funny, with sailors spending 
time in the bellies of whales and the like. The difference, Logan seems to think, between 
works of satire and works of political theory is always readily apparent. The problem with 
this idea, it seems to me, is that, although More clearly learned from Lucian, he was writing 
in a very different time for very different literary sensibilities, and so he does cut down on the 
absurdities in his narrative. Instead, then, of having trips to the moon, he has a people uproot 
a forest using only their hands. This is a difference of degree, not of kind. Moreover, Logan 
fails to bring up any of the passages in More’s Utopia that are frankly comical or absurd, like 
the story Hythlodaeus tells about the argument between the friar and the fool at Cardinal 
 Verhine 134 
 
Morton’s (78-80), Raphael’s ceaseless sarcasm against “lesser” men, the incident with the 
“cercopithecus,” and the several absurdities that I have considered above. More is doubtless 
subtler than Lucian, but that does not make his work the less satirical. It makes it, as Avery 
says, “the higher art” (233).   
So, Hythlodaeus is false. But how? What does that mean? Did he simply make up the 
island of Utopia? To further exhibit my understanding of Hythlodaeus, I would like to make a 
case that the text of Utopia provides some evidence that Hythlodaeus fabricated the people of 
Utopia from some genuine experience he had on his travels. Here and there in Utopia are 
hints of an experience quite different from the one Raphael relates to his interlocutors. It will 
be of use to consider one of those hints. When Hythlodaeus discusses the religions, and it is 
in the plural at first (“religionibus” and “religiones”), of the Utopians, his overall aim is to 
depict them as a people who, because they are so submissive to nature and reason, have 
developed a religion that is the perfect preparation for them to accept Christian revelation as 
truth, which they rapidly do (218 ff.). His account of how their own native religion naturally 
prepares them for Christianity is a part, it seems to me, of his overall argument that a people 
largely free from the grip of pride is able to conceive of the cosmos more correctly than those 
who, because of their money economy, live under the daily burdens that pride sets upon the 
shoulders of human beings to keep them from seeing the truth about invisible things. Hence, 
it is essential to Raphael’s whole purpose that in every aspect of life the Utopians seem not 
perfect but superior to Christian Europe. Hence, when one recalls the “religion” of the 
Utopians, and one does tend to think of it in the singular because of Raphael’s account, one 
thinks of a monotheistic people who believe firmly in the providence of God and in an eternal 
life of bliss or punishment after death, despite the fact that they are sort of Epicureans 
(Greenblatt 313).  
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But this final picture of the Utopian people is not what the beginning of Raphael’s 
account suggests will follow. It may be, furthermore, that the contrast between what 
Hythlodaeus says at the beginning of his account and what his account turns out to be opens 
up a space for the reader to see into something of the actual experience that lies behind the 
fabrication he foists upon Morus and Petrus. Here is how Hythlodaeus begins his account of 
the “religionibus Utopiensium:” “religiones sunt non per insulam modo verum singulas etiam 
urbes variae, aliis solem, lunam aliis, aliis aliud errantem siderum dei vice venerantibus. sunt 
quibus homo quispiam cuius olim aut virtus aut gloria enituit non pro deo tantum sed pro 
summo etiam deo suspicitur” (“There are diverse religions not only on the island [as a whole] 
but even in individual cities. Some worship the sun, others the moon, still others one of the 
wandering stars as God. Some take some man [or other] who once was renowned for his 
courage or glory not only as a god but even as the highest God”) (218). The gist of this 
beginning is that on the island of Utopia diversity is the rule in religion, just as one would 
expect of a pagan people who had never heard of Jesus Christ. This beginning reads very 
much like an ancient ethnographic account, such as the one Caesar gives of religion on the 
island of Britain in the sixth book of his Commentary on the Gallic Wars. The reader sits 
back and prepares to read of surprising religious traditions and customs set forth in a 
reasonably systematic fashion, but Hythlodaeus quickly turns the discussion with an abrupt 
“at,” (“But”) and there begins setting forth his account of a people whose religion makes 
them the perfect subjects for conversion to Christianity. That is, he completely drops this 
picture of religious pluralism and depicts a society that is suspiciously monotheistic and 
Christian in character, and he never looks back. My suggestion is that this may be a glimpse 
of the real natives he encountered that is essentially slipping out into his account, perhaps 
without his fully realizing it. It might even be that the real island to which he is referring had 
some monotheists on it. If that were the case, then what he does in his fabrication of Utopia is 
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less an invention of the island he visited than a betrayal of it, as I suggested when discussing 
the fact that Hythlodaeus uses the verb “proderem” to describe his act of communicating the 
ways and workings of this island to others. 
Dominic Baker-Smith provides evidence that might support this supposition both in 
an essay he wrote for the Cambridge Companion to Thomas More and in his translation and 
supplementary notes of Utopia. In his essay, Baker-Smith points out that Vespucci himself 
reported on natives from the New World who “preferred feathers to gold or pearls” (146). In 
the appendices of his translation of Utopia, Baker-Smith also includes an account of the New 
World, written by the Italian Peter Martyr d’Anghiera in 1511, five years before Utopia, that 
relates the voyages of Columbus and tells stories of natives who both believed in an afterlife 
and with whom  
the earth, like the sun and water, is common, nor do ‘mine and yours,’ the seeds of all 
evils, fall among them. For they are content with so little that in that vast earth there is 
an excess of land to farm rather than a lack of anything. Theirs is a golden age: they 
do not hedge their estates with ditches, walls, or hedges; they live with open gardens, 
without laws, without books, without judges; of their own nature they cultivate what 
is right (2418).  
One almost feels that Hythlodaeus himself is speaking here. At the least, d’Anghiera sounds 
like a Hythlodaeus in the making, “one of the first hippies,” as Sylvester says his students 
were fond of calling the Portuguese traveler when he speaks whimsically of the wondrous 
mellowness of the New World  (283). Perhaps, then, More the author, who may have read 
d’Anghiera’s account or others like it, is expecting that Hythlodaeus would have encountered 
on his many travels native peoples of the sorts he read about in accounts of Columbus’s and 
Vespucci’s travels, and he is suggesting that Hythlodaeus took those seeds and grew them, 
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again the verb “proderem” comes to mind, into a much more developed and well cultivated 
garden that would serve to decorate and finally substantiate the ideas he had about a 
moneyless, communal society. This is, of course, a largely speculative conclusion that I 
recognize as such, but it seems helpful to flesh out this idea in order to get a better sense of 
how Raphael’s thinking might work. 
A State of Mind  
 It is with the mind of Hythlodaeus that I would like to conclude this study. If, in fact, 
one of More’s central aims in Utopia was to create a Lucianic-style parody of a “philosophus 
gloriosus,” then what, exactly, has he given to his readers in Raphael Hythlodaeus, and why? 
Wooden and O’Brien maintain that Hythlodaeus is “a philosophus gloriosus, one in whom 
saeva indignatio has become a ruling passion, to the exclusion of other necessary qualities” 
(O’Brien 210). That is to say, in Hythlodaeus his indignation and his resentment towards the 
society he finds around him have come so to dominate him that he can only spill out his 
malice each time he speaks and will go to any lengths, including inventing peoples and 
places, to support his contentions, to make this malice seem as rational a response to the 
world as possible. I agree generally with this idea, but I hope to have shown in this chapter 
that More’s creation is even more complex than what Wooden and O’Brien suggest. To my 
mind, what mainly drives Hythlodaeus is not indignation, although he has a lot of that to 
share with others, but an almost maniacal autonomy and will to self-government most like the 
Cynic in Lucian’s own dialogue. In both dialogues, it is essential to note, both of the main 
speakers liken themselves to gods, the Cynic to the Greek gods whose statues he finds around 
him and Hythlodaeus to the radical Jesus whose teachings so conform to his own. This 
passionate insistence on his own autonomy drives Hythlodaeus to try to control the thinking 
of those around him every single time one finds him speaking (with the exception, perhaps, of 
the story he tells about the friar and the fool), just as he controlled his family’s claim on him 
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by distributing his patrimony among its members. His tendency to try to control the thinking 
of others is so deep-seated that he will go to any lengths to accomplish that goal. Ultimately, 
that is why the island of Utopia is what it is: it is a group of human beings behaving in 
precisely the measured ways that Hythlodaeus thinks they should. This move gives him 
psychological satisfaction, no doubt, but also a constant and unshakeable high ground from 
which to judge the lives of others and to win arguments. This is the same tendency one 
observes in Lucian’s Cynic, who is not so much concerned in the dialogue to live as he 
pleases as he is to harangue others about how they are living. It is, in fact, almost a constant 
in Lucian’s writings that whatever a character says, no matter how eloquently or appealingly 
put, it is motivated by some need or weakness in that character, which she or he is trying to 
manage through the use of language, either by trying to re-present the world in a more 
pleasing fashion, as is the case for Lucian’s learned men in Philopseudes, or by trying to 
control how others think about themselves, as is the case in Lucian’s Cynicus.  
 The point of fashioning this sort of character is most openly expressed in Lucian’s 
Necromantia: the inventions of a learned person, especially a philosopher, intended to tell 
others how to live or think should always be subjected to criticism and questioning in 
proportion as those inventions are the more appealing. This is because all humans, no matter 
how learned, are fundamentally flawed and therefore comical creatures. That they are 
comical does not mean that they are always amusing. It means that they are always 
preposterous in the etymological sense of that term, “prae-posterus,” “what is before coming 
after what is behind.” They are reversed. They are absurd. They are contrary to reason and 
sense, and so they cannot be corrected through sober directness. It is for this reason that the 
person who wishes to improve someone, and that is already a very questionable motive, must 
do so indirectly and with a sense of humor. This is the vision of Thomas More. It is for this 
reason that More corrected his porter by saying “that he should see the stocks mended and 
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locked fast, that the prisoner steal not in again” (9.119.16). And this is the reason he rendered 
Hythlodaeus such a complex figure: it is difficult to criticize someone whose opinions greatly 
appeal to one even when one senses that what motivates and buttresses those opinions is 
one’s own folly and the folly of the person issuing those opinions. Human folly, for More as 
for Erasmus, is both funny and susceptible to humorous correction, but this correction only 
comes about when people learn to think prudently about their lives and societies. Dominic 
Baker-Smith has argued that “one indubitable quality of Utopia is that it unsettles familiar 
attitudes and prompts acts of political imagination… Its goal is a state of mind rather than a 
specified state of society” (162). The familiar attitudes, the inheritance of custom, that More 
was trying to work against in Utopia were those habits of mind that, as he explains them to 
Ruthall, had led to the corruption of the Catholic Church in Europe. It was the thoughtless 
piety of a monk who wished to improve upon a story about a saint he loved by adding in a 
miracle or two. It was the carelessness of a person even so brilliant and learned as Augustine, 
who accepted an apocryphal tale without looking into the sources of that tale. It was the 
preacher who, to win some attention, told marvelous stories to the lay folk that only rendered 
them more gullible and superstitious. Ultimately, it was the unfounded belief that the Latin 
Vulgate was somehow magically the one text through which God might choose to speak. 
What was needed to resist those habits of mind, More thought, was the sort of skepticism that 
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